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Since the publication in 1823 by Mr. D. G. Lubé of his Princi-
ples of Equity Pleading that work has been recognized by the
profession as a standard treatise upon that subject. The two
generations of lawyers and judges who have come and gone since
Lubé wrote have contributed little to the art and science of equity
pleading, so that to_day Lubé’s work is the best in existence. In
this edition of the second part of his work the Editor has added
little to the text of importance and has omitted substantially noth-
ing. The only object he had in view in preparing this edition was

















































































































































Since the publication in 1823 by Mr. D. G. Lube of his Princi-
ples of Equity Pleading that work has been recognized by the 
profession as a standard treatise upon that subject. The two 
generations of lawyers and judges who have come and gone since 
Lube wrote have contributed little to the a~t and science of equity 
pleading, so that to-day Lube's work is the best in existence. In 
this edition of the second part of his work the Editor has added 
little to the text of importance and has omitted substantially noth-
ing. The only object he had in view in preparing this edition was 
to obtain a text suitable for the use of the student. 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 
October I, 1~. 
B. M. THOMPSON. 
PREFACE.
It has long been a subjectof reproach that the study of the
law has degenerated from a liberal and scientific pursuit into a
mere mechanical process of acquiring forms by dint of manual
labor at the desk. How far this general censure on the profession
may be just, we will not now stop to inquire; but this much we
may be permitted to observe, that they who would confine the edu-
cation of a lawyer to mere books, without affording the student the
advantages to be derived from the practice of an office; and those
who, on the other hand, recommend to have the pupil immersed in
all the details of business, without a previous competent knowledge
of the theory, would equally pursue a system erroneous and un-
profitable. “
Precision of language is so essential to law proceedings that the
change or omission of a word frequently frustrates the object in
view; and hence has arisen the custom of adhering to such forms
as experience has determined to be adequate. Without settled
forms the most extensive and profound acquaintance with the
theory could not secure the practicer against overlooking, in the
hurry of business, some point, or, perhaps, some phrase, important
to his case.* No general course of reading will ever suffice to draw
the attention to these minute, but necessary points, the knowledge
of which can be derived from practice alone in the ofiice of some
experienced guide who, in rectifying the errors and supplying the
omissions of the pupi1’s first efforts, can at the same time inform
him of the reasons and rules of law which suggest the propriety of
the alteration. This at once serves as an illustration of the theory
of the law, and impresses its maxims on the memory, and thus the
pupil gradually increases in confidence, until he feels himself com-
petent to enter the lists of the profession, and perform his duty to
his client with facility and dispatch. ,
On the other hand, to plunge the student at once. into all the
servile drudgery of copying precedents, and literally adhering to














































































































































It has long been a subject-of reproach that the study of the 
law has degenerated from a liberal and scientific pursuit into a 
mere mechanical process of acquiring forms by dint of manual 
labor at the desk. How far this general censure on the profession 
may be just, we will not now stop to inquire; but this much w.e 
may be permitted to observe, that they who would confine the edu .. 
cation of a lawyer to mere books, without affording the student the 
advantages to be derived from the practice of an office; and those 
who, on the other hand, recommend to have the pupil immersed in 
all the details of business, without a previous competent knowledge 
of the theory, would equally pursue a system erroneous and un-
profitable. 
Precision of language is so essential to law proceedings that the 
change or omission of a word frequently frustrates the object in 
view ; and hence has arisen the custom of adhering to such forms 
as experience has determined to be adequate. 'Vithout settled 
forms the most extensive and profound acquaintance with the 
theory could not secure the practicer against overlooking, in the 
hurry of business, some point, or, perhaps, some phrase, important 
to his case.* No general course of reading will ever suffice to draw 
the attention to these n1innte, but necessary points, the knowledge 
of which can be derived from practice alone in the office of some 
experienced guide who, in rectifying the errors and supplying the 
omissions of the pupil's first efforts, can at the same tin1e inform 
him of the reasons and rules of law which suggest the propriety of 
the alteration. This at once serves as an illustration of the theory 
of the la·w, and impresses its maxims on the memory, and thus the 
pupil gradually increases in confidence, until he feels himself com-
petent to enter the lists of the profession, and perform his duty to 
his client with facility and dispatch. 
On the other hand, to plunge the student at once. into all the 
servile drudgery of copying precedents, and literally adhering to 
*"Nihil simullnventum est, et perfectum." Co. Lltt. 230, a. 
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forms, the origin and meaning of which is seldom comprehended,
and frequently never investigated, is to begin at the wrong end, and
is certainly liable to all the animadversions cast upon that illiberal
mode of education which degrades one of the noblest and most
useful sciences into a narrow and insignificant art, and which has
given occasion to all the obloquy from time to time heaped on a
profession, thus requiring a very ordinary degree of capacity in the
acquisition. A man so trained may be an expert mechanic, but
can never be a sound lawyer. Besides, a system of this kind en-
feebles and contracts the mind, by bindfng it down to a timid and
obsequious subservance to the very syllable and letter of the form,
from which it durst not deviate because ignorant of its utility and
effect. Hence the worse than useless prolixity of deeds and other
law writings, and the accumulation of unnecessary phraseology
everywhere to be met with in the written proceedings. The student
who has gone through an ordeal of this kind, previous to his admis-
sion to the bar, comes out the “ leguleius cautus atque acutus aucepa
syllabarum cantor formularum.” But such a process of initiation is
abhorrent to the mind imbued with the taste of classic literature
and fresh from the spring of genuine science. The study of the
law, however, when properly pursued, is perfectly congenial to the
most enlightened intellect, connected as it is with ethics, legislation
and rhetoric.
If, as Mr. Locke has affirmed, morality be capable of demon
stration, a fortiori are the propositions of law, the terms of which
are precise and well defined, susceptible of proof. The laws of our
country, in fact, form a connected and well digested system of mu-
tually dependent rules, even to its minutest ramifications, and
those propositions which, when isolated, appear arbitrary, and
sometimes even attended with hardship, if traced to their source,
will be discovered as necessarily flowing from some fixed and just
principle of legislation. On this principle the following pages
attempt to pursue the course of the subject under investigation, up
to its fountain head, rather than track the several channels of its
divergence ; their design is more to point out the origin and ration-
ale of the rule, than to hunt after the shades of difference in its
application; “potius fontes expectere quam sectari rivulos.” By this
process of analytical research, the student will sometimes be sur-














































































































































forms, the origin and meaning of which is seldom comprehended, 
and frequently never investigated, is to begin at the wrong end, and 
is certainly liable to all the animadversions cast upon that illiberal 
mode of education whieh degrades one of the noblest and most 
useful sciences into a narrow and insignificant art, and which has 
given occasion to all the obloquy from time to time heaped on a 
profession, thus requiring a very ordinary degree of capacity in the 
acquisition. A man so trained m·ay be an expert mechanic, but 
can never he a sound lawyer. Besides, a system of this kind en-
feebles and contracts the n1ind, by bindfng it down to a timid and 
obsequious subservance to the very syllable and letter of the form, 
from which it durst not deviate because ignorant of its utility and 
effect. Hence the worse than useless prolixity of deeds and other 
law writings, and the accumulation of unnecessary phraseology 
everywhere to be met w·ith in the \Vritten proceedings. The student 
who has gone through an ordeal of this kind, previous to his admis-
sion to the bar, comes out the "leguleius cautus atque acutus auceps 
syllabarum cantor formularum." But such a process of initiation is 
abhorrent to the mind in1bued with the taste of classic literature 
and fresh from the spring of genuine science. The study of the 
law, however, when properly pursued, is perfectly congenial to the 
most enlightened intellect, connected as it is \vith ethics, legislation 
and rhetoric. 
If, as Mr. Locke has affirmed, morality be capable of demon 
stration, a jortior·i are the propositions of la\Y, the terms of which 
are precise and well defined, susceptible of proof. The laws of our 
country, in fact, form a connected and well digested system of mu-
tually dependent rules, even to its minutest ramifications, and 
those propositions which, when isolated: appear arbitrary, and 
sometimes even attended with hardship, if traced to their source, 
will be discovered as necessarily flowing from son1e fixed and just 
principle of legislation. On this principle the following pages 
attempt to pursue· the course of the subject under investigation, up 
to its fountain head, rather than track the several channels of its 
divergence; their design is more to point out the origin and ration-
ale of the rule, than to hunt after the shades of difference in its 
application; "potius jontes expectere quam sectari rivulos." By this 
process of analytical research, the student will sometimes be sur-
prised to find himself landed on a conclusion, by necessary infer-
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ence, which he may elsewhere meet with as an unsupported dictum,
or resting only on the authorfty of decision. Indeed, it seems to be
the prevalent fault of our law tracts that they heap together a mul-
titude of independenl rules, for the accuracy of which they are
contented to refer to the cases where they occur, without ever once
adverting to the grounds of their adoption; and the work is es-
teemed in proportion to the diligence with which cases are col-
lected, and to the number of references in the margin. This may
be abundantly useful, as the plan of a work of consultation, for the
benefit of such as are satisfied with point-learning, but cannot be
advantageous as an elementary treatise. On the contrary, the at-
tention is distracted and the intellect wearied by the infinity of
minute distinctions, and it requires the most patient industry and
indefatigable zeal to draw any general conclusion from a multitude
of apparently contradictory authorities.
A treatise intended for instruction should do little more than
sketch an outline of first principles, carefully discriminating be-
tween those propositions which are essential to the understanding
of the subject, and those superfluous corrollaries which only create
embarrassment. The student thus conversant with the elements of
his science, will be able to reason a priori upon every new case that
is presented to him, instead of being obliged to have recourse to
analogy, which is oftentimes a fallacious, and at best, a laborious
test. He will have less occasion to depend on the exercise of his
memory, and at every step that he advances, he will find order
and harmony throughout the whole progress of his acquirement.
Even the monotonous routine of the office, in the place of a mind-
less task of copying forms, is raised by him to intellectual dignity,
and he finds, even in that employment, a new and beautiful appli-
cation of foregone knowledge to present practice.
With this object in view, various books have been written to
assist the student, both in conveyancing and special pleading; but
nothing of the same kind seems to have been attempted in equity
drafting, partly from the notion that there is less nicety required in
equity pleadings, which are not so liable to be vitiated by verbal
flaws, or errors of form, and partly, perhaps, from an idea that
there can be no systematic arrangement of the subject—an opinion
that is countenanced by the latitude of indulgence prevalent in














































































































































ence, which he may elsewhere meet with as an unsupported dictu~, 
or resting only on the authorfty of decision. Indeed, it seems to be 
the prevalent fault of our law tracts that they heap together a mul-
titude of independenl rules, for the accuracy of which they are 
contented to refer to the cases where they occur, without ever once 
adverting to the grounds of their adoption; and the work is es-
teemed in proportion to the diligence with which cases are col-
lected, and to the number of references in the margin. This may 
be abundantly useful, as the plan of a work of consultation, for the 
benefit of such as are satisfied with point-learning, but cannot be 
advantageous as an elementary treatise. On the contrary, the at-
tention is distracted and the intellect wearied by the infinity of 
minute distinctions, and it requires the most patient industry and 
indefatigable zeal to draw any general conclusion from a multitude 
of apparently contradictory authorities. 
A treatise intended for instruction should do little more than 
sketch an outline of first principles, carefully discriminating be-
tween those propositions which are essential to the understanding 
of the subject, and those superfluous corrollaries which only create 
embarrassment. The student thus conversant with the elements of 
his science, will be able to reason a priori upon every new case that 
is presented to him, instead of being obliged to have recourse to 
analogy, which is oftentimes a fallacious, and at best, a laborious 
test. He will h,ave less occasion to depend on the exercise of his 
memory, and at every step that he advances, he will find order 
and harmony throughout the whole progress of his acquirement. 
Even the monotonous routine of the office, in the place of a mind-
less task of copying forms, is raised by him to intellectual dignity, 
and he finds, even in that employment, a new and beautiful appli-
cation of foregone knowledge to present practice. 
With this object in view, various books have been written to 
assist the student, both in conveyancing and special pleading; but 
nothing of the same kind seems to have been ·attempted in equity 
drafting, partly from the notion that there is less nicety required in 
equity pleadings, which are not so liable to be vitiated by verbal 
flaws, or errors of form, and partly, perhaps, from an idea that 
there can be no systematic arrangement of the subject-an opinion 
that is countenanced by the latitude of indulgence prevalent in 
equity, and its apparent deviations from the technical subtleties of 
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common law. But that this is a mistake arising from want of suffi-
cient attention to the forms of pleading in equity, will, it is
imagined, be apparent from a perusal of the following sheets. We
have endeavored to reduce the pleadings in equity into a scientific
method, to show their analogy to the pleadings at common lavw, and
of both to the principles of dialectics. Hitherto the pupil has been
left without any other guide than a few imperfect precedents, and
the scanty observations that are to be found scattered among books
of practice; added to which, he has to struggle against a very
faulty enumeration of the parts of a bill calculated to mislead and
perplex him. The deficiency in this particular has long been sensi-
bly experienced, and the following analysis is an attempt to supply
the desideratum.
As the original design was principally for the instruction of
pupils, the author thought it right to prefix an epitome of the prac-
tice; which, however, from his anxiety not to omit anything which
might be of utility, has gradually been raised into an important
portion of the work. He trusts, at the same time, that this part
of the performance will not be found superfluous; as, not satisfied
with seeing that ita lea: scripta est, he has endeavored throughout to
discover the origin and reason of the rule. This attempt is, for the
most part, entirely new; nnd so far as he has been enabled to suc-
ceed, is elucidatory of many points, which otherwise appeared co.n-
fused‘ and irrelevant. He has carefully abstained from encumber-
ing the memory with any disjointed matter, while he has been
diligent not to overlook anything material to a just apprehension of
the subject, being desirous of making it a useful as well as conve-
nient compendium. In this point of view, solicitors who wish to
acquire a knowledge of the principles of practice, will find it ad-
vantageous, at the same time that it is sufiiciently copious for the
purposes of general reference.
The author ventures to hope that a previous acquaintance with
the present work would materially abridge both the labor and dura-
tion of the pupil’s service in the equity draftsman’s oflice; and as
such, he recommends it to those young friends who are destined for
that branch of the profession. He also suggests the propriety of
not hastening too cursorily over the subject, as many parts of it
may appear at first somewhat difficult and abstruse. The pupil














































































































































common law. But that this is a mistake arising from want of suffi-
cient attention to the forms of pleading in equity, will, it is 
imagined, be apparent fron1 a perusal of the following sheets. We 
have endeavored to reduce the pleadings in equity into a scientific 
method, to show their analogy to the pleadings at common lww, and 
of both to the principles of dialectics. Hitherto the pupil has been 
left without any other guide than a few imperfect precedents, and 
the scanty observations that are to be found scattered among books 
of practice; added to which, he has to struggle against a very 
faulty enumeration of the parts of a bill calculated to mislead and 
perplex him. The deficiency in this particular has long peen sensi-
bly experienced, and the following analysis is an attempt to supply 
the desideratum. 
As the original design was principally for the instruction of 
pupils, the author thought it right to prefix an epitome of the praa-
tice; which, however, from his anxiety not to omit anything which 
might be of utility, has gradually been raised into an important 
portion of the work. He trusts, at the same time, that this part 
of the performance will not be found superfluous; as, not satisfied 
with seeing that ita lex scripta est, he has endeavored throughout to 
discover the origin and reason of the rule. This attempt is, for the 
most part, entirely new; nnd so far as he ha~ been enabled to suc-
£eed, is elucidatory of many points, which otherwise appeared con-• ~ 
fused and irrelevant. He has carefully abstained from encumber-
ing the memory with any disjointed matter, while he bas been 
diligent not to overloolt anything material to a just apprehension of 
the subject, being desirous of making it a useful as well as conve-
nient compendium. In this point of view, solicitors who ·wish to 
acquire a knowledge of the principles of practice, will find it ad-
vantageous, at the same time that it is sufficiently copious for the 
purposes of general reference. 
The author ventures to hope that a previous acquaintance with 
the present work would materially abridge both the labor and dura-
tion of the pupil's service in the equity draftsman's office; and as 
such, he recommends it to those young friends who are destined for 
that branch of the profession. He also suggests the propriety of 
not hastening too cursorily over the subject, as many parts of it 
may appear at first somewhat difficult and abstruse. The pupil 
should advance cautiously, secure of understanding previous points, 
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before he presses on to their deducibles, and proceed always a
notioribus ad minus nota.
With this advice the author takes his leave_—conc1uding with
the exhortation of Cicero to his friends—“Quamobrem pergite, ut
facitis, adolescentis ; atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et
vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublicae emolumento esse possi-
tis.”* t














































































































































before he presses on to their deducibles, and proceed always a 
notioribus ad minus nota. 
With this advice the author takes his leave-concluding with 
the exhortation of Cicero to his friends-" Quamobrem pergite, ut 
facitis, adolescentis; atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et 
vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublica emolumento esse possi-
tis."* 
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OF PLEADING IN GENERAL.
“ And know, my son, that it is one of the most honorable,
laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have the science of
well pleading; and therefore I counsaile thee especially to im-
ploy thy courage and care to learne this.”—Littleton.
1, The science of pleading has been so long regarded
by those who are ignorant of its true nature and objects
as a system invented for the purpose of evasion and per-
version of justice, an opinion which is unfortunately
countenanced by the frequent miscarriages of causes upon
small and trivial niceties in pleading, [a] that it will be
necessary for us to enter into the consideration of plead-
ing in general, its use and design, in order to rescue it
from undeserved obloquy, and to endeavor to remove
from the mind of the pupil the unfavorable impression he
is apt to conceive on his first entrance upon the study.
2, From the number of minute and intricate rules
laid down in the treatises on this subject, collected from
decisions in an infinite variety of cases, the compilers of
which consider it quite sufficient to refer to the authorities
without stating the reason upon which the rule is founded,
the student finds himself involved in a net of inextricable
difiiculties and niceties, for which he in vain seeks for a
solution. He is terrified in approaching a subject which















































































































































OF PLEADING IN GENERAL. 
"And know, my son, that it is one of the most honorable, 
laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have the science of 
well pleading ; and therefore I counsaile thee especially to im-
ploy thy courage and care to learne this."-Littleton. 
1. The science of pleading has been so long regarded 
by those who are ignorant of its true nature and objects 
as a system invented for the purpose of evasion and per-
version of justice, an opinion which is unfortunately 
countenanced by the frequent miscarria~es of causes upon 
small and trivial niceties in pleading, [a] that it will be 
necessary for us to enter into the consideration of plead-
ing in general, its use and design, in order to rescue it 
from undeserved obloquy, and to endeavor to remove 
from the mind of the pupil the unfavorable impression he 
is apt to conceive on his first entrance upon the study. 
2. From the number of minute and intricate rules 
laid down in the treatises on this subject, collected from 
decisions in an infinite variety of cases, the compilers of 
which consider it quite sufficient to refer to the authorities 
without stating the reason upon which the rule is founded, 
the student finds hin1self involved in a net of inextricable 
difficulties and niceti~s~ for which he in vain seeks for a 
solution. l-Ie is terrified in approaching a subject which 
[a] Hale's Hist. Com. Law, 212. 
2 EQUITY PLEADING.
I
at ‘first seems necessary to be committed to memory in
order to be mastered. He is in despair when\ be ob-
serves its complication and minute magnitude, and he too
often throws it up in disgust, from supposing that sub-
stantial justice is, in many instances, intercepted by mere
technical, and, to him, apparently unmeaning forms.
Add to this, that from the abuses that from time to time
have crept into the system, “special pleading” has been
long a byword for sophistry and the splitting of straws.
We cannot, therefore, be much surprised at the number of
prejudices to be overcome, on commencing the study of
this branch of the profession, that so few ever become
acquainted with its real principles, and that so little has
been done towards bringing back the science to that
ancient simplicity and perfection to which it had attained
in the reign of Edward the Third. [a]
3, It will be our business, then, to make an effort to
justify the encomiums of Littleton upon it; and to prove,
as Lord Mansfield says, that the “substantial rules of
pleading are founded in strong sense and in the soundest
and choicest logic; and so appear, when well understood
and explained,” but which (as he remarks in the same
case) “ by being misunderstood and misapplied, are often
made use of as instruments of chicane.” [b] To this pur-
pose we must commence, by endeavoring to arrive at a
clear and precise notion of what it is a man does when he
is said to bring an action, or institute a suit against
another. When a person feels himself aggrieved, and
cannot otherwise have redress, he applies to the law to
interpose its authority, in order to restore to him a right
that is withheld, or to give him reparation for an injury
sustained. But the law will not interfere by its minis-
[a] Vide Hale’s Hist. Com. Law. Co. Litt., 304, b. (h).













































































































































2 EQUITY PLEADING. 
at 'first seen1s necessary to be committed to memory in 
order to be mastered. He is in despair whet\ he ob-
serves its complication and minute magnitude, and he too 
of~en throws it up in disgust, from supposing that sub-
stantial justice is, in many instances, intercepted by mere 
technical, and, to him.. apparently unmeaning forms. 
Add to this, that from the abuses that from time to time 
have crept into the system," special pleadin~ '' has been 
long a byword for sophistry and the ~plitting of straws. 
We cannot, therefore, be much surprised at the number of 
prejudices to ·be overcome, on commencing the study of 
this branch of the profession, that so few ever becom~ 
acquain.ted with its real principles, and that so little has 
been done towards bringing back the science to that 
ancient simplicity and perfection to which it had attained 
in the reign of Ed ward the Third. [a] 
3. It will be our business, then, to make an effort to 
justify the encomiums of Littleton upon it; and to prove, 
as Lord Mansfield says, that the "substantial rules of 
pleading are founded in strong sense and in the soundest 
and choicest logic; and so appear, when well understood 
and explained;'' but which (as he remarks in the same 
case) " by being misunderstood and misapplied, are often 
made use of as instruments of chicane." [b] To this pur-
pose we must commence, by endeavoring to arrive at a 
clear and precise notion of what it is a man does when he 
is said to bring an action, or institute a suit against 
another. When a person feels himse]f aggrieved, and 
cannot o~;herwise have redress, he applies to the law to 
interpose its authority, in order to restore to him a right 
that is withheld, or to give him reparation for an injury 
sustained. But the law will not interfere by its minis-
[a] Vide Hale's Hist. Com. Law. Co. Litt., 304, b. (h). 
[b] 1 Burr., 319. 
OF PLEADING IN GENERAL. 3
terial ofiicers, upon the bare suggestion of injury; it re-
quires that the wrong shall be proved, and the right
substantiated, for otherwise it might be turned into an
instrument of violence. For this purpose courts of judi-
cature have been erected, where the claims of the parties
may be contested and the judgment of the law ascertained,
before its sanction is awarded. The courts of law have,
on their part, laid down certain rules and formulae of pro-
ceeding, which long experience has taught to be the best
adapted to the purpose of arriving at a speedy andjust
decision; a departure from which rules must occasion
great inconvenience, and sometimes a manifest defect of
justice. Hence causes are frequently delayed by the
raising of mere technical, and, to a common observer,
frivolous objections. And although this is an evil much
to be regretted, it is one that arises more from the ignor-
ance of practicers than from any inherent blemish in the
law. [a] This is an observation which applies with pecu_
liar force to pleading, the propriety and utility of the rules
in which are not always so discernable as in the other
branches of practice.
SECTION 1.
Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law.
4, Upon complaint being made to a court of justice,
its first step is to summon the defendant to appear and
answer the allegations made against him. As it would be
[a] 1 Bos. & Pul., 59; where it is observed by Eyre, Chief
Justice, that “infinite mischief has been produced by the fa-
cility of the courts in overlooking errors in form ; it encourages
carelessness, and places ignorance too much on a footing with














































































































































OF PLEADING IN GENERAL. 3 
terial officers, upon the bare suggestion of injury; it re-
quires that the wrong shall be ~roved., and the right 
substantiated, for otherwise it 1night be turned into an 
instrument of violence. For this purpose courts of judi-
cature bave been erected, where the claims of the parties 
may be contested and the judgment of the law ascertained, 
before its sanction is awarded. The courts of law have, 
on their part, laid do\vn certain rules and formulre of pro-
ceeding, which long experience has taught to be the best 
adapted to the purpose of arriving at a speedy and just 
decision; a departure from which rules must occasion 
great inconvenience, and sometimes a manifest defect of 
justice. H~nce causes are frequently delayed by the 
raising of mere technical, and, oo a common observer, 
frivolous objections. And although this is an evil much 
to be regretted, it is one that arises more from the ig.nor ... 
ance of practicers than from any inherent blemish in the 
law. [a] This is an observation which applies with pecu_ 
liar force to pleading, the propriety and utility of the rules 
in which are not always so discernable as in the other 
branches of practice. 
SECTION I. 
Analysis of the Pleadings at Common Law. 
4. Upon complaint being made to a court of justice, 
its first step is to summon the defendant to appear and 
answer the allegations made against him. As it would be 
[a] 1 Bos. & Pul., 59; where it is observed by Eyre, Chief 
Justice. that ''infinite mischief has been produced by the fa-
cility of the courts in overlooking errors in form; it encourages 
carelessness, and places ignorance too much on a footing with 
knowledge, amongst those who practice the drawing of plead-
ings.'' 
4 EQUITY PLEADING.
contrary to justice to pronounce an opinion “altera parte
inaudita,” the defendant thereupon comes and contests
the plaintiff’s right, either by disputing its legality or de-
nying the facts, or some particular fact, on the ground of
- which such right is claimed; or alleging on his own be-
half‘, such matter as would operate to avoid the plaintifi"s
demand, by showing that no cause of complaint existed;
or if it once existed, was subsequently removed. These
are such answers as go to the merits of the point in dispute.
But independently of these, there are preliminary objec-
tions which may be taken, to excuse the defendant from
entering into any contest about the matter—as that the
court applied to by plaintiff for relief, is not the one proper
to take cognizance of the suit; or that the plaintiff is, for
some reason foreign to the cause of action, not entitled to
claim the assistance of a court of justice; or lastly, that
there is some defect in the mode of proceeding, which
would ultimately render the interference of the law abor-
tive.
5, These disputations of the parties were originally
delivered “ore tenus ” .in court, and were noted down by
the oflicer, that the court might understand what was the
real point of controversy. And if any objection arose up-
on the law of the case,it was at once decided on argument.
If the dispute turned upon a question of fact, it was sent
to be ascertained, according to its appropriate mode of
trial. In process of time, however, as the business of the
courts increased, the parties were sent out of court to set-
tle among themselves the terms of the question upon
which the judgment of the court was demanded, or the
verdict of a jury required; and thenceforward the counsel
on both sides drew up, in writing, the several allegations
and answers of their respective clients, until, in course of













































































































































4 EQUITY PLEADING. 
contrary to justice to pronounce an opinion .. "altera parte 
ina·udita/' the defendant thereupon comes and contests 
the plaintiff's ri~ht., either by disputing its l~gality or de-
nying the facts, or some particular fact, on the ground of 
· which such right is claimed; or alleging on his own be-
half, such matter as would operate to avoid the plaintiff's 
demand, by ~howing that no cause of complaint exi~ted; 
or if it once existed, was subsequently removed. '".rhese 
are ~uch ans,vers as go to the rnerits of the point in dispute. 
But independently of these, there are preliminary objec-
tions which may be taken, to excuse the defendant from 
entering into any contest about the matter-as that the 
court applied to by plaintiff for relief, is not the one proper 
to take cognizance of the suit; or that the plaintiff is, for 
some reason foreign to the cause of action, not entitled to 
claim the assistance of a court of justice ; or lastly, that 
there is some defect in the mode of proceeding, which 
would ultimately render the interference of the law abor-
tive. 
5. These disputations of the parties were originally 
delivered "ore tenus". in court, and were noted down by 
the officer, that the court might understand what was the 
real point of controversy. And if any objection arose up-
on the law of the case, it was at once decided on argument. 
If the dispute turned upon a question of fact, it was sent 
to be ascertained, according to its appropriate mode of 
trial. In process of time, however, as the business of the 
courts increased, the parties were sent out of court to set-
tle among themselves the terms of the question upon 
which the judgment of the court was demanded, or the 
verdict of a jury required; and thenceforward the counsel 
on both sides drew up, in writing, the several allegations 
and answers of their respective clients, until, in course of 
the altercation, they arrive at some disputed point of law, 
PLEADINGS AT common LAW. 5
or some material fact, distinctly alleged on one side and de-
nied by the other; for not until then did they require the
assistance of the court or jury. These preliminary dispu-
tations of the parties are termed Pleadz'n-gs ; and the point
to which they arrive, is called the Issue.
The foregoing view at once furnishes us with the true
end and design of pleadings, which is nothing more
than to disencumber the question at issue between the
parties of all irrelevant and perplexing matter; that so the
court and jury may be saved from embarrassment by
having the points submitted to their consideration distinct
and material, and that the parties themselves may be
spared the trouble and expense of unnecessary litigation.
This accords with what Sir Matthew Hale says of “the art
or dexterity of pleading," which, as he expresses it, in its
use, nature and design, was only to render the fact plain
and intelligible, and to bring the matter tojudgment with
a convenient certamty. [a]
6, The student will observe that the rules of plead-
ing, how complicated or abstruse soever they may appear,
are all built upon the foundation of this single principle,
and all aim at the accomplishment of this one object. It
may seem extraordinary to some, how so plain and defin-
ite an object could ever be lost sight of in stating the
claims of the conflicting parties, or that a principle so ob-
vious could give birth to a system of rules upon which
volumes have been expended; but whoever will reflect
upon the many arguments which arise in ordinary conver-
sation, and how few of them are ever brought to any con-
clusion, solely in consequence of the disputants traveling
out of the true point in debate, will cease to be surprised
at the first; and when we come to consider that the most
abstruseand extensive sciences are foundedupon data,













































































































































PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW. 5 
or some material fact., distinctly alleged on one side and de-
nied b.v the other; for not until then did they require the 
assistance of the court or jury. 'rhese preliminary dispu-
tations of the parties are termed Pleadin,qa ,· and the point 
to which they arrive, is called the Issue. 
The foregoing view at once furnishes nq .wit.h the true 
end and design of pleadings, which is nothing more 
than to disencumber the question at issue between the 
parties of all irrelevant nnd perplexing matter; that so the 
court and jury may be saved from en1barrassn1ent by 
having the points submitted to their consideration distinct 
and material, and that the parties themsel v·es may be 
spared the trouble and expense of nnnece~sary litigation. 
l'his accords with what Sir Matthew Hale says of ''the art 
or dexterity of pleading,'" which, as he expre~s~s it, in its 
use, nature and de~ign, was only to render the fact plain 
and intelligible, and to bring the matter to judgment wit.h 
a convenient certainty. [aJ 
6. The student will observe that the rules of plead-
ing, how complicated or abstruse soever they may appear,. 
are all built upon the foundation of this single principle, 
and all aim at the accomplishment of this one object. It 
n1ay seem extraordinary to some, how so plain and defin. 
ite an object could ever be lost sight of in stating the 
claims of the conflicting parties, or that a principle so ob-
vious could give birth to a system of rules upon which 
volu1nes have been expended; but whoever will reflect 
upon the many arguments which arise in ordinary conver-
sation, and how fe\v of thetn are ever brought to any con-
clusion, solely in consequence of the disputants travelin~ 
out of the true point in de hate, \Vill cease to be surprised 
at the first; and when we cotne to cun~ider that the n1ost 
abstruse ·and extensive sciences are founcled ·upon data, 
[a] Hist. Corn. Law, 212. 
6 EQUITY PLEADING
comparatively few and simple, and that pleading is, in
fact, a very important branch of dialectics, or the art of
right reasoning, we shall no longer be astonished at the
complication and variety of its rules, which in reality, are
no more than a counterpart of the rules laid down in the
system of logic. Of this we shall have occasion to speak
more at large by and by. These rules, when properly
understood, are all conducive to the same end, and are
perfectly intelligible when referred to the principle above
stated. It is only when they are regarded as so many in-
dependent propositions, and grounded upon mere author-
ity (in which light our writers on pleading are too much
accustomed to treat them), that they appear to the student
as an arbitrary and unmeaning collection, calculated to in-
volve and embarrass the real justice of every case.
7, We shall now proceed to show the application of
these principles to the several pleadings on either side,
taking each of them separately as they occur on the part
of the plaintiff and defendant: and first, of the statement
of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and his application
for redress. Here then are two points to be considered:
first the nature of the wrong sustained, and how it is to be
set out; and, secondly, the plaintiff’s right to make the
application to the particular court, and the form of such
application. Of each of these in their order:
8, First, as to the statement of the injury. “ Wrongs
convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing
else but a privation of right.” [a] In complaining of a
wrong done to him, therefore, the plaintiff does nothing
more than to set out a right of which he has been deprived.
This leads us to the consideration of rights, which are noth-
ing more than legal or equitable relations. To prove a right,













































































































































6 EQUITY PLEADING 
comparatively few and simple, and that pleading is, in 
fact, a very important branch of dialectics, or the art of 
right reasoning, we shall no longer be astonished at. the 
complication and variety of its rules, which in reality, are 
no more than a counterpart of the rules laid down in the 
system of logic. Of this \Ve shall have occasion to spealr 
more at large by and by. These rules, when properly 
understood, are all conducive to the same end, and are 
perfectly intelligible when referred to the principle above 
stated. It is only when they are regarded as so many in-
dependent propositions, and grounded upon mere author-
ity (in which light our writers on pleading are too much 
accustomed to treat them), that they appear to the student 
as an arbitrary and unmeaning collection, calculated to in-
volve and embarrass the real justice of every case. 
7. We shall now proceed to show the application of 
these principles to the several pleadings on either side, 
taking each of them separately as they occur on the part 
of the plaintiff and defendant: and first, of the statement 
of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and his application 
for redress. Here then are two points to be considered: 
first the nature of the wrong sustained, and how it. is to be 
set out; and, secondly, the plaintiff's right to make the 
application to th.e partia1tlar aou'l't, and the form of such 
application. Of each of these in their order: 
8. First, as to the statement of tl~e injury. "'Wrongs 
convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing 
e1se but a privation of right." [a] In complaining of a 
wrong d0ne to him, therefore, the plaintiff does nothing 
more than to set out a 11i,qht of which he has been deprived. 
This leads us to the consideration of rights, which are noth-
ing 1nore than }ega) or equitable relations. rfo prove a right, 
[a] 3 Blacks, Com. 2. 
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then the relation in which it is related must be distinctly
shown. And here we must premise that in speaking of
relations we allude more particularly to such as arise ex
contractu, and are the foundation of action of that nature,
as being more analogous to cases in equity, and quite sulfi-
cient for purposes of illustration. Relations, again, let in
three separate considerations: first, the parties with their
several disabilities and liabilities in law; secondly, the
subject matter, or contract, with cigcumstances under
which it was made; and lastly, the legal and equitable
incidents or rights, the withholding of‘ any of which is
the cause of complaint. Who, then, for a moment reflects
upon the vast and diffusive field of‘ controversy which this
includes, can be surprised at the difficulty attending upon
the preliminary arrangement of the points in litigation, or
the number of minute regulations that have from time to
time been found necessary to be adopted in order “ to ren-
der the fact plain and intelligible, and to bring the matter
to judgment with a convenient certainty.”
Hence, we see that the statement of the injury is com-
posed of these three points: the setting forth the relation
between the parties; the right accruing by such relation,
and that such right is withheld. This entirely agrees with
the ancient view taken of a declaration at common law,
which was said to consist of three parts~—the demonstra-
tive, the declarative, and the perclose or conclusion. Here
the demonstrative part, which states the names of parties,
and the nature of the action corresponds with the setting ‘
forth of the right, because at common law certain actions
were given for certain injuries; the declarative part which
explains the cause of action is equivalent to the showing
the relation between the parties, and the perclose is the
complaint of injury sustained. The first and principal













































































































































PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW. 7 
then the relation in which it is related must be distinctly 
shown. And here we must premise that in speaking of 
relations we allude more particularly to such as arise e:n 
contractu, and are the foundation of action of that nature, 
as being more analogous to cases in equity, and quite suffi-
cient for purposes of illustration. Relation~, again, let in 
three separate considerations: first, the parties with their 
several disabilities and liabilities in law; secondly, the 
subject matter, or contract, with ciJcumstances under 
which it was made; and lastly, the legal and equitable 
incidents or right~, the withholding of any of which is 
the cause of complaint. Who, then, for a moment reflects 
upon the vast and diffusive field of controversy which this 
includes, can be surpri~ed at the difficulty attending upon 
the preliminary arrangement of the points in litigation, or 
the number of minute regulations that have from time to 
time been found necessary to be adopted in order "to ren-
der the fact plain and intelligible, and to bring the matter 
to judgment with a convenient certainty." 
Renee, we see that the atatement of the injury is corn-
posed of these three points: the setting forth the relation 
between the parties; the right accruin~ by such relation, 
and that such right is withheld. 'fhis entirely agrees with 
the ancient view taken of a declaration at common law, 
whieh was said to consist of three parts-the demoustra-
tive, the declarative, and the perclose or conclusion. Here 
the demonstrative part, \Vhich states the names of parties, 
and the nature of the action corresponds \Vith the setting 
forth of the right,. because at common law certain action8 
were given for certain injuries; the declarative part which 
explains the cause of action is equivalent to the showing 
the relation between the partie~, and the perolose is the 
con1plaint of injury sustained. The fir~t and principal 
point, therefore, with the plaintiff, is to show his right, 
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and however complicated and diffuse the statement in a
declaration at common law, or a bill in equity, may ap-
pear, it is nevertheless reducible to two propositions dec-
larative of such right. The first proposition states the
rule of law, that a certain right flows from a certain rela-
tion; the second, that the parties stand in such relation.
1. The first is proved—1st, by act of parliament, on
which turns the question of construction ; 2d,by precedent,
on which turns the meaning and extent of the rule gath-
ered from the precedent; 3d, by analogy, where a still
more general rule is to be collected, from a variety of
‘analogous cases, or from the universal principles of equity
itself.
2. The second proposition is founded on the facts of
the case, as stated in the declaration at common law, and
the bill in equity. But these statements may be untrue,
or inadequate. Their truth which is a question of fact, is
decided by the verdict of a jury, at common law; and in
equity, by written depositions and the defendant’s admis-
sions upon oath. But, secondly, the facts, though proved
to be true may be inadequate to sustain the assumed re-
lation. As if, for instance, a man, who claimed some duty
arising from the relation of copartnership, was unable to
prove a contract for the participation of loss as well as
profit (for without such essential ingredient; it would not
be a copartnership concern,) [a] he would thereby fail to
establish the relation on which his claim was founded,
‘ and this is frequently the ground of non-suit at law, and
‘of dismissing the bill in equity. This point of adequacy,
is purely a question of law, and is proved by showing that
the case made out has all the essential qualities of the
assumed relation; or in other words, that the facts proved,













































































































































8 EQUITY PLEADING. 
and however complicated and diffuse the staternent in a 
declaration at cotnmon la\v, or a bill in equity, may ap-
pear, it is nevertheless reducible to t\vo propositions dec-
larative of such right. The first propo~ition states t.he 
rule of law, that a certain right flows fron1 a certain rela-
tion; the second, that the parties stand in such relation. 
1. The first is proved-1st, by act of parliament, on 
which turns the question of construction; 2d, by pre~edent, 
on which turns the meaning and extent of the rule gath-
ered from the precedent; 3d, by analogy, where a still 
more general rule is to be collected, from a variety of 
·analogous cases, or from the universal principles of equity 
itself. 
2. The second proposition is founded on the facts of 
the case, as stated in the declaration at common law, and 
t.he bill in equity. But these statements may be untrue, 
or inadequate. 'fheir truth which is a question ·of fact, is 
decided by the verdict of a jury, at cotntnon law; and in 
equity, by \Vritten depositions and the defendant's adnlis-
sions upon oath. But, secondly, the facts, thongh proved 
to be true may be inadequate to sustain the assutned re-
lation. As if, for instance, a man, \Vho c]aitned son1e duty 
arising fron1 the relation of copartnership, wa~ unable to 
prove a contract for the partir.jpation of loss as well a:; 
profit (for without such essential ingredient; it would not 
be a copartnership concern,) [a] he wonld thereby fail to 
establish the relation on which his claim was founded, 
and this is frequently the ground of non-snit at law, and 
'of di~n1issing the bill in equity. This point of adequacy, 
is purely a question of la\v, and is proved by showing that 
the case made out has all the e8sential qualities of the 
assumed relation; or in other words .. that the facts proved, 
[al Hesketh v. Blanchard, 4 East., 144. 
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bring the case within the application of the rule oflaw,
laid down in the first proposition. The conclusion here is
as 1nuch demonstration as any theorem in pure quantities.
9, Next, as to the application for redress: although
every man who has suffered wrong is prima acie entitled
' to redress in a court of justice, yet as the aw has estab-
lished for the convenience and dispatch of business,
several distinct and independent judicatures, with exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the plaintiff must take care to bring his
action or commence his suit in such court as has authority
to take cognizance of the wrong complained of; otherwise,
besides the general inconvenience that would result from
an opposite course, great injustice might be done to the
defendant if he were obliged to contest the right in an in-
competent court, for want of adequate means of defence.
Secondly, there are certain disabilities, some of which
are only temporary, imposed by law, which restrict those
who are subject to them from suing in a court of justice;
and, on the other hand, there are certain privileges at-
tached to individuals in particular capacities, which ex-
empt them from liability.
Thirdly, as the courts have by a series of decisions,
laid down a system of proceedings which experience has
proved to be the best calculated to attain the ends ofjus-
tice, the application for redress must follow the established
forms, that the defendant may at once know what and
how to answer. The complaint must likewise be so framed
as that the whole question, and between all the parties,
may be brought before the court; since, otherwise, the
defendant would be harrassed by uselessly contestinga
suit in which complete and ample justice could not be
finally administered. And, lastly, we may add under this
head that no man is permitted to sue another while a













































































































































PLEADINGS AT. COMMON LAW. 
bring the case within the application of the rule of law, 
laid down in the first proposition. The conclusion here is 
as tnuch demonstration as any theorem in pure quantities. 
9. Next, as to the application for redress: although 
every man who has suffered wrong is prima/acie entitled 
to redress in a court of justice, yet as the faw has estab-
lished for the convenience and dispatch of business, 
several distinct and independent judicatures, with exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the plaintiff must take care to bring his 
act.ion or commence his suit in such court as has authority 
to take cognizance of the wrong complained or; otherwise, 
besides the general inconvenience that would result from 
an opposite course, great injustice might be done to the 
defendant if he were obliged to contest the right in an in-
comp~tent court, for want of adequate means of defence. 
Secondly, there are certain disabilities, some of which 
are only temporary, imposed by law, which restrict thos~ 
who are subject to them from suing in a court of justice; 
and, on the other hand, there are certain privileges at-
tached to individuals in particular capacities, which ex-
ernpt them from liability. 
Thirdly, as the courts have by a series of decisions, 
laid down a system of proceedings which experience ,has 
proved to be the best calculated to attain the ends of jus-
tice, th~ application for redress must follow the established 
forms, that the defendant may a.t once know what and 
how to answer. The complaint must likewise be so framed 
as that the whole question, and between all the parties, 
may be brought before the court; since, otherwise, the 
defendant would be harrassed by uselessly contesting ·a 
suit in which complete and ample justice could not be 
finally administered. And, lastly, we may add under this 
head that no man is permitted to sue another while a 
former suit fo~ the same cause of action is pending, either 
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in the same or any other court of competent authority.
“ Nemo debet his uezcari pro eadem causa.”
10, We now come to the pleadings on the part of the
defendant, or the answer which he gives to the complaint
made against him; and here an obvious distinction pre-
sents itself, corresponding with the division we have made
of the complaint into the statement of the injury and the
application for redress. The defendant either directly
answers the statement of the injury by denying it alto-
gether or, or by confessing and avoiding it; or, secondly,
if there be any objections to the application for redress,
founded upon the reasons specified in the preceding sec-
tion, he states such a ground why he should not be
further called to account, at least untilthe disability be
removed or informality rectified. The former are called
pleas in bar, and go to the merits of the cause. The latter
are termed pleas in abatement, their sol.e effect being to
set aside the complaint, and are sometimes distinguished
by the appellation of dilatory pleas, because their opera-
tion, for the most part, is only temporary.
11, As, therefore, pleas in abatement being merely
objections to entering into the “ litis contestatio,” must
precede the “ litis contestatio,” itself, we shall commence
our observations with them; and, in point of fact, a de-
fendant, after putting in a plea in bar, cannot plead in
abatement, for, by submitting to answer the substance of
the complaint, he waives all preliminary exceptions which
might have been taken to the mode of application. The
several species of pleas in abatement are conformable to
the subdivision we have noticed in the application for
redress.
1. First, therefore, if the suit be instituted in a court
which has not competent authority, the defendant may













































































































































10 gQUIT~ PLEADING. 
in .the same or any other court of competent authority. 
"Nemo debet bis vewari pro eadem causa." 
10. We now come to the pleadings on the part of the 
defendant, or the answer which he gives to the complaint 
made against him; and here an obvious distinction pre-
sents itself, corresponding with the division we have made 
of the complaint into the statement of the injury and the 
application for redress. The defendant either directly 
answero the statement of the injury by denying it alto-
~ether or~ or by confessing and avoiding it; or, secondly, 
if there be any objections to the application fo1' redress, 
founded upon the reasons specified in the preceding sec-
tion, he states such a ground why he should not be 
further called to account, at least until· the disability be 
removed or informality rectified. The former are called 
pleas in bar, and go to the merits of the cause. The latter 
are termed pleas in abatement, their sole effect being to 
set aside the complaint, and are sometimes distinguished 
by the appellation of dilatory pleas, because their opera· 
tion, for the most part, is only temporary. 
11. As, therefore, pleas in abatement bting merely 
objections to entering into the " litis contestatio," must 
precede the " litis contestat-io," itself, we shall commence 
our observations with them; and, in point of fact, a de-
fendant" after putting in a plea in bar, cannot plead in 
abatement., for, by subrnitting to answer the substance of 
the complaint, he waives all preliminary exceptions which 
might have been taken to the mode of application. The 
several species of pleas in abatement are conformable to 
the subdivision we have noticed in the application for 
redress. 
1. First, therefore, if the suit be instituted in a court 
which has not competent authority, the defendant n1ay 
state that circumstance as a reason why he should not 
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answer to the cause of complaint; and this kind of dila-
tory plea is called a plea to the jum‘sdiction.
2. Secondly, the defendant may allege in abatement
of the suit, either, first, a legal disability on the part of the
plaintiff, disentitling him from seeking the assistance of a
court ofjustice, or some privilege of the defendant, which
saves him from responsibility. Of these, some are only
temporary, and are the proper subject of abatement ;
others, again, are permanent and take away all right of
action at any time. These latter, therefore, are of an
amphibious character, and may be ple'aded in bar as well
as in abatement; for it is manifest that these latter may
be considered as an answer to the very cause of action, by
annulling the relation between the parties. This second
species of pleas in abatement are termed pleas to the per-
sons; and under this head may be classed such pleas as
state that the plaintiff is a fictitious person or dead.
3. Thirdly, if there be any defect in the mode or
form of proceeding adopted by the plaintiff, arising from
mistake or want of certainty in his statement of the cause
of action, in consequence of which the real merits of the
question cannot conveniently be inquired into, or, when
inquired into, cannot lead to any satisfactory result, the
defendant may take advantage of it by pleading the same
in abatement of the complaint. The plea of want of
proper parties is a plea of this nature, as also the plea of
the pendenoy of another action for the same cause. Pleas
of this last kind are strictly dilatory pleas, and have this
quality annexed: that where the deficiency is in a point
which comes more properly within the knowledge of the
defendant, he must give the plaintiff a better form, 71. e.,
at the same time that he states the error he must show
how it may be corrected, as, for example, when he pleads













































































































































PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW. 11 
answer to the cause of complaint; and this kind of dila-
tory plea is called a plea to the ju1'isdiction. 
2. Secondly, the defendant may allege in abatement 
of the suit, either, first, a legal disability on the part of the 
plaintiff, disentitling him from seeking the assistance of a 
court of justice, or some privilege of the defendant, which 
saves him fron1 responsibility. Of ~hese, some are only 
tetnporary, and are the proper subject of abatement; 
others, again, are permanent and take away all right of 
action at any time. 1,hese latter, therefore, are of an 
amphibious character, and may be ple"aded in bar as well 
as in abatement; for it is manifest that these latter may 
be considered as an answer to the very cause of action; by 
annulling the relation between ~he parties. This second 
species of pleas in abatement are termed pleas to the per· 
aona; and under this head may be classed such pleas as 
state that the plaintiff is a fictitious person or dead. 
3. Thirdly, if there be any defect in the mode or 
form of proceeding adopted by the plaintiff, arisin~ from 
mistake or want of certainty in his statement of the cause 
of action, in consequence of which the real merits of the . 
question cannot conveniently be inquired into, or, when 
inquired into, cannot lead to any satisfactory result, the 
defendant may take advantage of it by pleading the same 
in abatement of the complaint. The plea of want of 
proper parties is a plea of this nature, as also the plea of 
the pendency of another action for the same cause. Pleas 
of this last kind are strictly dilat01'Y pleas, and have this 
quality annexed: that where the deficiency is in a point 
which comes more properly within the knowledge of the 
defendant, he must give the plaintiff a better form, i. e., 
at the same t.ime that he states the error he must show 
how it may be corrected, as, for example, when he pleads 




not be eluded by any frivolous evasion. These pleas are
called pleas in abatement, because they go particularly to
quash the form of proceedings. The same objections, if
they appear on the face of the pleading, may also be taken
by special demurrer, which is the denial of the sufliciency
of the pleading, in the particular matter specified; for this
is a 1nere point of law, and does not involve any dispute as
to fact.
12. Next, as to pleas in bar, or answer as to the
merits of the complaint, the substance of every complaint
being, as we have already seen, the subtraction of some
duty or right (these being co-relative terms) derived from
an existing relation, the only conclusive answer must be,
either of the four following
Modes of Defence.
1. First, confessing the relation, to deny the right;
and this is the general issue in law, and is called a demur-
rer; an issue being, as was before stated, formed of an
affirmative and negative.. [a]
2. Secondly, confessing that the right demanded
would follow from the relation assumed, to deny generally
the existence of the relation, which is the general issue in
fact, or to deny some particular allegation, upon which the
whole relation rests.
3. Thirdly, confessing the right and relation, to deny
the subtraction.
La] It may appear startling, from its novelty, to class de-
murrers under the head of pleas in bar ; but taking the defini-
tion of pleas in bar to be such answers as go to the gist of the
action, demurrers are clearly a species, being the pleading which
tends an issue in law as the general issue does in fact;-and the
general is confessedly a plea in bar. In reality, however, it mat-
ters little how the parts are distributed, provided the arrange-















































































































































12 EQUITY PLEADING. 
not be eluded by any frivolous evasion. These pleas are 
called pleas in abatement, because they go particularly to 
quash the form ot proceedings. The same objections, if 
they appear on the face of the pleading, may also be taken 
'by special demurrer, which is the denial of the sufficiency 
of the pleading, in the particular matter specified; for this 
is a tnere point of law, and does not involve any dispute as 
to fact. 
12. Next, as to pleas in bar, or answer as to the 
merits of the complaint, the substance of every complaint 
being, as we have <O.lready seen, the subtraction of some 
duty or rigltt (thes~ being co-relative terms) derived from 
an existing relation, the only conclusive answer must be, 
either of the four following 
.Modes of Defence. 
1. First, confessing the relation, to deny the r1:gn,t; 
and this is the general issue in law, and is called a demur-
rer; an issue being, as was before stateu, formed of an 
affirmative and negative. [a] 
2. Secondly, confessing that the right demanded 
would follow from the relation assumed, to deny generally 
the ewistence of the relation, which is the general issue in 
fact, or to deny some particular allegation, upon which the 
whole relation rests. 
3. Thirdly, confessing the right and relation, to deny 
the subtraction. 
La] It may appear startling, from its novelty, to class de-
murrers under the head of pleas in bar; but taking the defini-
tion of pleas in bar to be such answers as go to the gist of the 
action, demurrers are clearly a species, being the pleading which 
tends an issue in law as the general issue does in fact,- .and the 
general is confessedly a plea in bar. In reality, however, it utat-
ters little how the parts are distributed, provided the arrange-
ment be intelligible; and that has been the principal uirn of the 
present treatise. 
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4. And fourthly, confessing the subtraction, to give
some valid reason to excuse the non-performance of a duty.
The two latter are called special pleas in bar.
13. Again: the reason assigned in excuse may be
twofold, in reference to the two propositions concerning
the relation and the right. First, it may be some new
matter to invalidate the prima facie relation set out in
the complaint; or secondly, it may be some new matter by
means of which, supposing the relation to exist, yet the
right derived from it is gone; and here it is obvious that
the reason alleged must be of new matter; for if the
san1e statement appeared on the face of the complaint,
the defendant might at once deny the right; which, as ob-
served above, would be a demurrer, or general issue in
law. It has been before remarked that relations may be
considered with respect to the parties, the subject matter,
and the incidents.
1. First, then, to invalidate the relation, the new
matter may show, first, that the parties were incapacitated
from contracting the relation,or are incapable to continue
it. Secondly, that the subject matter was insuflicient or
illegal, or had undergone some alteration. Thirdly, that
the right, being incidental, had not accrued.
2. Second, the new matter may show that the right,
though once existing, is barred by the act of the part;/;
by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of God, or un-
avoidable calamity. ’
The student, upon examination, will find that every
possible species of defence is included under the above
heads, and may be referred to some one of the foregoing
classes—a proof of the correctness of the principles from
which they are deduced. . .













































































































































PLEADINGS AT COMMON LAW. 13 
4. An(l fourthly, confessing the ~ubtraction, to give 
so1ne valid reason to e~cuse the non-performance of a duty. 
'fhe two latter are called special pleas in bar. 
13. Again: the reason assig1~ed in eaJcuse ma.y he 
t\vofold, fn reference to the two propositions concerning 
the relation and the right. ·First, it may be som~ new 
matter to invalidate the prima facie 'relation set out in 
the complaint; or secondly, it tnay be some neu' matter by 
menns of which, supposing the relation to exist, yet the 
right derived from it is gone; and here it is obvious that 
the reason alleged must be of HAW matter; for if the 
same state1nent appearea on the face of the complaint, 
the defendant might at once deny the right; which, as ob-
served above, would be a demurrer, or general issue in 
law. It has been before remarked·that relations may be 
considered with respect to the parties, the subject matter, 
and the incidents. 
1. First, then, to invalidate the relation, the new 
matter tnay show, first, that the parties were incapacitated 
from contracting the relation, or are incapable to continue 
it. Secondly, that the aubject matter was insufficient or 
illegal, or had undergone some alteration. Thirdly, that 
the ri,qht, being incidental, had not accrued. 
2. Second, the new matter may show that the ri,qht, 
though once existing, is barred by the act of the party; 
by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of God, or un-
avoidable calamity. 
The student, upon exan1ination, \viii find that every 
possible species of defence is included under the above 
heads, and may be referred to some one of the foregoing 
classes-a proof of the correctness of the principles from 
which they are deduced .. 
' '~ .. 
14. Upon an attentive investigation of the four modes 
1_1 . EQUITY PLEADING.
of rebutting the complaint just enumerated, it will be
seen that the fourth is in a great measure resolvable into
the second; for it is manifest that whatever matter is ad-
duced to demonstrate that the relation is invalidated or its
incidents altered, will tend to prove that it is not the same
as stated in the complaint, and therefore may be denied
generally,‘ and this, at first view, would appear to be the
shortest course. In effect, many things which might be
pleaded specially in excuse, are allowed to be given in
evidence under the general issue, in avoidance of the
claim. [a] But there are three grand objects achieved by
special pleas: first, the law and the fact are kept distinct;
second, the issue is narrowed, by means of which the points
to be proved in evidence are considerably diminished, and
the parties saved expense; and third, the court and oppo-
site party are apprised of the nature of the defence.
Wherever the attainment of these three ends, therefore,
is not materially obstructed, the court has given great lat-
itude in allowing the general issue to he pleaded.
15, From what has been said above, it is clear that
to constitute a suflicient answer to any material allegation
in a pleading. the adverse party must either deny the alle-
gation altogether, or r,-onfess the fact, and avoid the infer-
ence, viz.: by setting up some new matter consistent with
such allegation, but which, if true, is an answer to it. [b]
If, however, he set forth matter inconsistent with the allega-
tion, by way of avoidance, this will not be suflicient, with-
out a direct denial of the allegation. And this for two
reasons; first, because as the inconsistent matter is in
effect a different statement, both statements may relate to
distinct subjects and so be both true; [c] and, second,
[a] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 468.
[b] 1 Saunders, 22, n. 2.













































































































































14 EQUITY PLEADING. 
of rebutting the complaint just enumerated, it will be 
seen that the fourth is in a great 1neasure resolvable into 
the second; for it is manifest that whatever n1atter is ad-
duced to detnonstrate that the relation is invalidated or its 
incidents altered, will tend to prove that it is not the same 
as stated in the complaint, and therefore may be denied 
generally,· and this, at first view, \Vould appear to be the 
shortest course. In effect, tnany things which might be 
pleaded specially in ·excuse, are allowed to be given in 
evidence under the general issue, in avoidance of the 
claim. [a] But there are three grand objects achieved by 
special pleas: first, the la\V and the fact are kept distinct; 
second, the issue is narrowed, by means of which the points 
to be proved in evidence are considerably diminished, and 
the parties saved expense; and third, the court and oppo-
site party are apprised of the nature of the defence. 
Wherever the attainment of these three ends, therefore, 
is not materially obstructed, the court has given great lat-
itude in allo\ving the general issue to be pleaded. 
15. From what has been said above, it is clear that 
to constitute a sufficient answer to any material allegation 
in a pleading, the adverse party must either deny the alle-
gation altogether, or oonfess the fact, and avo·id the infer· 
ence, viz.: by setting up some new matter consistent with 
such allegation, but which, if true, is an answer to it. [h] 
If, however, he set forth tnatter inconsistent \Vith the allega-
tion, by \Vay of avoidance, this \Vill not be sufficient, with-
out a direct denial of the allegation. And this for two 
reasons; first, because as the inconsistent matter is in 
effect a different staten1ent, both staternents may relate to 
distinct subjects and so be both true; [ c] and, second, 
[a] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 468. 
[b] 1 Saunders, 22, n. 2. 
[c] Bennett v. Filkins, 1 Saund., 23. 
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such denial avoids prolixity, by tendering an issue at once,
and gives the party an apportunity to prove his allegations.
16, A denial of this kind, prefaced by matter of
avoidance, is called a traverse, and begins with the techni-
cal words “absque hoc.” The preceding statement is
termed the inducement, [a] and such formal traverse is
only necessary when it is requisite to show that the point
traversed is material; [b] otherwise a simple denial, ac-
cording to the second mo ie of defence, will be suflicient.
[c] As the inducement, therefore, shows the materiality
of the traverse if the inducement be bad. the traverse will
be insufficient. The inducement, however, cannot be met
by a denial,.because it is enough for the opposite party to
prove his allegation true (which the traverse enables him
to do), and then the inducement being of inconsistent
matter, if relating to the same subject, must be false;
or relating to a different subject, does not operate as an
avoidance. This is the meaning of the rule laid down in
the books, that “ a traverse cannot be taken after a trav-
verse.” [d]
17, The immediate use and design of pleading is the
formation for an issue, which Lord Coke defines to be “ a
single, certain, and material point, issuing out of the alle-
gations or pleas of the plaintiff and defendant, consisting
regularly upon an aflirmative and negative.” [e] As soon
as this object is effected, therefore, in such manner as to
answer the whole of the precedent pleading, the matter is
brought to a close; and the party who first arrives at that
point is said to tender an issue; and concludes by praying
[a] 1 Saund. 22, n. 2. I Chitty, 592, n. (g) and 699.
[b] Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 20.
[c] 1 Saund., 103, b.
[cl] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 612 Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 17.













































































































































PLEADINGS AT COMl\-ION LAW. 15 
such denial avoids prolixity, by tendering an issue at once, 
and gives the party an apportunity to prove his allegations. 
16. A denial of this kind, prefaced by matter of 
avoidance, is called a traverse, and begins with the techni-
cal words ""absque hoc." The preceding statement is 
termed the inducement, [a] and such formal traverse is 
only necessary when it is requisite to show that the point 
-traversed is material; [b] otherwise a sitnple denial, ac-
cording to the second mo.ie of defence, will be sufficient. 
[c] As the inducement, therefore, shows the materiality 
of the traverse if the inducement be bad .. the traverse will 
be insufficient. The inducement, however, cannot be met 
by a denial,.because it is enough for the opposite party to 
prove his allegation true (which the traverse enables him 
to do), and then the inducetnent being of inconsistent 
matter, if relating to the same subject, must be false; 
or relating to a different subject, does not operate as an 
avoidance. This is the meaning of the rule laid down in 
the books, that "a traverse cannot be taken after a trav-
verse.'' [ d] 
17. The immediate use and design of pleading is the 
formation for an issue, which Lord Coke defines to be.;, a 
single, certain, and material point, issuing out of the alle-
gations or pleas of the plaintiff and defendant, consisting 
regularly upon an affirmative and negative." [e] As soon 
as this object is effected, therefore, in such manner as to 
answer the whole of the precedent pleading, the matter is 
brought to a close; and the party who first arrives at that 
point is said to tender an issue; and concludes by praying 
[a] 1 Saund. 22, n. 2. I Chitty, 592, n. (g) and 699. 
[b] Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 20. 
[c] 1 Saund., 103, b. 
[d] 1 Chitty on Pleading, 612 Com. Dig. Pleader, G. 17. 
[e] Co. Lit., 126, a (q) 
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the judgement of the court, if it be a question of law; or
if it be a matter of fact, he concludes to the country, i. e.,
he demands a trial by jury; for if it be a disputed record;
he appeals to the record itself, and the adverse party joins
issue by doing the like. On the other hand,when a plead-
ing introduces new matter by way of avoidance or excuse,
it only concludes with a verification, because such new
matter may be contested as to its validity in law or its
truth in fact, or the other side may adduce new reasons
to invalidate it in turn. In this latter case, the pleadings
must advance one step further.
18, Having taken this view, we shall now proceed
to the plaiutilf’s reply to the defendant’s plea, called the
Replication. The replication being an answer to ,the plea,
we shall consider it with reference to the four modes of
defence already enumerated. It is manifest that the first
two constitute issues, there being an affirmation on one
side, met by a denial on the other. The replication in
these cases, therefore, only joins issue.
19, The third mode of defence, namely, the denial
of subtraction is' always put aflirmatively, by averring a
performance; because this is is a proposition which ad-
mits of dispute both in law and in fact, and, therefore, the
opposite side should have an opportunity of answering it.
which is done by assigning a particular breach. This last
mentioned replication bears a strong analogy to that which
is called a “novel assignment,” [a] viz: where the com-
plaint not having been set out with sufficient precision, it
becomes necessary from the evasiveness of the plea, to
re-sign the cause of the action with fresh particulars.
20, It is, however, the excusing non-performance
(being the fourth mode of defence) which opens the widest
[a] 2Chitty on Pleading, 617, 1 Saund., 299, 6. Com. Dig-













































































































































16 EQUITY PLEADING. 
the judgement of the court, if it be a question of law; or 
if it be a matter of fact, he concludes to the country, i. e., 
he demands a trial by jury: for if it be a disputed record; 
he appeals to the record itself, and the adverse party joins 
issue by doing the like. On the other hand, when a plead-
ing introduces new matter by way of avoidance or excuse, 
it only concludes with a verification, because such new 
matter may be contested as to its validity in Jaw or its 
truth in fact, or the other side may adduce new reasons 
to invaliaate it iu turn. In this- latter case, the pleadings 
mdst advance one step further. 
18. Having taken this view, we shall now proceed 
to the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's plea, called the 
Replication. 11he replicfl;tion being an answer to ,the plea, 
we shall consider it with reference to the four modes of 
defence already enumerated. It is manifest that the first 
two constit11te issues, there being an affirmation on one 
side, Inet by a denial on the other. rfhe replication in 
these cases, therefore, only joins issue. 
19. 11he third mode of defence, narnely, the denial 
of subtraction is· always put affirtnatively, by ~verring a 
performance; because this is is a proposition which ad .. 
mits of dispute both in la\v and in fact, and, therefore, the 
·opposite side should have an opportunity of answering it, 
which is done by assigning a particular breach. This last 
mentioned replication bears a strong analogy to that which 
is called a "novel asai.qnment," [a] viz: \vhere the com-
plaint not having been set out with sufficient precision, it 
becomes necessary froni the evasiveness of the plea, to 
re-~ign the cause of the action with fresh particu Iars. 
20. It is, however, the excusing non-performance 
(being the fourth mode of defence) which opens the \Videst 
[a] 2 Chitty on Pleading, 617, 1 Sauntl., 299, 6, Con1. Dig. 
Pleader, 3M. 34. 
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range for replicationi The statement of excuse may, like
the statemerit of the right, be reduced to two propositions,
and of a similar nature. The first proposition is-
T hat certain incidents superadded to the admitted re-
lation, operate as a legal discharge to the otherwise result-
ing liability.
The second— That such incidents affect the acknowl-
edged relation.
Therefore, That the defendant is discharged from lia-
bility.
The first proposition here is a question of law. and
may be met by demurrer; the second is a question of fact,
and may be denied or confessed, and avoided by a new
showing; or traversed, in a manner precisely similar to
that which we have described at large, when treating of
pleas in bar.
To the replication the defendant must again rejoin, by
taking issue or tendering issue, or adding new matter of
avoidance; and so on, until the parties arrive at the true
and simple point of controversy.
21, This will suffice to convl'hce'the student that the
rules of pleading are, in reality, founded in common sense,
and are by no means so abstruse as he might be inclined
to suppose them. At the same time they offer the
greatest possible scope for exercising the intellectual fac-
ulties, and might, with great advantage, be studied for the
mere improvement of the reasoning powers. Indeed,
pleading affords the most beautiful illustration of the
nature and utility of the art of logic—an art which has also














































































































































PLEADINGS IN COMMON LAW. 17 
range for replication. The statement of excuse may, like 
the state merit of the right, be reduced to two propositions, 
and of a similar nature. The first proposition is-
That certain incidents superadded to the admitted re-
lation, operate aa a legal discharge to the otherwise result-
ing liability . . 
The second-That auah incidents affect the acknowl-
edged relation. 
Therefore, That the defendant is dischar_ged from lia-
bility. 
The first proposition here is a question of law .. and 
may be met by demurrer; the second is a question of fact, 
and may be denied or confessed, and avoided by a new 
showing; or traversed, in a manner precisely similar to 
that which we have described at large, when treating of 
pleas in bar. 
To the replication the defendant must again rejoin, by 
taking issue or tendering issue, or adding new matter of 
avoidance; and so on, until the parties arrive at the true 
and simple point of controversy. 
21. This will suffice to convftlce•the student that the 
rules of plearling are, in reality, founded in common sense, 
and are by no means so abstruse as he rnight be inclined 
to suppose them. At the same time they offer the 
greatest poss1ble scope for exercising the intellectual fac-
ulties, _and might, with great advantage, be studied for the 
mere improvement of the reasoning powers. Indeed, 
pleading affords the most beautiful illustration of the 
nature and utility of the art of logic-an art which has also 
been greatly and undeservedly decried, but from which 
2 
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the most important advantages may be derived, both in
morals and science. (a)
.
SECTION II.
The Analogy of the Rules of Pleading to Pure Dialectics.
22, In order to show the close connection which ex-
ists beween the forms of pleading and the rules of logic,
we shall endeavor to put the foregoing pleadings into dia-
lectic form, which will also serve to elucidate the observa-
tions we have already made.
The declaration may be resolved into a syllogism, of
which the major premise states the rule of law, and the
minor shows the application of the case to the rule. This
syllogism, however, is usually an enthymeme, of which the
major premise is suppressed. To take a familiar example,
suppose debt on bond, the declaration states:
Min. That the defendant acknowledges himself, by a cer-
tain writing obligatory, bound to pay a certain
sum to the plaintif.
Therefore, he ought to pay it.
Here the suppressed premise,which for greater conven-
ience we shall make an hypothetic, is :
Maj. If a man acknowledges himself, by a writing, obli-
gatory bouhd to pay a certain sum, he ought to
pay it.
(a) Lord Coke, in his Commentary on Sect. 381 of Little
ton, says, “By this argument, logically drawn a divisione, it ap-
peareth how necessary it is that our student should (as Littleton
did) come from one of the universities to the study of the com-
mou law, where he may learn the liberal arts, and especially
logic; for that teacheth a man, not only by just argument to
conclude the matter in question, but to discern between truth
and falsehood, etc., whereby it appeareth how necessary it is for













































































































































18 EQUITY PLEADING. 
the most important advantages may be derived, both in 
morals and science. (a) 
SECTION II. 
The Analo.qy of the R·ules of Pleading to Pure Dialectics. 
22. In order to show the close connection which ex-
ists beween the forms of pleading and the rules of logic, 
we shall endeavor to put the foregoing pleadings into dia-
lectic form, which will also serve to elucidate the observa-
tions we have already made. 
The declaration may be resolved into a syllogism, of 
which ·the major premise states the rule of law, and the 
minor shows the application of the case to the rule. This 
syllogis1n, however, is usually an enthymeme, of which the 
majo1' premise is suppressed. To take a familiar example, 
suppose debt on bond, the declaration states: 
Min. That the defendant acknowledges himself, by a cer-
tain writin.q obligatory, bound to pay a certain 
sum to the plaintiff. 
Therefore, he ought to pay it. 
Here the suppressed premise, which for greater conven-
ience we shall make an hypothetic, is : 
Maj. If a man acknowledges himself, by a writing, obli-
gatory bou1td to pay a certain sum, he ought to 
pay it. 
(a) Lord Coke, in his Commentary on Sect. 381 of Little-
ton, says, "By this argument, logically drawn a divisione, it ap-
peareth how necessary it is that our student should (as Littleton 
did) come from one of the universities to the study of the com-
mon law, where he may learn the liberal arts, and especially 
logic; for that teacheth a man, not only by just argument to 
conclude the matter in question, but to discern between truth 
and falsehood, etc., w1tereby it appeareth how necessary it is for 
our student." Co. Litt. 235, b. 
RULES or PLEADING. 19
This is the general rule of law, and is prima facie
true. I
23, Now let us examine each proposition separately:
if the minor be false, the defendant at once pleads the
general issue of “ non est factam,” which is equivalent to
“ negatur minor,” and puts the plaintiff on the proof. If
the minor be true, then the error must lie in the sup-
pressed premiss, or the conclusion is badly drawn. But
the hypothetic major may be a in two ways: first, the con-
sequent may not follow from he antecedent at all, or, in
other words, there may be no such general rule of law ; and
to this the defendant may demur, which is equivalent to
“ negatm‘ major; ” but, secondly, as the antecedent of the
hypothetic is indefinite, it may be taken either as uni-
versal or particular, i. e., it may be considered as an uni-
versal rule, or one admitting of exceptions if it be taken
in the argument as universal, then it may be bad; or, in
other words, there may be exception to the general rule of
law. And, on the other hand, if in such case it be taken as
particular, then the conclusion is improperly drawn, for it
is “ argumentum a particulars‘ ad um‘versaZe,” because,
the conclusion being in the singular, the subalternans,
from which it is deduced, must be universal. In other
words, the defendant may show that the case falls within
the exceptions, and not within the rule ; and this he
must do by special plea, which is equivalent to a “non
sequitur,” and must be proved by a collateral argument,
for it is not enough to show that there are exceptions to
the general rule, but the defendant must prove his case to
be one of the exceptions. And, in general, where the con-
clusion is contingent it will be taken to be good until the
contrary is proved. Another reason why the defendantis,
in this latter instance, bound to prove his case, is because













































































































































RULES OF PLEADING. 19 
This is the general rule of law, and is prima facie 
true. 
. 23. Now let us examine each proposition separately: 
if the minor be false, the defendant at once pleads the 
general issue of "non est faotam," which is equivalent to 
"negatur minor," and puts the plaintiff on the proof. If 
the minor be true, then the error must lie in the sup-
pressed premiss, or the conclusion is b.adly drawn. B.ut 
the hypothetic major may be q~<}Jn two ways: first, the con-
.sequent may not follow fro~he antecedent at all, or, in 
other words, there.may be no such general rule of law; and 
to this the defendant may demur, which is equivalent to 
'' negatur major,·~' but, secondly, as the. antecedent of the 
hypothetic is indefinite, it may be taken either as uni-
versal or particular, i. e., it may be considered as an uni-
versal rule, or one admitting of exceptions if it be taken 
in the argument as universal, then it may be bad; or, in 
other words, there may be exception to the general rule of 
law. And, on the other hand, if in such case it be taken as 
particular, then the conclusion is improperly drawn, for it 
is " arg~umentum a partioulari ad universale," because, 
the conclusion being in the singular, the subalternans, 
from which it is deduced, must be universal. In other 
words, the defendant may show that the case falls within 
the exceptions, and not within the rule ; and this he 
must do by special plea, which is equivalent to a ''non 
8equitur," and must be proved by a collateral argument, 
for it is not enough to show that there are exceptions to 
the a;ceneral rule, but the defendant must prove his case to 
be one of the exceptions. And, in general, whe.re the con-
clusion is contingent it will be taken to be good un~il the 
contrary is proved. Another reason why the defendant is, 
in this latter instance, bound to prove his case, is because 
no man shall be obliged to prove a negative, which the 
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plaintiff would be compelled to do if it lay upon him to
show that the case did not fall within the exceptions.
Let us‘ suppose, then, in the example given, that the
defendant pleads satisfaction “ solvit ad diem.” We shall
now examine his collateral syllogism.
Here the suppressed premiss is :
Maj. If the condition of the bond has beeen performed,
then the defendant is not liable.
Min. The condition has been performed, for the money
was paid at the day.
Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the penalty.
24, The student will observe that the minor of this
syllogism is not a simple proposition, but that the whole
argument is in fact a “ sorites,” though expressed for the
sake of brevity in the above form. Here “negatur major”
is a demurrer to the exception, or that there is no such
exception to the general rule of law laid down by the
plaintiff. But the minor is resolved into two parts,
namely, whether the money has been paid in the manner
stated, or at all; and, secondly, whether such payment is
a performance of the condition. The first is put in issue
by a negatur minor, and the defendant must prove it at
the trial; the second point results from the major of the
second syllogism, into which the sorites is resolved, and is
a demurrer in law by a “ negatur major secunda.”
25, We might pursue this investigation much higher,
but we have purposely selected the simplest example for
illustration; and this, it is apprehended, is sufiicient to let
the student see that the principles of special pleading and
those of pure dialectics are perfectly similar, [0] It is
[a] “ The structure of a record raised on these foundations is
not less solid than the demonstration of a proposition in Euclid ;
and pleading formed on these maxims, is not only matter of
science, but perhaps aflords some ol‘,the best specimens of strict













































































































































20 EQUITY PLEADING. 
plaintiff would be compelled to do if it lay upon him to 
show that the case did not fall within the exceptions. 
Let us· suppose, then., in the example given, that the 
defendant pleads satisfaction " solvit ad diem." We shall 
now examine his collateral syllogism. 
Here the suppressed premiss is : 
Maj. If the condition of the bond has beeen performed, 
then the defendant ·is not liable. 
Min. Th,e condition has been performed, for the money 
was Pfid at the d~y. 
Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the penalty. 
24. The student will observe that the minor of this 
syllogism is not a simple proposition, but that the whole 
argument is in fact a "sorites,'' though expressed for the 
sake of brevity in the above form. Here ''negatur major" 
is a demurrer to the exception, or that there is no such 
exception to the general rule of law laid down by the 
plaintiff. But the minor is resolved into two parts, 
namely, whether the money has been paid in the manner 
stated, or at all ; and, secondly, whether such payment is 
a performance of the condition. The first. is put in issue 
by a negatur minor, and the defendant must prove it at 
the trial; the second point results from the major of the 
second syllogism, into which the aorites is resolved, and is 
a demurrer in law by a " negatur major secunda." 
25. We might pursue this investigation much higher, 
but we have purposely selected the simplest example for 
illustration; and this, it is apprehended, is sufficient to let 
the student see that the principles of special pleading and 
those of pure dialectics are perfectly similar, [a] It is 
[a] "The structure of a record raised on these foundations is 
not less solid than the dem9nstration of a proposition in .Euclid ; 
and pleading formed on these maxims, is not only matter of 
science, but perhaps aftords some ot .. the best specimens of strict 
genuine logic." Vide Wynne's Eunomus, Dial. 2d. 
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obvious that the illustrations we have adduced refer only
to special pleas in bar. The same logical method is, how-
ever, equally applicable to all other pleas. In effect, the
declaration does not confine itself to the naked proof of
right, but proceeds to show,by a statement of demand and
refusal, that the right is withheld, and therefore the plain-
tifi‘ calls upon the court for its assistance, or, in other
words, the sanction of the law. By this concluding part
of the declaration, the competency of the jurisdiction, the
non-disability of the plaintifi‘, and the correctness of the
form of proceeding, are all inferred; and if the defendant
can show a deficiency in any of these particulars he may
plead the same in abatement. And these propositions,
like the former, may be all put in the syllogistic form, and
their correctness tried by the same test.
SECTION III.
Of Pleading in Eguiil/, and its Analogy to Common Law.
26, We shall now proceed to show the application of
the principles we have laid down, to cases in equity, and
although from the difference in the forn1s of proceeding in
chancery it may not appear at first sight, yet upon a closer
inspection we shall find that there is a strict analogy be-
tween the pleadings in equity and those at common law.
27, The original writ, sued out at common law, re-
quires the defendant to repair the injury complained of,
or to appear in court and show cause to the contrary.
The declaration afterwards is but an exposition or ampli-
fication of the writ. If the defendant contests the suit, he
comes in and pleads, in the manner we have described in
the former part of this chapter. Proceedings in equity are
commenced by a petition to the court, to issue the king’s













































































































































PLEADING IN EQUITY, ETC. 21 
obvious that the illustrations we have adduced refer only 
to special pleas in bar. The same logical method is, how-
ever, equally applicable to all other pleas. In effect, the 
declaration does not confine itself to the naked proof of 
right, but proceeds to show, by a statement of demand and 
refusal, that the rigb~ is withheld, and therefore the plain-
tiff calls upon the court for its assistance, or, in other 
words, the sanction of the law. By this concluding part 
of the declaration, the competency of the jurisdiction, the 
non-disability o.f the plaintiff, and the correctness of the 
form of proceeding, are all inferred; and if the defendant 
can show a deficiency in any of these particulars he may 
plead the same in abatement. And these propositions, 
like the former, may be all put in the syllogistic form, and 
their correctne.3s tried by the same test. 
SECTION Ill. 
Of Pleading in Equity, and its Analogy ·to Oo1nmon Law. 
26. We shall now proceed to show the application of 
the principles we have laid down, to cases in equity, and 
although from the difference in the forn1s of proceeding in 
chancery it may not appear at first sight, yet upon a closer 
inspection we shall find that there is a strict analogy be-
tween the pleadings in equity and those at common law. 
27. ':rhe original writ, sued out at common law, re-
quires the defendant to repair the injury complained of, 
or to appear in court and show cause to the· contrary. 
The declaration after\vards is but an exposition or ampli-
fication of the writ. If the defendant contests the suit, he 
comes in and pleads, in the manner we have described in 
the former part of this chapter. Proceedings in equity are 
commenced by· a petition to the court, to issue the king's 
wnt of suhpmna, to compel the defendant to appear and 
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“ answer concerning those things which shall be objected to
by him; and further, to do and receive what the said court
shall have considered in that behalf :” which is the lan-
guage of the writ. The petition must, therefore, state the
cause of complaint, as a ground for issuing the subpama.
Originally when the defendant appeared on the wbpwna,
articles in writing were exhibited to him, containing such
charges as he was required to answer upon oath; but it
was found more convenient to insert such charges in the
body of the petition itself, which was thence denominated a
bill in chancery. Hence the primary object of a bill is to
obtain a discovery upon oath from the defendant, and
then to have such relief grounded upon the defendant’s ,
admissions, or the complainant’s proofs, as the court shall
think proper. The bill. therefore, being framed with a
view to extract a discovery in the first instance, is gener-
ally of considerable amplitude, stating a variety of cir-
cumstances by way of inducement, and usually anticipat-
ing and controverting the defence of the adverse party;
In this respect it differs from the declaration at common
law, Which is a pure pleading, confined to the single and
simple point of charge or statement of injury; and from
this difference, it will be seen, some of the apparent an-
omalies in pleading in equity arise.
28, As the bill in setting out a cause- of complaint
must state an injury sustained, or likely to be sustained, it
will contain the two propositions to prove the right for-
merly noticed, and will, in substance, admit of the same
modes of defence as at common law; whatever dissimilar-
ity exists, is qaused by the difference of form. The prayer
of the bill is, in the first instance, that the defendant shall
be compelled to answer upon oath the several allegations
contained in the bill; and thus it performs the ofiice of an













































































































































22 EQUITY PLEADIN"G. 
"answer concerning those things which shall be objected to 
by him; and further, to do and receive what the said cour~ 
shall have considered in that behalf:" which is the lan-
guage of the writ. The petition must, therefore, state the 
cause of complaint, as a ground for issuing the subpmna. 
Originally wlien the defendant appeared on the subpmna, 
articles in writing were exhibited to him, containing such 
charges as he was required to answer upon oath; but it 
was found more convenient to insert such charges in the 
body of the petition itself, which was thence denominated a 
bill in chancery. Hence the primary object of a bill is to 
obtain a discovery upon oath from the defendant, and 
then to have such relief grounded upon the defendant's 
admissions, or the complainant's proofs, as the court shall 
think proper. The bill.. therefore, being framed with a 
view to extract a discovery in the first instance, is gener-
ally of considerable amplitude, stating a variety of cir-
cumstances by way of inducement, and us~ally anticipat-
ing and controverting the defence of the adverse party~ 
In this respect it differs from the declaration at common 
law, which is a pure pleading, confined to the single and 
simple point of charge or statement of injury; and from 
this difference, it will be seen, some of the apparent an-
omalies in pleading in equity arise. 
28. As the bill in setting out a cause· of complaint 
1nust state an injury sustained, or likely to be sustained, it 
will contain the two propositions to prove the right for· 
merly noticed, and will, in substance, admit ·of the same 
modes of defence as at common law; whatever dissimilar-
ity exists, is caused by the difference of form. The prayer 
of the bill is, in the first instance, that the defendant shall 
be compelled to answer upon oath the several allegations 
contained in the bill; and thus it performs the office of an 
examination as well as of complaint. Hence arises a species 
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of pleading in equity different from anything we have hith-
erto seen, namely,the answer to the bill; which in analogy to
the bill, has the double character of a pleading and a proof,
being a plea so far as it denies the allegations of the bill,
perfectly analogous to the general issue at law; and a proof,
so far as it contains admissions of any part of the complain-
ant’s case. Here, too, many facts which might have been
available as a plea are allowed to be stated by way of an-
swer, similar to the rule which permits such facts to be
given in evidence under the general issue at common law.
And the reason seems to be, that as the chief end of a plea
in equity is to decide a preliminary .valid objection, with-
out putting the parties to the expense and trouble of arriv-
ing at the same point, by the circuitous mode of following
up the suit, wherever that object will not be efiected by a
plea, the party is at liberty to resort to which ever mode of
defence he thinks most suitable, for as the reason of the
rule ceases, “cessat et ipsa' Zex.” The invariable rule of
the law, that every defence which cannot be specially
pleaded, may be given in evidence under the general issue ;
and a similar rule holds in equity; for wherever the party
has a defence, which is not the proper subject of a plea,
such defence may be stated in the answer. [a] Thus we
find the answer either, lst, traverses and denies the alle-
gations of the bill; or, 2nd, it admits them to be true; or,
3d, it confesses and avoids such points as need not be spe-
cially pleaded to, and these are in fact, the several parts of
an answer, as laid down in the books of practice.
29, Now, as a decree of the court of equity is pro-
nounced on a view, both of the fact and the law of the case,
the answer, such as we have described it, might be deemed
in all cases a sufficient defence, since it includes the three














































































































































PLEAD!NG IN EQUITY, ETC. 23 
of pleading in equity different from anything we have hith-
erto seen, namely,the answer to the bill; ·which in analogy to 
the bill, has the double character of a pleading and a proof, 
being a plea so far as it denies the allegations of the bill, 
perfectly analogous to the general iaaue at ]aw; and a proof, 
so far as it contains admissions of any part of the complain-
ant's case. Here, too, many facts which might have been 
available as a plea are allowed to be stated by way of an-
swer, similar to the rule which permits such facts to be 
given in evidence under the general issue at common law. 
And the reason seems to be, that as the chief end of a plea 
in equity is to decide a preliminary .valid ol?jection, with-
out putting the p_arties to the expense and trouble of arriv-
ing at the same point, by the circuitous mode of following 
up the suit, wherever that object will not be effected by a 
plea, the party is at liberty to resort to which ever mode of 
defence he thinks most suitable, for as the reason of the 
rule ceases, "ceaaat et ipaa· ler».'' The invariable rule of 
the law, that every defence which cannot be specially 
pleaded, may be given in evidence under the general issue; 
and a similar rule holds in equity; for wherever the party 
has a defence, which is not the proper subject of a plea, 
such defence may be stated in the answer. [a] Thus we 
find the answer either, 1st, traverses and denies the alle-
gations of the bill; or, 2nd, it admits them to be true; or, 
3d, it confesses and avoids such points as need not be spe-
cially pleaded to, and these are in fact, the several parts of 
an answer, as laid down in the books of practice. 
29. Now, as a decree of the court of equity is pro-
nounced on a view, both of the fact and the lavy of the case, 
the answer, such as we have described it, might be deemed 
in all cases a sufficient defence, since it includes the three 
[a] Mitf. 249. 1 Atk. 54. 2 P. Wms. 145. 
EQ. PL.-14. 
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last modes ; and the question of law is determined at the
hearing. But we must recollect that one of the principal
objects of special pleading is to save the parties the ex-
pense and trouble of proving, by evidence, facts which
might eventually turn out to be immaterial, or inadequate
to sustain the right demanded.
30, From the nature of equity, it is obvious that the
right demanded cannot be any definite essential quality,
flowing from the relation, but only growing out of it inci-
dentally; and which, therefore, must be determined “secun-
dum oequum et bonum.” This is the proper business of the
court at the hearing; and when the rights of all the parties
are ascertained, thereupon is grounded such measure of re-
lief as the reason and justice of the case may require. The
party complainant, therefore, after stating the hardship
under which he labors, from the nature of the relation ex-
isting between him and the defendant, prays the court to
grant him such specific relief as he conceives himself en-
titled to demand. The relief prayed includes, of course,
the restoration of the equitable right, supposed to be with-
held; and ancillary to relief, is discovery from the defend-
ant; or the discovery may be the principal point, and the
only right demanded. Hence the propositions of a bill
may be universally laid down to be—1st: That from the
relation stated accrues the right to discover.//, and such re-
lief as is prayed for. 2d: That the relation stated is that
which actually exists.
31, It is evident that this first proposition assumes
the sufficiency of the form of the application, as well as the
existence of the right; from which it has been doubted













































































































































24 EQUITY PLEADING-. 
last modes,· and the question of law is determined at the 
hearing. But we must recollect that one of the princiJ]al 
objects of special pleading is to save the parties the ex-
pense and trouble of proving, by evidence, facts which 
might eventually turn out to b.e immaterial, or inadequate 
to sustain the right demanded. 
30. From the nature of equity, it is obvious that the 
right demanded cannot be any definite essential quality, 
flowing from the relation, but only growing out of it inci-
dentally; and which, therefore, must be detern1ined ,.; secun-
dum mquum et bonum." This is the proper business of the 
court at the hearing; and when the rights of all the parties 
are ascertained, thereupon is grounded such measure of re-
lief as the reason and justice of the case may require. The 
party complainant, therefore, after stating the hardship 
under which he labors, from the nature of the relation ex-
isting between him and the defendant, prays the court to 
grant him such specific relief as he conceives himself en-
titled to demand. The relief prayed includes, of course, 
the restoration of the equitable right, supposed to be with-
held; and ancillary to relief, is discovery frotn the defend-
ant; or the discovery may be the principal point, and the 
only right demanded. Hence the propositions of a bill 
may be universally laid down to be-1st: That from the 
relation stated accrues the Tl~.qht to discover.'/, and such re-
lief as is prayed for. 21: That the relation stated is that 
which actually exists. 
31. It is evident that this first proposition assumes 
the sufficiency of the form ~f t.he application, as well as the 
existence of the right; fron1 which it has been doubted 
whether equity has any pleas in abatement, as contradis-
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tinguished from pleas in bar; but this is a mere question
of words, and not worth the inquiry. [a]
These two propositions admit of any defence which
either, 1st, denies the right either to discovery or ‘relief, or
both; or, 2d, denies the relation ; or, 3d, invalidates the re-
lation, or bars the right. Most of these may be done by
'way of answer; but as it may be a principal object with
the defendant not to answer at all, and as it will preclude
unnecessary litigation to state a valid bar in limine, the
first mode of defence must,in general, be taken advantage
of by demurrer; the third, by plea. To these there is only
a formal replication,for the purpose of tendering andjoin-
ing issue; the necessity for special replications being obvi-
ated by the permission which the parties have to add to,
and amend their pleadings. '
32, From the principles above stated, it is sufficiently
clear that the two modes of defence just mentioned are
similar to the analogous ones at common law, and are here
perfectly applicable; for in general terms, a demurrer is
confined to the single point of law, but aplea opens the
two questions of law and of fact, to either of which the op-
posite party may except. The demurrer, in the first mode
of defence in equity, is taken on the complainant’s own
statement, by his bill; and consequently the facts cannot
be disputed. In the third mode, the defendant puts for-
ward a new statement of his own, and this must be by plea,
that the complainant may have an opportunity to reply,
and so put him to‘ the proof of the new facts.
33, Hence is the grand distinction which is drawn be-
tween demurrers and pleas in the books, that the one is an
La] Merewether v. Melish, 13 Ves. 437. And wide Beames’
Pleas, 57, 58, 59. The difference between pleas in abatement and
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tinguished from pleas in bar,· but this is a mere question 
of words, and not ·North the inquiry. [a] 
These two propositions admit of any defence which 
either, 1st, denies the right either to discovery or ·relief, or 
both; or, 2d, denies the relation; or, 3d, invalidates there-
lation, or bars the right. Most of these may be done by 
·way of answer; but as it may be a principal object with 
the defendant not to answer at all, and as it will preclude 
unnecessary litigation to st.ate a valid bar in limine, the 
first mode of defence must, in general, be taken ad vantage 
of by demurrer; the third, by plea. 11o these there is only 
a formal replication, for the purpose of tendering and join-
ing issue; the necessity for special replications being obvi-
ated by the permis..~ion which the parties have to add to, 
and amend their pleadings. 
32. From the principles above stated, it is sufficiently 
clear that the two modes of defence just mentioned are 
similar to the analogous ones at common law, and are here 
perfectly applicable; for in general terms, a demurrer is 
confined to the single point of law, but a plea opens the 
two questions of law and of fact, to either of which the op-
posite party may except. The demurrer, in the first mode 
of defence in equity, is tak~n on the complainant's own 
statement, by his bill; and consequently the facts cannot 
be disputed. In the third mode, the defendant puts for-
wa.rd a new statement of his own, and this must be by plea, 
that the complainant may have an opportunity. to reply, 
and so put him to· the proof of the new facts. 
33. Hence is the grand distinction .which is drawn be-
tween demurrers and pleas in the books, that th.e oBe is an 
La] Merewether v. Melish, 13 Ves. 437. And vide Beames' 
Pleas, 57, 58, 59. The difference between pleas in abatentent and 
those in bar in equity, rests on precisely the same grounds as at 
common law. 
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objection, apparent from matter contained in the bill ; the
other, from matter “ dehors ” the bill. [a] But this latter
is rather an accident than the essential difference, as the
matter of a plea need not necessarily be dehors the bill.
Accordingly we find that that species of plea, called a “neg -
ative plea,” [b] does not advance any new fact which the
bill had omitted, but is simply confined to the denial of a
point stated in the bill, on which the whole right of action
depends. Nor is this peculiar to equity ; the plea of “ ne
unques executor” [c] “ ne unques accouple,” and such like,
which are pleas in bar at common law, coming under the
second mode of defence; and many of the pleas in abate-
ment are strictly of the same nature as the negative plea
in equity, and do not advance foreign matter. In like
manner that species of plea which sets up a defence an-
ticipated by the bill, and therein sought to be controverted,
does not bring forward matter dehors the bill; and yet the
objection cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer, but
is, with strict propriety, the subject of a plea, because it
involves a question of fact as well as of law. Such is the
plea of release to a bill, which seeks to set such release
aside on the ground of fraud, or want of consideration;
or the plea to a bill to set aside a decree on the ground of
fraud, and the like. Here the whole question turns on the
validity of the bar sought to be impeached; and therefore
the plea must go on to deny, by averment, the ground of
impeachment; which is, in such case, the real point at
[a] Beames on Pleas, 2 Mitf. Passim.
[b] Mitf. 187, 188.
[c] The plea of “ne unques executor,” is classed by Lord
Redesdale, among pleas in abatement; and is treated as such by
Mr. Beames, when speaking of negative pleas. But it is mani-
festly a plea in bar, of the second mode; namely, the denial of a
particular fact on which the relation rests. See also 1 Saund.













































































































































26 EQUITY PLEADiNG. 
objection, apparent from matter contained in the bill ; the 
other, from matter" dehors" the bill. [a] But this latter 
is rather an accident t.han the essential difl'erence, as the 
matter of a plea need not necessarily be de/tors the bill. 
Accordingly we find that that species of plea, called a ''neg-
ative plea," [b] does not advance any new fact which the 
bill had omitted, but is simply confined to the denial of a 
point stated in the bill, on which the whole right of action 
depends. Nor is this peculiar to equity; the plea of" ne 
unques ewecutor ,, [o] '' ne unques aooouple," and such like, 
which are ·pleas in bar at comtnon law, coming under the 
second mode of defence; and many of the pleas in abate-
ment are strictly of the same nature as the negative plea 
in equity, and do not advance foreign matter. In like 
manner that species of plea which sets up a defence an-
ticipated by the bill, and therein sought to be controverted, 
does not bring forward matter dehors the bill; and yet the 
objection cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer, but 
is, with strict prolJriety, the subject of a plea, because it 
involves a question of fact as well as of law. Such is the 
plea of release to a bill, which seeks to set such release 
aside on the ground of fraud, or want of consideration; 
or the plea to a bill to set aside a decree on the ground of 
fraud, and the lilre. Here the whole question turns on the 
validity of the bar sought to be impeached; and therefore 
the plea must go on to deny, by averment, the ground of 
impeachment; which is, in such case, the real point at 
[a] Beames on Pleas, 2 Mitf. Passim. 
[b] Mitf. 187, 188. 
[c] The plea of "ne unques executor," is classed by Lord 
Redesdale, among pleas in abatement; and is treated as such by 
Mr. Beames, when speaking of negative pleas. But it is mani-
festly a plea in bar, of the second mode; namely, the denial of a 
particular fact on which the relation rests. See also 1 Saund. 
274, a. (n. 3.) 
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issue. But this point is a point of fact, and consequently
cannot be controverted by demurrer, which is an issue in
l-aw only.
34, But it is necessary that the fraud, or other mat-
ter, be denied by answer likewise. To seek for the reason
of this peculiarity from the analogy of law, we must go
somewhat deeper into the inquiry. In the first place, we
must recollect that an issue is produced by a direct aver-
ment on the one side and a traverse on the other, and that
party which first traverses or denies a specific averment,
is said to tender an issue on that point. Now, at law no
issue is tendered by the special plea, but as it always relies
upon new facts, it concludes with a verification. And
even in the case of a special negative plea there is no issue
tendered by such plea, because it is not the denial of a
distinct averment in the declaration, but only of apoint
assumed, and which must be formally averred before the
traverse can tender an issue; and the negative plea, as it
alleges no new fact, does not even require the usual veri-
fication. [a] In equity, since the disuse of special replica-
tions and rejoinders, there are but two of the pleadings
which tender an issue—the answer, on the part of the de-
fendant, and the replication, on ‘that of the complainant.
When the defendant desires to take issue in law he files a
demurrer, and the complainant sets it down to be argued,
which is a joinder in demurrer; on the other hand, he
tenders an issue on the facts by his answer, so far as it
traverses or denies them; and the complainant ‘joins issue
by the first part of his general replication, which states
that “he will aver and prove his said bill to be true, cer-
tain, and sufiicient in law to be answered unto ;” and in
the latter part, which maintains that “ the said answer of
the said defendant is uncertain, untrue, and insuflicient to
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issue. But this point -is a point of fact, and consequently 
cannot be controverted by demurrer, which is an issue in 
· law only. 
34. But it is necessary that the fraud, or other mat-
ter, be denied by an.swer likewise. To seek for the reason 
of this peculiarity from ·the analogy of law, we must go 
somewhat deeper into the inquiry. In the first place, we 
must recollect that an issue is produced by a direct aver-
ment on the one side and a traverse on the other, and that 
party which first traverses or denies a specific averment, 
is said to tender an issue on that point. Now, at law no 
issue is tendered by the special plea, but as it always relies 
upon new facts, it concludes with a verification. And 
even in the case of a special negative plea there is no issue 
tendered by such plea, because it is not the denial of a 
distinct averment in the declaration, but only of a. point 
assumed, and which must be formally averred before the 
traverse can tender an issue; and the negative plea, as it 
alleges no new fact, does not even require the usual veri-
fication. [a] In equity, since th~ disuse of special replica-
tions and rejoinders, there are but two of the pleadings 
which tender an issue-the answer, on the part of the de-
fendant, and the replication, on ·that of the complainant. 
When the defendant desires to take iaaue in law he files a 
demurrer, and the complainant sets it down to be argued, 
which is a joinder in demurrer; on the other hand, he 
tenders an issue on the facts by his answer, so far as it 
trav.erses or denies them; and the complainant 'joins issue 
by the first part of his general replication, which states 
that "he will aver and prove his said bill to be true, cer-
tain, and sufficient in law to be answered unto;" and in 
the latter part, which maintains that " the said answer of 
the said defendant is uncertain, untrue, and insufficient to 
[a] Co. Li tt. 303, a. 
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be replied unto by this repliant,” he tenders an issue on
his part to such portions of the answer as confess and
avoid the bill, or to the new facts of the plea; and to this
the defendant pro forma rejoins. As, therefore, in conform-
ity to the rule of law, the plea in equity does not tender
an issue, [a] in the case of negative averments being con-
tained in the plea, the same points must also be denied by
way of answer, for othewise no issue could be joined on
such negative averments. The complainant could not
tender an issue upon them by his replication, for that
would be but the negation of a negation, which, in fact,
only amounts to an afiirmative; and we have seen that an
issue “ consists upon an affirmative and an negative,”
therefore the defendant must produce the issue in the only
way whichremains to him—that is, by answer. This dif-
ficulty.is obviated at common law by a special replication,
which may tender an issue aflirmatively to the negative
averment.
35, And here we must mark the distinction between
a negative plea, which is frequently supported by afiirm-
ative averments, and negative averments, which are used
in support of an aflirmative plea. And this distinction
will furnish us with another reason for the general rule
laid down, viz: “that if there is any charge in the bill
which is an equitable circumstance in favor of the plain-
tifl"s case against the matter pleaded, as fraud, or notice
of title, that charge must be denied by way of answer as
well as by averment in the plea.” [b] It will be seen at
once that such denials are negative averments in support
of an affirmative plea. Now we have before noticed that
when the complainant intends to dispute the facts of the
plea he replies, and thereby puts the defendant to the
[a] 2 Bro. C. C. 144.














































































































































be replied unto by this repliant," he tender:s an issue on 
his part to such portions of the answer as confess an~ 
avoid the bill, or to the new facts of the plea; and to this 
the defendant pro forma rejoins. As, therefore, in conform-
ity to the rule of law, the plea in equity does not tender 
an issue, [a] in the case of negative averments being con-
tained in the plea, the same points tnust also be denied by 
way of answer, for othewise no issue could be joined on 
such negative averments. T~e complainant could not 
tender an issue upon them by his replication, for that 
would be but the negation of a negation, which, in fact, 
only amounts to an affirmative; and we .have seen that an 
issue "consists upon an affirmative and an negative," 
therefore the defendant must produce the issue in the only 
way which .remains to him-that is, by answer. 1,his dif-
ficulty .is obviated at common law by a special replication, 
which may tender an issue affirmatively to the negative 
averment. 
35. And here we must mark the distinction between 
a negative plea, which is frequently supported by affirm-
ative averments, and negative averments, which are used 
in support of an affirmat~ve plea. And this distinction 
will furnish us with another reason for the general rule 
laid down, viz : " that if there is any charge in the bill 
which is an equitable circumstance in favor of the plain-
tiff's case against the matter pleaded, as fraud, or notice 
of title, that charge must be denied by way of answer as 
well as by averment in the plea." [b] It will be seen at 
once that such denials are negative av~rments in support 
of an affirmative plea. Now we have before noticed that 
when the complainant intends to dispute the facts of the 
plea he replies, and thereby puts the defendant to the 
[a] 2 Bro. C. C. -144. 
[ b] Mitf. 241. Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 728. 
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proof of his allegations, so that in this instance the de-
féndant would be forced to prove a negative, which is con-
trary to reason and the rule of law. This absurdity is ob-
viated by the defendant’s denying the fraud or notice in
his answer, which at once tenders the issue and puts the
complainant on the proof. But besides the denial by way
of answer, there must likewise be positive averments in
the plea; and this for two reasons: first, because as the
plea admits the facts of the bill,without such averment, it
would acknowledge the fraud or other ground of impeach-
ment to the bar; and, secondly, by such acknowledgment
the plea would be imperfect, as a fraudulent release, for
instance, would be no release, and therefore not a good bar.
36, The mode of pleading has been objected to on
the ground of duplicity—a mistake which has arisen from
want of sufficient attention to the distinction between
averments in support of a plea and the pleading a double
bar, which alone constitutes duplicity. [a]
Thus, it is humbly conceived, we have shown that this
kind of plea differs not in principle from other pleas—a
disquisition into which we have been led both because it
serves to elucidate the nature of pleas in general and to
point out the correctness of Lord Eldon‘s observation,
“ that the best rule is analogy to law ;” [b] but, princi-
pally, because Mr. Beames in his learned Treatise on Pleas
styles this an “incongruous plea,” and thinks that it is
not properly a plea, but something in the nature of one.
His opinion upon this subject seems to have been formed
from supposing that the essential difference between a
demurrer and a plea is that the latter always relies on
matter “ delzo-rs ” the bill; whereas, the true distinction is
that the demurrer is an an issue in law, on the complain-
[a] 1 Burrows, 320.
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proof of his allegations, so that in this instance the de-
f~ndant would be forced to prove a negative, which is con· 
trary to reason and the rule of law. This absurdity is ob-
viated by the defendant's denying the fraud or notice in 
his ans,ver, which at once tender~ the issue and puts the 
complainant on the proof. But besides the denial by way 
of answer, there must likewise be positive averments in 
the plea; and this for two reasons: first, because as the 
plea admits the facts of the bill. without such averment, it 
would acknowledge the fraud or other ground of impeach-
ment to the bar; and, secondly, by such acknowledgment 
the plea would be imperfect, as a fraudulent release, for 
instance, would be no release, and therefore not a good bar. · 
36. The mode of pleading has been objected to on 
the ground of duplicity-a mistake which has arisen from 
want of sufficient attention to t.he distinction between 
averments in surport of a plea and tbe pleading a double 
bar, which alone constitutes duplicity. [a] 
Thus, 1t is humbly conceived, we have shown that this 
kind of plea differs not in principle from other pleas-a 
disquisition into which we have been led both because it 
serves to elucidate the nature of pleas in general and to 
point out the correctness of Lord Eldon,s observation, 
''that the best rule is analogy to la.w ;" [b] but, princi-
pally, because Mr. Beames in his learned Treatise on Pleas 
styles this an "incongruo·us plea," and thinks that it is 
not properly a plea, but something in the nature of one. 
His opinion upon this subject seems to have been formed. 
from suppo~ing that the essential difference between a 
demurrer and a plea is that the latter always relies on 
matter "dehors" the bill; whereas, the true distinction is 
that the demurrer is an an issue in law, on the complain-
[ a] 1 Burrows, 320. 
[b] 9 Ves. 54. 
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ant’s own showing; the plea is an objection raised by a
new showing of the defendant. But the defendant’s new
showing may be of old matter stated in the bill (out of
which matter a contradictory case may be made by trav-
erse), although most usually it is altogether of new matter.
And the reason for such new showing, whether old or new
matter, being the proper subject of a plea, is that it lets in
the fact as well as the law.
37, With the view that ishere taken of this subject,
the old definition of a plea in equity, laid down in the
Cursus Cancelariae, [a] and adopted by Lord Redesdale,
strictly accords, and tends to fortify and prove the correct-
ness of the foregoing reason. A plea is there defined to
be, “ a special answer to a bill, or some part thereof, show-
ing and relying upon one or more things as a cause why
the suit should be either dismissed, delayed or barred.” [b]
And, first, it is an answer because it avers and maintains
one or more facts wherein itdiffers from a demurrer, which
rests upon law only; and in some instances it denies
allegations in the bill by negative averments.
But, secondly, it is a special answer, “ differing in this.
from an answer in the common form, as it demands the
judgment of the court in the first instance, whether the
matter urged by it does not debar the complainant from
his title to that answer which the bill requires.” [c]
Thirdly: “It relies upon one or more things (not new
things), as a cause why the suit should be either dismissed,
delayed or barred.” The first part of this member of the
definition points out the integral division of a plea into
the matter of it and the averments: “ on one or more
things” (i. e. facts or averments which may be manifold)
[a] Cure. Ca. 180.
[b] Mitf. 178.
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a1"t's own showing; the plea is an objection raised by_ a 
new showing of the defendant. But the defendant's new 
showing may be of old matter stated in the bill (out of 
which ma.tter a contradictory case niay be made by trav-
erse), although most usual~y it is altogether of new matter. 
And the reason for such new showing, \Vhether old or new 
tnatter, being the proper subject of a plea, is that it lets in 
the fact as well as the law. 
37. With the view that is.here tal{en of this subject, 
the old definition of a plea in equity, laid down in the 
Cursus Cancelarire, [a] and adopted by Lord Redesdale, 
strictly accords, and tends to fortify aud prove the correct-
ness of the foregoing reason. A plea is there defined to 
be, "a special answer to a bill, or some part thereof, show-
ing and relying upon one or more things as a cause why 
the suit should be either dismissed, delayed or barred." [b] 
And, first, it i€ an answer because it avers and maintains 
one or more facts wherein it differs from a demurrer, which 
rests upon law only; and in some instances it denies 
allegations in the bill by negative averments:. 
But, secondly, it is a special answer, "'differing in this. 
from an answer in the common form, as it demands the 
judgment. of the court in the first instance, whether the 
matter urged by it does not debar the complainant from 
his title to that answer which the bill requires." [c] 
Thirdly: "It relies upon one or tnore things (not new 
things), as a cause why the suit should be either dismissed, 
delayed or barred.'' The first part of this member o~ the 
definition points out the integral division of a plea into 
the matter of it and the averments: "'on one or more 
things'' (i.e. facts or averments which 1nay be n1anifold) 
[a] Curs. Ca. 180. 
[b] Mitf. 178. 
[c] Roche v. Morgell, Scb. & Lef. 721. 
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—“ as a cause” (i. e. the matter or bar) which must be
single. [a] The latter part briefly gives the division of a
plea into its several kinds.
38, This will give the student some idea of. the ex-
treme accuracy of most old legal definitions, which can-
not be too attentively studied, and it was the more advan-
tageous to pursue this subject so far, because he might be
induced to conclude, from the loose manner in which it
has been ordinarily treated, that the system of pleading in
equity was not founded on any fixed principles, but left to
fluctuate amid variable decisions and arbitrary rules.
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-"as a cause " ( i. e. the matter or bar) which must be 
single. [a] The latter part briefly gives the division of a 
plea into its . l'everal kinds. 
38. This will give the student some idea of_ the ex~ 
treme accuracy of most old legal definitions, which can-
not be t.oo attentively studied, and it was the more advan-
tageous to pursue this subject so far, because he might be 
induced to conclude, from the loose manner in which it 
has been ordinarily treated, that the system of pleading in 
equity was not founded on any fixed principles, but -left to 
fluctuate amid variable decisions and arbitrary rules. 
[a] 1 Burr. 320. Mitford, 238, and the cases there cited. 
CHAPTER II.
OF THE ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY.
.
SECTION I.
Of the General Form and Structure of Ordinary Bills.
39, A bill in equity, as we have remarked in the
preceding chapter, has a two_fold object in view, first, the
statement of complaint, similar to the declaration at com-
mon law; and secondly, the examination of the defendant
upon oath. So far as it is a mere pleading, the bill must
set out the nature of the relation between the parties,and
the particular incidents which create the hardship which
is the cause of complaint; and one of these incidents is
the want of adequate relief at common law. This is the
main body of the bill. Again, so far as the bill acts the
part of an examination, it must state all such matters of
inducement, and such collateral circumstances as may tend
to extract a discovery, or which may raise a presumption
of the truth of the principal statement, even if denied by
the defendant. Should there be matter of avoidance, of
which the defendant might avail himself, the bill, as an
examination, should also contain charges to rebut the de-
fence. It has already been observed that the bill is a peti-
tion‘ to the court for a subpaana, or such other writ as the
exigency of the case may require; and, accordingly, it
concludes with a prayer in the usual form of petition, and
stating the ends for which this writ it prayed; which are,
first, that the defendant may answer the several distinct














































































































































OF THE ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY. 
SECTION I. 
Of tlte General Form and Structure of Ord~inary Billa. 
39. A bill in equity, as we have remarked in the 
preceding chapter, has a two-fold object in view, first, the 
statement of complaint, similar to the· declaration at com-
mon law; and secondly, the examination of the defendant 
upon oath. So far as it is a mere pleading, the bill must 
set out the nature of the relation between the parties,.arad 
the particular incidents which create the hardship which 
is the cause of complaint; and one of these incidents is 
the want of as}equate relief at cornmon law. rrhis is the 
main body of the bill. Again, so far as the bill acts the 
part of an ewarn,ination, it must state all such matters of 
inducement, and such collateral circumstances as rnay tend 
to extract a discovery, or which may raise a presun1pt1on 
of the truth of the principal statement, even if denied by 
the defendant. Should there be tnatter of avoidance, of 
which the defendant mi~ht avail hitnself, the bill, as an 
e;rJamination, should also contain charges to rebut. the de-
. fence. It has already been observed that the bill is a peti-
tion· to the conrt for a subpmna, or such other writ as the 
exigency of the case tnay require; and, accordingly, it 
concludes with a prayer in the usual form of petition, nnd 
stating the ends for which this writ it prayed; whieh nre, 
first, that the defendant may answer the several distinct 
allegations of the bill, which are for that purpose put in an 
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interrogative form; and, second, that the court may inter-
pose with relief.
40, This is the sum and substance of every bill
which can be filed; and how long and intricate soever it
may be drawn, it nevertheless contains but the four fol-
lowing parts:
1st. The circumstantial statement of the relation, in.
cluding the inducement or introductory part.
2d. The incidents which/produce the grievance oom-
plained of, including the requests made to the defendant,
and his refusal.
3d. The statement of such collateral circumstances,
if necessary, by way of charge, as may compel the defend-
ant to acknowledge tht: grievance, or which may antici-
pate and controvert his defence. J/
4th. And lastly, by reason of the foregoing complaint,
and for the want of adequate remedy at common law, it
concludes with a petition for the subpcena, to the end that
the defendant may answer the premises, and the court
decree relief.
41, These four parts are each marked by certain
technical language, with which they commence. The first
part begins thus: “Humbly complaining, showeth unto
your Lordship, your orator, A. B. of , that, etc.,” and
then proceeds at once to the statement. Here we must
stop to observe that this commencement of the bill is
framed to express its office, both as a petition and com-
plaint. The words are: “ humbly complaining, showeth ; ”
and it styles the complainant not your petitioner, but your
orator, to mark the distinction between a bill and a mere
petition, and to designate the higher character which he
sustains. The word “orator” is used in allusion to the















































































































































ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY. 33 
interrogative·form; and, second, that the court may inter-
pose with relief. 
40. This is the sum and substance of every bill 
which can be filed; and how long and intricate soever it 
may be drawn, it nevertheless contains but the four fol-
lowing parts : 
1st. The circumstantial statement of the relation, in_ 
eluding the inducement or introductory part. 
2d. The incidents which produce the grievance com-
plained of, including the requeata made to the defendant, 
and his refusal. 
3d. The statement of such collateral circumstances, 
if necessary, by way of cfl,arge, as may co~pel the defend--
ant to acknowledge th~· grievance, or which may anti~i­
pate and controvert his defence. /-} / 
4th. And lastly, by reason of"tn'e foregoing complaint, 
a11d for the want of adequate remedy at common law, it 
concludes with a petition for the aubpmna, to the end that 
the defendant may answer the premises, and the court 
decree relief. 
41. These four parts are each marked by certain 
technical language, with which they commence. The first 
part begins thus: "Humbly complaining, showeth unto 
your Lordship, your orator, A. B. of--, that, etc.," and 
then proceeds at once to the statement.· Here we mus.t 
· stop to observe that this commencement of the bill is 
framed to express its office, both as a petition and com-
plaint. The words are: "humbly complaining, showeth;" 
and it styles the complainant not your petitioner, but your 
orator, to mark the distinction between a bill and a mere 
petition, and to designate the higher character which he 
sustains. The word "orator" is used in allusion to the 
formal conclusion of all petitions, "and your petitioner 
3 
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will ever pray,” [a] a custom which took its origin from
the piety of our ancestors, and the authority of ecclesias-
tics in these primitive days, when the seals were always
entrusted to churchmen,who were likewise the keepers of
the king’s conscience. [b] Another point to be observed in
the formal commencement of the bill is, the grammatical
inversion; a more remarkable instance of which, however,
occurs in the last part of the bill, which we shall notice
presently.
42, The second part commences, “And your orator
hath frequently and in a friendly manner applied to and
requested” [the defendant to do such acts according to
the nature of the bill, as equity and good conscience re-
quired of him.] “And your orator well hoped that such his
just and reasonable requests would have been complied
with, as in justice and equity they ought to have been;
but now so it is, &c.” [i. e. the defendant, confederating
with others to oppress and defraud the complainant, refuses
to do what isjust.] As this part is nearly the same in all
bills, it has become a common form. If the circumstances
creating the hardship be only such as the court can rectify
or control, and not depending on the acts of the defendant,
as where trustees desire to act under the direction of the
court, and the like, then the above common forms are
omitted, and the difliculty labored under is here stated
according to the nature of the case.
43, The third part is generally introduced by a state-
ment that the defendant makes various pretences to jus_ '
tify his refusal, the contrary of which the complainant
charges to be true; and then proceeds to make such other
charges as either corroborate his own statement or contro-
[a] In Ireland, the form used is, “your suppliant and daily
orator,” i. e. “ who remembers you daily in his prayers.”
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will ever pray," [a] a custom which took its origin from 
the piety of our ancestors, and the authority of ecclesias-
tics in these primitive days, when the seals were always 
entrusted to churchmen, who were likewise the keepers of 
the king's conscience. [ b] Another point to be observed in 
the formal commencement of the bill is, the grammatical 
inversio~; a more remarkable instance of which, however, 
occurs in the last part of the bill, which we shall notice 
presently. 
42. The second part commences, "And your orator 
hath frequently and in a friendly manner applied to and 
requested" [the defendant to do such acts according to 
the nature of the bill, as equity and good conscience re-
quired of him.] ''And your orator well hoped that such his 
just and reasonable requests would have been complied 
with, as in justice and equity they ought to have been; 
but now so it is, &c." [i.e. the defendant, confederating 
with others to oppress and defraud the complainant, refuses 
to do what is just.] As this part is nearly the same in all 
bills, it has become a common form. If the circumstances 
creating the hardship be only such as the court can rectify 
or control, and not depending on the acts of the defendant, 
as where trustees desire to act under the direction of the 
court, and the like, then the above common forms are 
omitted, and the difficulty labored under is here stated 
according to the nature of the case. 
43. The third part is generally introduced by a state-
ment that the defendant makes various pretences to jus- · 
tify his refusal, the contrary of which the complainant 
charges to be true; and then proceeds to make such other 
charges as either corroborate his own statement or contro-
[a] In Ireland, the form used is, "your suppliant and daily 
orator.'' i.e. "who remembers you daily in his prayers." 
[b] 3 Black. Com. 48-04. Madox Hist. Exch. 42. 
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vert the defence likely to be adopted by the adversary.
“And to countenance such, his unjust conduct, the said
defendant sometimes pretends that” [there is some good
matter of excuse to discharge him from liability] “ where-
as your orator charges the contrary to be true, and that”
[there are such other circumstances in the case as invali-
date the excuse, or corroborate the statement]; “ and other
times he pretends” [other pretences], “ whereas your
orator charges the contrary to be true, and” [other charges.]
And the whole concludes with the averment, “all which
actings, pretences and refusals of the said confederates”
[alluding to the charge of confederacy on the second part]
“ are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tend to
the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the
premises.”
44, The fourth part is, the petition to the court for
the subpoena ; and begins by formally setting out the rea-
sons for applying to the court, viz: “ In consideration
whereof” (i. e. “the wrong and injury” complained of,)
and forasmuch as your orator is without remedy at com-
mon law, and cannot have adequate relief but in a court
of equity; May it please your Lordship to grant his Ma-
jesty’s most gracious writ of subpoena, etc., commanding
the defendant to appear; to the end that he may distinctly
answer upon oath whether each particular fact and charge
in the bill is not as therein stated, or how otherwise ; and
that he may be decreed by the court to perform such acts
as the court in its wisdom shall think proper, and the jus-
tice of the case may require. “And your orator shall ever
pray,” etc. The whole of the part, beginning with the
words, “ in consideration whereof,” to the conclusion of
the bill, is but a single sentence. There is, however, a
considerable inversion in its form, the clause commencing













































































































































ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY. 35 
vert the defence likely to be adopted by the adversary. 
"And to countenance such, his unjust conduct, the said 
defendant sometimes pretends t~at" [there is some good 
matter of excuse to discharge him from liability] '' where-
as your orator charges the contrary to be true, and that" 
[there are such other circumstances in the case as invali-
date the excuse, or corroborate the statement]; "and other 
times he pretends" [other pretences], "whereas your 
orator charges the contrary to be true, and" [other charges.] 
And the whole concludes with the averment, " all which 
actings, pretences and refusals of the said confederates " 
[alluding to the charge of confederacy on the second part] 
'' are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tend to 
the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the 
premises." 
44. 'fhe fourth part is, the petition to the court for 
the aubpwna,· and begins by formally setting out the rea-
sons for applying to the court, viz: " In consideration 
whereof" ( i. e. ''the wrong and injury" complained of,) 
and forasmuch as your orator is without remedy at com-
mon law, and cannot have adequate relief but in a court 
of equity; May it please your Lordship to grant his Ma-
jesty's most gracious writ of aubpmna, etc., commanding 
the defendant to appear; to the end that he may distinctly 
answer upon oath whether each particular fact and charge 
in the bill is not as therein stated, or how otherwise ; and 
that he may be decreed by the court to perform such acts 
a~ the court in its wisdom shall think proper, and the jus-
tice of the case may require. "And your orator shall ever 
pray," etc. The whole of the part, beginning with the 
word~, ''in consideration whereof," to the conclusion of 
the bill, is but a single sentence. There is, however, a 
considerable inversion in its form, the clause commencing 
''to the end," being put before the prayer for the su~pcena 
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“ may it please,” etc. The want of sufficient attention to
this point, coupled with the circumstance of the extreme
length of the sentence, the whole statement and charge of
the bill being here repeated in the form of interrogation,
and the prayer for particular relief being also included,
has occasioned great perplexity in the mind of many a
pupil, and in not a few instances, has prevented him from
ever arriving at the knowledge of the true bearing and
connection of the several members of this complicated
sentence. Nor is the pupil much assisted in this difliculty
by the usual division of a bill into nine parts, than which
nothing can be more illogical and incorrect. According to
this arrangement, to be met with in all the books, the sev-
eral parts of a bill are: first, the direction or address;
second, the parties; third, the plaintiff ’s case; fourth, the
charge of confederacy; fifth, the pretence and charge;
sixth, that part which gives jurisdiction to the court;
seventh,the interrogating part; eighth, the prayer; ninth,
the usual prayer for a subpoena or other process. The four
last are included in the single sentence to which we have
just called the student’s attention, and which are thus
presented to his mind as so many distinct and unconnected
parts; and his embarrasment is increased by finding that
in the precedents to be found in the books these several
parts are marked as distinct periods.
In order to illustrate the forgoing observations, we
shall insert here the skeleton of a bill:
To the Rt. Honorable the Earl of Eldon,
Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain :
(1.) Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lord-
ship, your orator, A B, of , gent. that [at a particular
time mentioned, certain events took place which led to
the relation now existing between your orator and G D,













































































































































36 PLEADING IN EQUITY. 
~'may it please,'' etc. 'rhe want of sufficient attention to 
this point, coupled with the circumstance of the extreme 
length of the sentence, the whole statement and charge of 
the bill being here repeated in the form of interrogation, 
and the prayer for particular relief being also included, 
has occasioned great perplexity in the mind of many a 
pupil, and in not a few instances, has prevented him from 
ever arriving at the knowledge of the true bearing and 
connection of the several members of this complicated 
sentence. Nor is the pupil much assisted in this difficulty 
by the usual division of a bill into nine parts, than which 
nothing can be more illogical and incorrect. According to 
this arrangement, to be met with in all the books, the sev-
eral parts of a bill are : first, the direction or address ; 
second, the parties; third, the plaintiff's case; fourth, the 
charge of c·onfederacy; fifth, the pretence and charge; 
sixth, that part which gives jurisdiction to the court; 
seventh, the interrogating part; eighth, the prayer; ninth, 
the usual prayer for a subpmna or other process. The four 
last are included in the single sentence to which we have 
just called the student's attention, and which are thus 
presented to his mind as so many distinct and unconnected 
parts; and his embarrasment is increased by finding that 
in the precedents to be found in the books these several 
parts are marked as distinct periods. 
In order to illustrate the forgoing observations, we 
shall insert here the skeleton of a bill : 
To the Rt. Honorable the Earl of Eldon, 
Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain : 
(1.) Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lord-
ship, your orator, A B, of. , gent. that [at a particular 
time mentioned, certain events took place which led to 
the relation now existing between your orator and 0 D, 
the defendant, hereinafter named.] And your orator 
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further showeth unto your Lordship that [your orator and ,
the said defendant are parties to such relation, under cir-
cumstances to which particular equitable incidents are
concomitant; whence arise certain duties to be performed
by the said defendant, C D.] (II) And your orator hath
accordingly, both by himself and his agents, applied to
and requested the said C D to [perform the said duties;
and your orator well hoped that such, his just and reason-
able requests, would have been complied with, as in justice
and equity they ought to have been; but now so it is, may
it please your Lordship. the said G D, combining and con-
federating with divers persons at present unknown to your
orator (but whose names, when discovered, your orator
prays he may be at liberty to insert in this, his bill, with
apt and proper words to charge them as parties defendants
hereto), and contriving how to injure and oppress your
\ orator in the premises, absolutely refuses to comply with
your orator’s aforesaid reasonable requests. ( III.) And to
countenance such, his unjust conduct, he sometimes pre-
tends [some matter of excuse to discharge him from lia-
bility;] whereas, your orator charges the contrary to be
true, and that [there are other circumstances which in-
validate the excuse of the said defendant and corroborate
your orator’s statement] All which actings, pretences
and refusals of the said confederates are contrary to equity
and good conscience, and tend to the manifest wrong and
injury of your orator in the premises. ( IV.) In considera-
tion whereof, and for as much as your orator is without
remedy in the premises at common law, and cannot have
adequate relief except in a court of equity, where matters
of this sort are properly cognizable and relievable, to the
end that the said C D and his confederates, when discov-
ered, may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths,
according to the best and utmost of their several and re-














































































































































ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUIT~, 37 
further s~oweth unto your Lordship that [your orator and . 
the said defendant are parties to such relation, under cir-
cumstances to which particular equitable incidents are 
concomitant; whence arise certain duties to be performed 
by the said defendant, 0 D.] {11) And your orator hath 
accordingly, both by hi1nself and his agents, applied to 
and requested the said 0 D to [perform the said duties; 
and your orator well hoped that such,. his just and reason-
able requests, would have been complied 'vith, as in justice 
and equity they ought to have been; but now so it is, may 
it please your Lordship,. the said C D, combining and con-
federating with divers persons at present unknown to your 
orator (but whose names, when discovered, your orator 
prays he may be at liberty to insert in this, his bill, with 
apt and proper words to charge them as parties defendants 
hereto), and contriving how to injure and oppress your 
' orator in the premiseR, absolutely refuses to comply with 
your orator's aforesa.id reasonable requests. {III.) And to 
countenance such, his unjust conJ.uct, he sometimes pre-
tends [some matter of excuse to discharge him from lia-
bility;] whereas, your orator charges the contrary to Be 
true, and that [there are other circumstances which in-
validate the excuse of the said defendant and corroborate 
your orator's statement.] All which actings, pretences 
and refusals of the said confederates are contrary to equity 
and good conscience, and tend to the manifest \Vrong and 
injury. of your orator in the pren1ises. {Iv.) In considera-
tion whereof, and for as much as your orator is without 
remedy in the premises at cornmon law, and cannot have 
adequate relief except in a court of equity, where matters 
of this sort are properly cognizable and relievable, to the 
end that the said 0 D and his confederates, when discov-
ered, may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths, 
according to the best and utmost of their several and re-
spective knowledge, remembrance, information and belief, 
' 
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full, true, perfect and distinct answers make to all and
singular the matters aforesaid; and that as fully and par-
ticularly as if the same were here repeated, and they
thereunto severally and respectively distinctly interro-
gated; and more especially that the said C D may, in
manner aforesaid, answer and set forth whether [at the
time hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned, or at some,
and what other time, certain events did not take place,
which led to the relation now existing between your orator
and the said defendant, or how otherwise; and whether
such relation does not in fact exist; and whether your
orator and the said defendant are not parties to such re-
lation, under circumstances to which particular equitable,
or some and what incidents are concomitant, or how other-
wise; and whether such duties as are hereinfore set forth
to be performed by the said defendant did not arise there-
from, or how otherwise]; and whether your orator hath
not, by himself or his agents, or how otherwise, made such
applications and requests as are hereinbefore in that be-
half mentioned, or some such or the like; or any and what
other applications and requests, in respect of ‘the several
matters aforesaid; and whether the said defendant hath
not refused to comply therewith, and why; and whether
[such circumstances as are hereinbefore charged, for the
purpose of invalidating the excuse of the said defendant,
and corroborating your orator’s statement, are not true, or
how otherwise] ; and that the said defendant may be com-
pelled, by and under the decree and direction of this hon-
orable court, [to perform such duties as are incident to the
relation hereinbefore stated to exist between him and your
orator;] and that your orator may have such farther and













































































































































38 EQUITY PLEADING. 
full, true, perfect and distinct answers make to all and 
singular the matters aforesaid; and that as fully and par-
ticularly as if the same were here repeated, and they 
thereunto severally and respectively distinctly interro-
gated; and more especially that the said 0 D may, in 
manner aforesaid, answer and set forth whether [at the 
time hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned, or at some, 
and what other time, certain events did not take place, 
which led to the relation now existing between your orator 
and the said defendant, or how otherwise ; and whether 
such relation does not in fact exist; and whether your 
orator and the said defendant are n<'t parties to such re-
lation, under circumstances to which particular equitable, 
or some and what incidents are concomitant, or how other. 
wise; and whether such duties as are hereinfore set forth 
to be performed by the said defendant did not arise there-
from, or how otherwise]; and whether your orator hath 
not, by himself or his agents, or how otherwise, made such 
applications and requests as are hereinbefore in that be-
half mentioned, or some such or the like; or any and what 
other applications and requests, in respect of "the several 
matters aforesaid; and whether the said defendant hath 
not refused to comply therewith, and why; and whether 
[such circumstances as are hereinbefore charged, for the 
purpose of invalidating the excuse of the said defendant, 
and corroborating your orator's statement, are not true, or 
how otherwise] ; and that the said defendant may be com-
pelled, by and under the decree and direction of this hon-
orable court, [to perform such duties as are incident to the 
relation hereinbefore stated to exist between him and your 
orator;] and that your orator may have such farther and 
other relief in the premises as to your Lordship shall seem 
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meet, and the nature and justice of the case may require.





The above is the general form of every kind of bill, as
prepared in the draftman’s office; and with this outline
before him the pupil will be able to shape his course with-
out any difiiculty, in all cases, and to judge what parts are
essential and what may be omitted, according to the nature
of the subject. We shall presently advert to this point
more at large.
45, The pupil will observe that in the precedent of
the draft, the conclusion being a common and invariable
form of prayer for the subpoena, is marked by an “&c.,”
with a marginal direction to the solicitor, who is to have it
engrossed at full length, as to the names of the parties
whom he is to pray process; for none are defendants to
the suit, although mentioned in the body of the bill,unless
process of subpoena be issued against them. [a] The con-
clusion of the bill, as engrossed, is as follows: “May it
please your Lordship to grant unto your orator his Majes-
ty’s most gracious writ of subpoena, to be directed to the
said C D, and to the confederates when discovered, there-
by commanding them, and every of them, at a certain
day, and under a pain to be therein limited, personally to
be and appear before your Lordship, in this honorable
court, and then and there full, true, direct and perfect
answer make to all and singular the premises; and further
to stand to, perform, and abide such further order, direc-
tion and decree therein as to your Lordship shall seem
meet; [b] and your orator shall ever pray,” etc. If the
[a] 2 Dick. 707.
[b] If the bill be for discovery merely, the words in italics













































































































































ORIGINAL BILL IN EQUITY. 89 
meet, and the nature and justice of the case may require. 




[ Counsel's name.] 
The above is the general form of every kind of bill, as 
prepared in the draftman's office; and with this outline 
before him the pupil will be able to shape his course with-
out any difficulty, in all cases, and to judge what parts are 
essential and what may be omitted, according to the nature 
of the subject. We shall presently advert to this point 
more at large . 
. 45. The pupil will observe that in the precedent of 
the draft, the conclusion being a co1nmon and invariable 
form of prayer for the subpmna, is marked by an- "&c.,'' 
with a marginal direction to the solicitor, who is to have it 
engrossed at full length, as to the names of the parties 
whom he is to pray process; for none are defendants to 
the suit, ~.I though mentioned in the body of the bill, unless 
process of subpmna be issued against them. [a] The con-
clusion of the bill, as engrossed, is as follows: "May it 
please your Lordship to grant unto your orator his Majes-
ty's most gracious writ of subpmna, to be directed to the 
said 0 D, and to the confederates when discovered, there-
by commanding them, and every of them, at a certain 
day, and under a pain to be therein limited, personally to 
be and appear before your Lordship, in this honorable 
court, and then and there full, true, direct and perfect 
answer make to all and singular the premises; and further 
to stand to, perform, and abide such further order, di'i'ec-
tion and decree therein as to your Lordship shall seem 
1neet,· [b] and your orator shall ever pray," etc. If the 
[a] 2 Dick. 707. 
[b] If the bill be for discovery merely, the words in italics 
are omitted. 3 Atk. 439. 
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bill seeks for an injunction, or a “ne exeat regno,” such
writ is also prayed for in the conclusion, in addition to the
writ of subpaana, for the form of which the student may
consult the books of precedents, the above being sufiicient
for our purpose. In a certiorari bill, the only object being
to remove the proceedings from the court below, the
prayer for a subpoena is unnecessary, as the parties must
follow in the suit. [a]
46, Where the attorney general is a defendant, in-
stead of a subpana the bill prays, “ that his Majesty’s said
Attorney General, being attended with a copy of this bill,
may appear and put in his answer thereto, and may stand
to and abide,” etc.; [b] and in the case of a peer, a letter
missive is prayed, “ to be directed to the said [peer], de-
siring him to appear to and answer your orator’s said bill;
or in default thereof, his Majesty’s most gracious writ of
subpoena,” etc. -
SECTION II.
Of the first Part of a Bill; and herein of the Doctrine
of Relations.
46 5;, Having given this general view of the nature
and form of a bill, we shall now draw the student’s atten_ .
tion to its several parts, and add a few particular observa-
tions on each. In the appendix of common forms, will be
found the different modes of address used in the several
courts of equity, and also the formal words of commence-
ment, according to the various capacities of the parties
instituting the suit.
[a] Mitf. 40.
[b] The Attorney General may refuse to answer, and no pro-
cess of contempt can go against him. 1 Dick. 730. Davine v.













































































































































40 EQUITY PLEADING. 
bill seeks for an injunction, or a "ne eweat regno," such 
writ is also prayed for in the conclusion, in addition to the 
writ of subpmna, for the form of which the student may 
consult the books of precedents, the above being sufficient 
for our purpose. In a certiorari bill, the only object being 
to remove the proceedings from the court below, the 
prayer for a subpmna is unnecessary, as the parties must 
follow in the suit. [a] 
46. Where the attorney general is a defendant, in-
stead of a subpmna the bill prays, " that his Majesty's said 
Attorney General, being attended with a copy· of this bill, 
may appear and put in his answer thereto, and may stand 
to and abide," etc.; [ b] and in the case of a peer, a letter 
missive is prayed, "to be directed to the said [peer], de-
siring him to appear to and answer your orator's said bill; 
or in default thereof, his M~jesty's most gracious writ of 
subpmna," etc. 
SECTION II. 
Of the first Part of a Bill,· and herein of the Doctrine 
of Relations. 
46 a. Having given this general view of the nature 
and form of a bill, we shall now draw the student's atten-
tion to its several parts, and add a few particular observa-
tions on each. In the appendix of common forms, will be 
found the different modes of address used in the several 
courts of equity, and also the formal words of commence-
ment, according to the various capacities of the parties 
. instituting the suit. 
[a] Mitf. 40. 
[b] The Attorney General may refuse to answer, and no pro-
cess of contempt can go against him. 1 Dick. 730. Davine v. 
Attorney General. Exchequer, 1813. 
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46 b, The additions and places of abode of the com-
plainants should be specially stated, both to prevent suits
from being commenced in the names of fictitious persons,
and also that the defendants may know where to resort for
redress, in case the proceedings should be deemed vexa-
tious, the practice of taking security for that purpose hav-
ing been long since disused,except where the complainant
resides out of the jurisdiction, when security for costs, to
the amount of forty pounds, will be required, on the de-
fendant’s motion. In the exchequer, in order to give the
court jurisdiction, the complainant states himself to be a
debtor and accountant to his Majesty, which is similar to
the practice at common law, and this is an averment not
allowed to be traversed, and therefore mere form. A bill
filed by a Peer always commences without afiixing the
epithet humbly; but simply—“ complaining, showeth unto
your Lordship.” The form for infants, married women,
and lunatics, will be seen in the Appendix.
47, When the attorney general commences a suit,
either on half of the crown or those under its protection,
whether with or without a relator not personally interested,
he proceeds by way of information, which differs in no
respect from the form of a bill, except that it does not use
the language either of complaint or petition; but merely,
“ informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B. knight,
his Majesty’s attorney general, on behalf,” etc. If the
relator be also a complainant, then the proceeding will be
both information and bill; for the form of which, as also
of informations in general, see the Appendix.
48, The two first parts, according to our division, are
essential to every kind of billwhatever; as the first states
the circumstances of the case, or the relative situation of
the parties, and the second sets out the injury sustained,













































































































































FIRST PART OF A BILL. 41 
46 b. The additions and pla·ces of abode of .the com-
plainants should be specially stated, both to prevent suits 
from being commenced in the names of fictitious persons, 
and also that the defendants may know where to resort for 
redress, in case the proceedings should be deemed vexa-
tious, the practice of taking security for that purpose hav-
ing been long since disused, except where the complainant 
resides out of the jurisdiction, when security for costs, to 
the an1ount of forty pounds, will be required, on the de-
fendant's motion. In the exchequer, in order to give the 
court jurisdiction, the complainant states himself to be a 
debtor and accountant to his Majesty, which is similar to 
the practice at common law, and this is an averment not 
allowed to be traversed, and therefore mere form. A bill 
filed by a Peer always commences without affixing the 
epithet humbly; but simply-" complaining, sboweth unto 
your Lordship." The form for infants, married women, 
and lunatics, will be seen in the Appendix. 
47. When the attorney general commences a suit, 
either on half of the crown or those under its protection 
' whether with or without a relator not personally interested, 
he proceeds by way of information, which differs in no 
respect from the form of a bill, except that it does not use 
the language either of complaint or petition; but merely, 
"informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B. knight, 
his Majesty's attorney general, on behalf," etc. If the 
relator be also a complainant, then the proceeding will be 
both information and bill ; for the form of which, as also 
of informations in general, see the Appendix. 
48. The two first parts, according to our division, are 
essential to every kind of bill.whatever; as the first states 
the circumstances of the case, or the relative situation of 
the parties, and the second sets out the injury sustained, 
or the grievance likely to ensue, not remediable at com-
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mon law, which is the ground of application for the inter-
ference of a court of equity. So far the bill acts the
part of a pleading, similar to the declaration at com-
mon law, and according with this view of it, is the defini-
tion given in the Cursus Cancellariae; where it is said, “a
bill in equity is in nature of a declaration at common law,
wherein the complainant is to set forth the circumstances
of his case for some fraud, force, or injury done to him,
praying relief of the court, for that he has no remedy by
the common law; and also process of subpoena against the
defendant, to compel him to answer the charge of the bill.
[a] The observations we have made, therefore, in the fore-
going chapter relative to the mode of statement of injury
are entirely applicable to this part of a bill. We there
showed that the plaintiff, in complaining of a wrong done
to him, does nothing more than set forth a right of which
he has been deprived; that rights are incident to rela-
tions, and that therefore to prove a right, the relation in
Which it is founded must be thoroughly understood. Rela-
tions, again, we have seen,let in three separate considera-
tions: 1st, the parties, with their several disabilities and
liabilities in law; 2d, the subject matter or contract, with
the circumstances uhder which it was made, and herein
also of the nature of the property in litigation; and lastly,
the legal and equitable incidents or rights, the withhold-
ing of any of which is the cause of complaint. We shall
subjoin such additional instructions with regard to the doc-
trine of relations as may be generally useful to the pupil.
49, Relations may be divided into primary or origi-
nal—sec0ndary or derivative—and collateral. The first
are those which subsist between the original parties; the
second are such as are derived therefrom, either by the
transmission of interest or the transfer of title or liability.













































































































































42 EQUITY PLEADING. 
mon law, which is the ground of application for the inter-
ference of a court of equity. So far the bill acts the 
part of ~ pleading, similar to the declaration at com-
mon law, and according with this view of it, is the defini-
tion given in the Cursus Cancellarim; where it is said, "a 
bill in equity is in nature of a declaration at common law, 
wher~in the complainant is to set forth the circumstances 
of his· case for some fraud, force, or injury done to him, 
praying relief of the court, for that he has no remedy by 
the common law; and also process of subpmna against the 
defendant, to compel him to answer the charge of the bill. 
[a] The observations we have made, therefore, in the fore-
going chapter relative to the mode of statement of injury 
are entirely applicable to this part of a bill. We there 
showed that the plaintiff, in complaining of a wrong done 
to him, does nothing more than set forth a right of which 
, he has been deprived; that rights are incident to rela-
tions .. and that therefore to prove a right, the relation in 
whi~h it is founded must be thoroughly understood. Rela-
tions, again, we have seen, let in three separate considera-
tions: l~t, the parties, with their several disabilities and 
liabilities in law; 2d, the subject matter or contract, with 
the circumstances ubder which it was made, and herein 
also of the nature of the property in litigation; and lastly, 
the legal and equitable incidents or rights, the withhold-
ing of any of which is the cause of complaint. We shall 
subjoin such additional instructions with regard to the doc-
\, trine of relations as may be generally useful to the pupil. 
49. Relations may be divided into primary or origi-
nal-secondary or derivative-and collateral. The first 
are those which subsist between the original parties; the 
second are such as are derived therefrotn, either by the 
transmission of interest or the transfer of title or liability. 
[a] Curs. Can. 36. 
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Thus there is a primary relation between the mortgagor
and mortgagee; but if the mortgagor assigns his equity of
redemption, there then arises a new or secondary relation
between the mortgagee and the assignee of the equity. A




Thus in the figure above, let O and T stand for the
parties to the original relation; let T be tenant for life,
and R a remainderman; let A be an assignee, or alienee
of T’s interest; let H represent the heir at law to O; D
be his devise, and E executor. Here there will be a
secondary relation between O and A, in respect of the
privity of contract between T and A. There will be also
a secondary relation between O and R, in respect of the
prioity of estate between T and R. Between T and H
there will be a secondary relation, in respect of the privity
of blood between O and H. So between T and D, in re-
spect of the privity of interest between 0 and D; and in
like manner between T and E, on account of the privity
of representation between 0 and E. Again, H, D, and E
on one side, and A and R on the other, stand in collateral
relations to each other. Other derivative relations might
be enumerated; but this will suffice at present for
the purpose of illustration. The right understanding
of these particulars is in the first place essential to the
determination of the necessary parties to the suit, and the
importance of this doctrine will be still further apparent















































































































































FIRST PART OF A BILL. 48 
1,hus there is a primary relation between the mortgagor 
and mortgagee; but if the mortgagor assigns his equity of 
redemption, there t.hen arises a new or secondary relation 
between the mortgagee and the assignee of the equity. A 
collateral relation is that which exist between two or more 
derivative parties. 
o ______________ T 
I I m n 
'l,hus in the figure above, let 0 and T stand for the 
parties to the original relation; letT be tenant for life, 
and R a remainderman ; let A be an assignee, or alienee 
of T's interest; let H represent the heir at law to 0; D 
be his devise, and E executor. Here there will be a 
secondary relation between 0 and A, in respect of the 
privity of contract between T and A. There will be also 
a secondary relation between 0 and R, in respect of the 
pri,vity of estate between T and R. Between T and H 
there will be a secondary relation, in respect of the privity 
of blood between 0 and H. So between T and D, in re-
spect of the privity of interest between 0 and D; and in 
Jike manner between T and E, on account of the privity 
of representation between 0 and E. Again, H, D, and E 
on one side, and A and R on the other, stand in collateral 
relations to each ot~er. Other derivative relations might 
be enumerated; but this will suffice at present for 
the purpose of illustration. The right understanding 
of these particulars is in the first place essential to the 
determination of the necessary parties to the suit, and the 
importance of this doctrine will be still further apparent 
when we come to treat of Supplemental Bills and Bill of 
Revivor. 
44 EQUITY PLEADING.
50, The original relation may arise, either, 1st, out
of a specific contract, the incidents of which must depend
upon the terms of agreement, as in those cases where a
specific performance is sought to be enforced; or, 2d, the
relation may be such as though arising from contract be-
tween‘ the parties, is nevertheless recognized and ascer-
tained by the law, which attaches to it certain essential’
incidents and ingredients—such as the relation of part-
nership, of mortgagor and mortgagee, and the like; or,
3d, it may be produced by the act of a third person, as in
the relation of executor and legatee; or, 4th, it may arise
by the operation of law, as, for example, the relation be-
tween tenant in dower and heir at law. '
In the first instance, as the nature of the relation is to
be collected from the words of the contract, if the agree_ -
ment be in writing, it must in general be set out verbatim
in the bill; if not in writing, then such collateral circum-
stances must be stated as raise a strong presumption in
favor of its existence. On this point of the specific per-
formance of parol agreements, various rules have been
laid down in equity, with which the student should make
himself acquainted, in order to frame his bill in cases of
this nature. In the statement of specific contracts, the
agreement must also be shown to be of such a kind as not
to militate with general policy, [a] and that the stipula-
tions contained in it are such as a court of equity ought in
conscience to enforce. [b] The circumstances under which
the agreement was made, form therefore, in most instan-
ces, a material part of the statement; and every fact
should be set out, by way of inducement, tending to show
that the consideration was valid and the terms fair and
[a] 9 Ves. 608. 1 Vern. 5.













































































































































44 ~QlJITY PLEAl>ING. 
50. The original relation may arise, either, 1st, out 
of a specific contract, the incidents of which must depend 
upon the terms of agreement, as in those cases where a 
specific perfor1nance i~ sought to be enforced; or, 2d, the 
relation may be such as though arising from contract be-
tween' the parties, is nevertheless recognized and ascer-
tained by the law, which attaches to it certain essential .. 
incidents and ingredients-such as the relation of part-
nership, of mortgagor and mort~agee, and the like; or, 
3d, it may be produced by the act of a third person, as in 
the relation of executor and legatee; or, 4th, it may arise 
by the operation of law, as, for example, the relation be-
tween tenant in dower and heir at law. 
In the first instance, as the nature of the relation is to 
be collected from the words of the contract, if the agree- · 
ment be in writing, it must in general be set out verbatim 
in the bill; if not in writing, then such collateral circum-
stances mu.st be stated as raise a strong presumption in 
favor of its existence. On this point of the specific per-
formance of parol agreements, various rules have been 
laid down in equity, with which the student should make 
himself acquainted, in order to frame his bill in cases of 
this nature. In the statement 9f specific contracts, the 
agreement must also be shown to be of such a kino as not 
to militate with general policy, [a] and that the stipula-
tions contained in it are such as a court of equity ought in 
conscience to enforce. [b] The circumstances under which 
the agreement was made, form therefore, in most instan-
ces, a material part of the statement; and every fact 
should be set out, by way of inducement, tending to show 
that the consideration was valid and the terms fair and 
[a] 9 Ves. 608. 1 Vern. 5. 
[b] 2 An st. 543. 
FIRST PART or A BILL. 45
-equitable; for it is a maxim, “that he that would have
equity should do equity.”
In the second case above noticed, where the relation
is one recognized by law, all the legal requisites to form
such relation and the liabilities resulting from it, should
be well understood, that the draftsman may be able to
bring the case in the bill within the meaning of the law,
and show such a breach as constitutes an injury cogniz-
able in equity. As this kind of relation is founded in like
manner as the former, on the contract of the parties, it
will be subject to the same rules with regard to the equity
of consideration and origin. ‘
51, The same observations will apply to the 3d and
4th classes above enumerated, with this additional remark
-_that all the circumstances that led to the existing rela-
tion, must be succinctly alleged by way of preamble, both
for the advantage of clearness of statement, and also in
order to deduce the complainant’s title.
This last is essential to every bill, and in general, it is
to be remarked, there are four things indispensably re-
quisite to be shown in the stating part, namely, 1st, the
complainant’s interest [a] in the thing demanded; 2d, his
title (b) to sue; 3d, the defendant’s interest; [c] and 4th,
his liability; [d] for though there cannot be a title or a
liability without an interest, there may be an interest with-
out either. Thus, an executor, before he has proved the will,
has an interest in the testator’s chattels, but not such as
to give him a title to sue; [e] so also an assignee has an
interest in the thing assigned, although not liable to be
[a] 2 Atk. 210.
[b] 1 Vern. 105. 9 P.Wms. 371.
[c] 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 78, 2 Vern. 380.
[d] 1 Vern. 180. 1 Ves. 56.













































































































































FIRST PART OF A BILL. 45 
equitable; for it is a maxim, "that he that would have 
equity should do equity." 
In the second case above noticed, where the relation 
is one·recognized by law, all the legal requisites to form 
~uch relation and the liabilities resulting from it, should 
be well understood, that the draftsman may be able to 
bring the case in the bill withi11 the meaning of the law, 
and show such a brea.ch as constitutes an injury cogniz-
able in equity. As this kind of relation is founded in like 
manner as the former, on the contract of the parties, it 
will be subject to the same rules with regard to the equity 
of consideration and origin. 
51. The same observations will apply to th~ 3d and 
4th classes abov~ enumerated, with this additional ren1ark 
-that all the circumstances that led to the existing rela-
tion, must be succinctly alleged by way of preamble, both 
for the advantage of clearness of statement, and also in 
order to deduce the complainant's title. 
This last is essential to every bill, and in general, it is 
to be remarked, there are four things indispensab~y re-
quisite to be shown in the stating part, namely, 1st, the 
complainant's interest [a] in the thing demanded; 2d, his 
title (b) to sue; 3d, tha defendant's interest; [ c] and 4th, 
his liability; [d] for though there ca~not be a title or a 
liability without an interest, there may be an interest with-
out either. Thus, an executor, before he has proved the will, 
has an interest in the testator's chattels, but not such as 
to give him a title to sue; [ e] so also an assignee has an 
interest in the thing assigned, although not liable to be 
[a] 2 Atk. 210. 
[b] 1 Vern. 105. 9 P.Wms. 371. 
[c] 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 78, 2 Vern. 380. 
[d] 1 Vern. 180. 1 Ves. 56. 
[e] 1 P.Wms. 172, 176. 
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sued for breach of covenant, unless such covenant runs
with the land. [a] We do not here speak of the title or
liability with reference to those defects which are the
proper subject of abatement; but the title and liability, as
derived from the very relation itself, and which therefore
must appear on the face of it, if the relation be adequately
stated; which title Lord Coke defines to be “justa causa
possidendi quod nostrum est.” And he says: “dicitur
titulus a tuendo;” because by it a man holds and defends
his right. [b] It is necessary, however, to observe, that
the title thus deduced, must not appear by the bill to be
affected by any personal disability; and the defendant
must be liable in the court of equity where the suit is
instituted.
52, In deducing the title in the third class of origi-
nal relations, it will be seen that such a preamble is neces-
sary as will show that the person creating the relation had
the power to do so, whether by law or by express power
in a deed. In the first case the capacity in law is all that
need be stated—as, for example, “that the testator was,
at the time of making his will, and at his death, seized of
or entitled to freehold estate, and possessed of personal
property; and being of sound and disposing mind, made
and published his will, with the usual formalities.” With
regard to the execution of a power created by deed, it
will in general be requisite to set out the power in haac
cerba, since a question may turn on its extent or validity ;
and if the latter be likely to be contested, the preamble
should go back to the origin of the instrument containing
the power. Indeed, the student will observe that the pre-
amble must, in a great measure, depend upon his discre-
tion, always making it consistent with clearness of ex-
[a] 1 Ves. 56.













































































































































46 EQUITY PLEADING. 
sued for breach of covenant, unless such covenant runs 
with the land. [a] We do not here speak of the title or 
liability with reference to those defects which are the 
proper subject of abatement; but the title and liability, as 
derived from the very relation itself, and which therefore 
must appear on the face of it, if the relation be adequately 
stated; which title Lord Coke defines to be "justa causa 
possidendi quod nostrum est." And he says: '' dicitur 
titulus a tuendo;" because by it a man holds and defends 
his right. [b] It is necessary, however, to observe, that 
the title thus deduced, must not appear by the bill to be 
affected by any personal disability; and the defendant 
must be liable in the court of equity where the suit is 
instituted. 
52. In deducing the title in the third class of origi-
nal relations, it will be seen that such a preamble is neces-
sary as will show that the person creating the relation had 
the power to do so, whether by law or by express power 
in a deed. In the first case the capacity in law is all that 
need be stated-as, for example, "that the testator was, 
at the time of making his will, and at his death, seized of 
or entitled to freehold estate, and possessed of personal 
property; and being of sound and disposing mind, made 
and published his will, with the usual formalities." With 
regard to the execution of a power created by deed, it 
will in general be requi~ite to set out the power in hmc 
verba, since a question may turn on its extent or validity ; 
and if the latter be likely to be contested, the preamble 
should go back to the origin of the instru.ment containing 
the power. Indeed, the st.udent will observe that the pre-
amble must, in a great measure, depend upon his discre-
tion, always making it consistent with clearness of ex-
[a] 1 Ves. 56. 
[b] Co. Litt. 345, b. 
SECOND PART, OR STATEMENT OF INJURY. 47
planation, and such as may assist the complainant’s title,
by discovery from the defendant, if any ambiguity in the
title render such detail necessary; but upon the face of
the statement, at least a prima facie title must appear.
In like manner, the draftsman must use his discretion as
to whether the whole o1' any part of the instrument
creating the relation be set out totidem 'verbis; having
this general rule to guide him, that it is usually unneces-
sary, and therefore improper, to state more than the sub-
stance, unless where the duty claimed depends upon the
very words of the instrument.
53. With respect to relations arising by operation of
law, we need only observe that the progress of the opera-
tion should be traced from the prior relation to its subse-
quent effect, and the circumstances must be sl1oWn to be
such as that the legal results necessarily ensue.
From the foregoing remarks the student must feel
conscious how necessary it is to have a clear and just con-
ception of the nature of the relation which is to be the
subject of his statement, with all its legal and equitable
incidents, before he sits down to draw the bill; for, as the
nature of the injury must be derived from the incidents of
the relation, so the form of the statement must depend
upon the nature of the injury ; if it be the deprivation of
a right issuing out of the express contract of the parties,
the terms of the contract will be essential; if, on the
other hand, the right demanded is one given by law, the
statement, to be adequate, must bring the case within the
relation affected by the legal or equitable incidents.
.
Sucrron 111.
Of the Second Part, 0r Statement of Injury.













































































































































SECOND PART, OR STATEMENT OF INJURY. 47 
planation, and such as may assist the complainant's title, 
by discovery from the defendant, if any ambiguity in the 
title render such detail necessary; but upon the face of 
the statement, at least a prima facie title must appear. 
In like manner, the draftsman must use his discretion as 
to whether the whole or any part of the instrument 
creating the relation be set out totidem verbis; having 
this general rule to guide him, that it is usually unneces· 
sary, and therefore improper, to state more than the sub-
stance, unless where the duty claimed depends upon the 
very words of the instrument. 
53. With respect to relations arising by operation of 
law, we need only observe that the progress of the opera-
tion should be traced from the prior relation to its subse-
quent effect, and the circumstances must be shown to be 
such as that the legal results necessarily ensue. 
From the foregoing remarks the student must feel 
conscious how necessary it is to have a clear and just con-
ception of the nature of the relation which is to be the 
subject of- his statement, with all its legal and equitable 
incidents, before he sits down to draw the bill; for, as the 
nature of the injury must be derived fro1n the incidents of 
the relation, so the form of the statement must depend 
upo11 the nature of the injury; if it be the deprivation of 
a right issuing out of the express contract of the parties, 
the terms of the contract will be essential ; if, on the 
other hand, the right demanded is one given by law, the 
statement, to be adequate, must bring the case within the 
relation affected by the legal or equitable incidents. 
SECTION III. 
Of the Second Part, or Statement of Injury. 
54. The point next to be considered is, what circum-
48 EQUITY PLEADING.
stance in the case it is which produces the injury, or
causes the hardship against which the complainant seeks
relief; and this must arise from the state of the relation
between the parties, either where a duty flowing from it
is withheld, which, though binding in conscience, yet the
ordinary courts have notthe power to enforce; or where
the relative situation of the parties is such, whether from
fraud or accident, or any other cause, as that a manifest
wrong, or even probable injustice or inconvenience
would ensue, but for the interference and assistance of a
court of equity in compelling a discovery and supplying
the adequate remedy.
55, This statement of grievance forms the second
part of the bill, according to our division, corresponding
to the breach in the declaration at common law, and
should be made with brevity and succinctness. When
the injury sought to be redressed is occasioned by the
subtraction of a duty on the part of the defendant, this
part of the bill merely contains a statement of request
and refusal, viz : that various applications were made to
the defendant, requesting him to do justice to the com-
plainant and restore to him the right demanded, or per- '
form the duty withheld, which nevertheless he has re-
fused to do. The refusal is most commonly ushered in by
the formal charge of confederacy, which, though usually
inserted, is altogether unnecessary, [a] as new parties
may be added at any period of the suit, without any such
charge in the bill; and, therefore, in amicable suits, the
refusal is stated without charging combination. and this
form is invariably omitted where the defendant is a peer
of the realm. [b]
56, In those cases, on the other hand, where the














































































































































48 EQUITY PLEADING. 
stance in the case it is which produces the injury, or 
causes the hardship against which the complainant seeks 
relief; and this must . arise (rom the state of the relation 
,between the parties, either where a duty flowing from it 
is withheld, which, though binding in conscience, yet the 
ordinary courts have not. the power to enforce; or where 
the relative situation of the parties is such, whether from 
fraud or accident, or any oth~r cause, as that a manifest 
wrong, or even probable injustice or inconvenience 
would ensue, but for the interference and assistance of a 
court of equity in compelling a discovery and supplying 
the adequate remedy. 
55. This statement of grievance forms the second 
part of the bill, according to our division, corresponding 
to the breach in the declaration at common law, and 
should be made w.i.th brevity and succinctness. When 
the injury sought to be redressed is occasioned by the 
subtraction of a duty on the part of the defendant, this 
part of the bill merely contains a statement of request 
and refusal, viz : that various applications were made to 
the defendant, requesting him to do justice to the com-
plainant and restore to him the right demanded, or per-
form the duty withheld, which nevertheless he has re-
fused to do. The refusal is most commonly ushered in by 
the formal charge of confederacy, which, though usually 
inserted, is altogether unnecessary, [a] as new parties 
may be added at any period of the suit, without any such 
charge in the bill; and, therefore, in amicable suits, the 
refusal is stated without charging coznbination .. and this 
form is invariably omitted where the defendant is a peer 
of the realm. [ b] 
56. In those cases, on the other hand, where the 
[a] 1 Anstr. 81. 
[b] Mitf. 83. 
THIRD PART, on PBETENCES AND CHARGES. 49
grievance arises out of the peculiar situation of the parties,
the complainant having explained by his statement their
relative position, goes on in this part of his bill briefly to
show the nature of the difficulty resulting from it, or the
hardship likely to ensue unless a cfifi uity inter-
poses to his relief. “ To the end, th , .Qge:?;bEV..-P Here,
then, the student will observe, as no retfififilfi zxtated, of
course the introductory charge of confederady “has no
place; and, in like manner, as the necessity for the inter-
ference of a court of equity is embodied in the very state-
ment of grievance, the formal clause of equity, as it is
called, commencing : “ And for as much as your orator is
without remedy in the premises," is also omitted. In the
statement of the injury for which redress is sought, it is
obvious that the draftsman must be previously acquainted
with the extent‘ of the jurisdiction of the court; and to
this point the student should turn his particular attention,
in order that he may be able to set forth such a grievance
in his bill as a court of equity will take cognizance of; for
the mere averment that there is no remedy but in equity
will not avail, unless it appear also on the face of the
statement that the case is such that the court of chancery
can compel a discovery or decree relief.
.
Sscrron IV.
Of the Third Part, or Pretences and Charges.
57, We next come to the pretences and charges, the
nature and utility of which have been already pointed out.
As the two former parts belong to a bill, as a pleading, in
common with the declaration at law, so this t/zird part has
a peculiar reference to its character as an examination.
One of the principal advantages attendant upon the mode
of proceeding in chancery, is that the complainant is en-














































































































































THIRD PART, OR PRETENCES AND CHARGES. 49 
grievance arises out of the peculiar situation of the parties, 
the complainant having explained by his statement their 
relatiYe position, goes on in this part of his bill briefly to 
show the nature of the difficulty resulting from it, or the 
hardship likely to ensue unless a co~ity inter-
poses to his relief. "To the end, th~fQi~Ht~. Here. 
then, the stu.dent will observe, as no r~~~~'i! aJt, ted, of 
course the mtroductory charge of confeekk~dy .- has no 
place; and, in like manner, as the necessity for the inter-
ference of a court of equity is embodied in the very state-
ment of grievance, the formal clause of equity, as it is 
called, commencing: " And for as much as your orator is 
without remedy in the premises,, is also omitted. In the 
statement of the injury for which redress is sought, it is 
obvious that the ·draftsman must be previously acquainted 
with the extent· of the jurisdiction of the court; and to 
this point the student should turn his particular attention, 
in order that he may be able to set forth such a grievance 
in his bill as a court of equity will take cognizance of; for 
the mere averment that there is no remedy but in equity 
will not avail, unless it appear also on the face of the 
statement that the case is such that the court of chancery 
can compel a discovery or decree relief. 
SECTION IV. 
Of tlte Third Part, or Pretences and Charges. 
57. We next come to the pretences and charges, the 
nature and utility of which have been already pointed out. 
As the two former parts belong to a bill, as a pleading, in 
common_ with the declaration at law, so this third part has 
a peculiar reference to its character as an examination. 
One of the principal :;tdvantages attendant upon the mode 
of proceeding in chancery, is that the complainant is en-
titled to have an answer upon oath from the defendant, as 
4 
50 .‘ EQUITY PLEADING.
to all the facts stated in the bill; but as it is a maxim in
our law that no man shall be bound to criminate himself,
care must be taken that no allegation be made which
would subject the defendant, if admitted by him, to pen-
alty or forfeiture, [a] unless, indeed, the forfeiture be one
thereby accruing to the complainant himself, and that he
specifically waives his right to it, [b] for the sake of the
discovery. So far, then, as the defendant admits the facts
alleged in the bill, it precludes the necessity of having
them proved in evidence; as, on the other hand, if there
be an unequivocal denial on the part of the defendant,
two witnesses, at least, are required to establish the fact
against his oath. [c] One of the chief objects of the
draftsman’s care, therefore, should be to charge in his bill
all such material circumstances of the case as may tend to
draw forth from the defendant an admission of the princi-
pal matters, and so avoid the necessity of proving them by
depositions.
58, This, then, is the peculiar province of the charg-
ing part of the bill ; for if the same were attempted to be
done in the statement, it would interrupt its course and
render that confused, the chief quality of which should be
clearness and intelligibility. But this, though the princi-
pal, is not the only end of the charging part, for as the
relief sought frequently consists of a variety of particulars,
the charges are sometimes made to support a part of the
prayer. Thus, the circumstances which warrant the ap-
plication for an injunction are generally stated in the
charging part. Again, if it be anticipated that the defend_ ,
ant has any matter of avoidance to set up against the
statement of complaint, whatever will operate to rebut
[a] 1Bro. o. o. as. 1Atk. 529. 2Atk. 392. 2Ves. 109.
[b] 1 Vern. 109-129. 1 Chan. Rep. 144.













































































































































50 EQUITY PLEADING. 
to all the facts stated in the bill ; but as it is a maxim in 
our law that no man shall be bound to criminate himself, 
care must be taken that no allegation be n1ade which 
would subject the defendant, if admitted by him, to pen-
alty or forfeiture, [a] unless, indeed, the forfeiture be one 
thereby accruing to the complainant himself, and that he 
specifically waives his right to it, [b] for the sake of the 
discovery. So far, then, as the defendant admits the facts 
alleged in the bill~ it precludes the necessity of having 
them prov~d in evidence; as, on the other hand, if there 
be an unequivocal denial on the part of the defendant, 
two witnesses, at least, are required to establish _the fact 
against his oath. [c] One of the chief objects of the 
draftsman's care. therefore, should be to charge in his bill 
all such material circumstances of the case as n1ay tend to 
draw forth from the defendant an admission of the princi-
pal matters, and so avoid the necessity of proving them by 
depositions. 
58. This, then, is the peculiar province of the charg-
ing part of the bill ; for if the same were attempted to be 
done in the statement, it would interrupt its coursd and 
render that confused, the chief quality of which should be 
clearness and intelligibility. But this, though the princi-
pal, is not the only end of the charging part, for as the 
relief sought frequently consists of a v~riety of particulars, 
the charges are sometimes made to support a part of the 
prayer. Thus, the circumstances which warrant the ap-
plication for an injunction are generally stated in the 
charging part. Again, if it be anticipated that the defe_nd- . 
ant has any matter of avoidance to set up against the 
statement of complaint, whatever will operate to rebut 
[a] I Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Atk. 392. 2 Ves. 109. 
[b] 1 Vern. 109-129. 1 Chan. Rep. 144. 
[c] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 649, 270. 
THIRD PART, on PRETENCES AND crmnens. 51
that avoidance should be stated by way of charge, founded
upon the supposed reasons of the defendant for refusing
to accede to the complainant’s reasonable requests; [a]
and in this respect the charging part supersedes the use of
a special replication, and, as far as regards discovery, is
somewhat similar to a cross examination.
59, Hence we may collect, that the difference be-
tween the stating and charging parts of the bill, is, that
the first is confined to simply unfolding the nature of the
relation clearly and concisely, containing such matters of
inducement as are requisite for explanation and for de-
' ducing the title; the latter is used for the purpose of add-
ing all such further facts and allegations which cannot be
conveniently inserted in the statement, and which yet are
material, either to extract admissions from the defendant,
or to obtain collateral relief; or, lastly, to anticipate the
defence. In fact, it being a question of arrangement only,
much must beleft to the sagacity and discretion of the
draftsman in determining which part of the bill he shall
choose for making any particular statement, since the
pretences and charges are made a separate part of the bill,
more for the sake of the “ lucidus ordo” than from any
real distinction existing, other than that we have noticed
above. [b] In many cases, therefore, this part may be
altogether passed over; and the foregoing observations
will serve to instruct the pupil when charges should be in-
troduced arid when they may be omitted.
[a] Mitt‘. 34-5. '
[0] Lord Kenyon, in the bills he drew when at the bar,
never put in the charging part, which does little more than un-
fold and enlarge the statement. Madd. Prac. 169; and Patridge













































































































































'rHIRD PART, OR PRETENCES AND CHARGES. 51 
that avoidance should be stated by way of charge, foundeq 
upon the supposed reasons of the defendant for refusing 
to accede to the complainant's reasonable requests; [a] 
and in this reRpect the charging: part supersedes the use of 
a special replicatjon, and, as far as regards discovery, i~ 
somewhat similar to a cross examination. 
59. Hence we may collect, that the difference be-
tween the stating and charging parts of the bill, is, that 
the first is confined to simp1y unfolding the nature of the 
relation clearly and concisely, containing such matters of 
inducement as are requisite for explanation and for de .. 
, ducing the title; the latter is used for the purpose of add-
ing all such further facts and allegations which cannot be 
conveniently inserted in the statement, and which yet are 
material, either to extract admissions from the defendant, 
or to obtain collateral relief; or, lastly, to anticipate the 
defence. In fa?t, it being a question of arrangement only, 
much must be left to the sagacity and discretion of the 
d.raftsman in determining which part of the bill he shall 
choose for making any particular statement, since the 
pretences and charges are made a separate part of the bill, 
more for the sake of the "' lucidus ordo " than from any 
real distinction existing, other than that we have noticed 
above. {b] In many cases, therefore, this part may be 
altogether passed over; and the foregoing observations 
will serve to instruct the pupil when ch.arges should be in-
troduced a~d when they may be omitted. 
[a] Mitf. 34-5. 
[b] Lord Kenyon, in the bills he drew when at the bar, 
never put in the charging part, which does little more than un-
fold and enlarge the statement. Madd. Pr~c. 169; and Patridge 
v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 574, there cited. 
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SECTION V.
Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer.
60, Of the conclusion (which, as we have elsewhere
remarked, is but a single sentence), the groundwork is
the prayer for a subpoena, adding a statement of the pur-
poses for which the writ is required. These are in ordi-
nary bills: first, that the defendant may be compelled to
attend, in order to answer distinctly the several points of
the bill; and, second, that upon a view of the case the
court may interpose its authority to prevent or redress
immediate wrong; or it may decide upon the ultimate
claims of the parties, and enforce its decree by process of
execution.
61, By the words of the bill, the defendant is re-
quired to give “full, true, perfect and distinct answers,
upon oath, to all and singular the matters stated and
charged in the bill, as if he were distinctly interrogated to
each-;” and this he must do, whether there be interroga-
tories or not. At first view, therefore, the repetition of
the whole bill by way of interrogation would appear a
very useless prolixity. But experience has proved the
utility of this practice beyond cavil; for the contrary
method would not fail to produce still greater expense and
delay to the parties, by occasioning frequent and nu mer-
ous exceptions and amendments. The statement, must of
necessity be direct and positive; and if the defendant
thought it his interest to do so, he might content himself
with answering it according to the letter. But in most
instances such a mode of answering would be perfectly
evasive, and leave the substance pf the charge quite un-
touched. [a] Thus, for instance, if the defendant were














































































































































52 EQUITY PLKADING. 
SECTION v. 
Of the Fourth, or Interrogating Part, and Prayer. 
60. Of the conclusion (which, as we have elsewhere 
remarked, is but a single sentence), the gro!lnd \Vork is 
the prayer for a aubpmna, adding a statement of the pur-
poses for which the writ is required. These are in ordi-
nary bills: first, that the defendant may be compelled to 
attend, in order to answer distinctly the several points of 
the bill ; and, second~ that upon a view of the case the 
court may interpose its authority to prevent or redress 
immediate wrong; or it may decide upon the ultimate 
claims of the parties, and enforce its decree by process of 
executi0n. 
61. By the words of the bill, the defendant is re-
quired to give "full, true, perfect and distinct answers, 
upon oath, to all and singular the matters stated and 
charged in the bill, as if he were distinctly interrogated to 
each·;" and this he must do, whethel' there be interroga-
tories or not. At first view, therefore, the repetition of 
the whole bill by way of interrogation would appear a 
very useless prolixity. But experience has proved the 
utility of this practice beyond cavil; for the contrary 
method would not fail to produce still greater expense and 
delay to the parties, by occasioning frequent and numer-
ous exceptions and amendments. The statement, must oi 
necessity be direct and positive; and if the defendant 
thought it his interest to do so, he might content himself 
with answering it according to the letter. But, in most 
instances such a mode of answering would be perfectly 
evasive, and leave the substance pf the charge quite un-
touched. [a] Thus, for instance, if the defendant were 
charged with having received a f:pecific sum of money at 
[a] Mitf. 36. 
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a particular time, although he may have actually received
the money, yet he might with strict truth deny his having
received the precise sum, or at the time, or in the manner
specified. The possibility of evasion is, however, obviated,
by putting the statement into the form of an interroga-
tory, with all the concomitant alternatives : as,“ whether
the defendant did not receive that particular sum, or
some, and what other sum of money, at the particular
time mentioned, or at some and what other time, and in
the manner specified, or how otherwise.”
62- The great object of the interrogating part of the
bill is, therefore, to preclude evasiveness in the answer;
and the whole attention of the draftsman must be turned
to this single point of putting the question in every variety
of form, to elicit a full and definite reply, and to prevent
the defendant’s having any loophole to escape upon a
negativepregnant. In fact, this part of the bill is alto-
gether subservient to the oflice which the bill performs, of
an examination, and should therefore omit nothing essen-
tial to the proof and elucidation of the statement; but as
the substance of the bill is, in fact, the thing to be an-
swered, and the interrogatories are only permitted for the
sake of convenience, no question can be put which is not
immediately dependent on, or relevant to, a particular
statement or charge in the bill. [a]
63, With the foregoing reservation, however, what-
ever may be important to the complainant as matter of
discovery to support his case, without his being compelled
to resort to extraneous evidence, may and ought to be in-
terrogated to, since one of the principal ends of a bill
taken as an examination, is‘ to supersede the necessity of‘
proof. Thus in a bill for an account, the nature, value,
and amount of the property charged to have come into the













































































































































:FOURTH, OR INTERROGATING PART. 53 
a particular time, although he may have actually received 
the money, yet he might with strict truth deny his having 
received the precise sum, or at the time, or in the manner 
specified. The possibility of evasion is, however, obviated, 
by putting the statement into the form of an interroga-
tory, with all the concomitant alternatives: as,'' whether 
the defendant did not receive that particular sum, or 
some, and what other sum of money, at the particular 
time mentioned, or at some and what other tiJne, and in 
the manner specified, or how otherwise." 
62. The great object of the interrogating part of the 
bill is, therefore, to preclude evasiveness in the answer; 
and the whole attention of the draftsman must be turned 
to this single point of putting the question in every variety 
of form, to elicit a full and definite reply, and to prevent 
the defendant's having any loophole to escape upon a 
negative pregnant. In fact, this part of the bill is alto-
. gether subservient to the office which the bill performs, of 
an examination, and should therefore omit nothing essen-
tial to the proof and elucidation of the· statement; but as 
the substance of the bill is, in fact, the thing to be an-
swered, and the interrogatories are only permitted for the 
sake of convenience, no question can be put which is not 
immediately dependent on, or relevant to, a particular 
statement or charge in the bill. [a] 
63. With t~e foregoing reservation, however, what-
ever may be important to the complainant as matter of 
discovery. to support his case, without his being compelled 
to resort to extraneous evidence, may and ought to be in-
terrogated to, since one ?f the principal ends of a bill 
taken as an examination, i~ to supersede the necessity of 
proof. Thus in a bill for an account, the nature, value, 
and amount of the property charged to have cotne into the 
[a] Mitf .. 35-6. 4 Bro. C. C. 458. 6 Ves. 62-3. 11 Ves. 273. 
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defendant’s hands may be inquired into, and how every
part has been disposed of; and if any remains in the de-
fendant’s hands, how it is employed; and every other cir-
cumstance which may be of service in taking the account
required. [a]
64, This is, however, only subsidiary to the decree,
and therefore the bill goes on to state, as the secondpur-
pose for which the writ is prayed, that the defendant may
be compelled to account under the decree of the court, in
nearly the same words. We have thought it right to make
this remark here, because it is apt to appear strange to
the pupil that in one sentence the defendant is called
upon to account with the complainant,-and in the next,
almost the same terms are used, that an account may be
taken under the direction of the court. But the foregoing
observations will have explained that there are two pur-
poses or ends for which the writ of subpoena-is required:
first, for discovery ; and second for the interference of the
court, expressed by its order or decree; and that each of
these are distinct.
65, We now come to the latter purpose, the state-
ment of which is usually, though improperly, the “prayer
for relief.” On examining the structure of a bill, the stu-
dent will see that the only prayer contained in it is that
for the subpoena, and that the clause of which we are now
treating is inserted in order to show to the court how far,
and in what respect, its assistance is required. This is es-
sential, in order to point out to the court and opposite
party the definite object for which the bill is filed, that the
former may know‘ distinctly what it is called upon to
decide, and the latter what to defend.
. 66, At common law, the settled forms of action ren-













































































































































54 EQUITY PLEADING. 
defendant's hands may be inquired into, and how every 
part has been disposed of; and if any remains in the de-
fendant's hands, how it is employed ; and every other cir-
cumstance which may be of service in taking the account 
required. [a] 
64. This is, however, only subsidiary to the decree, 
and therefore the bill goes on to state, as the second pur-
pose for which the writ is prayed, that the defendant may 
be compelled to account under the decree of the court, in 
nearly the same words. We have thought it right to make 
this remark here, because it is apt to appear strange to 
the pupil that in one sentence the defendant is called 
upon to account with the complainant,. and in the next, 
almost the same terms are used, that an account may be 
taken under the direction of the court. But the foregoing 
observations will have explained that there are two pur-
poses or ends for which the writ of subpmna -is required: 
first, for discovery ; and second for the interference of the 
court, expressed by its order or decree ; and that each of 
these are distinct. 
65. We now come to the latter purpose, the state-
ment of which is usually, though itnproperly, the'' prayer 
for relief." On Pxamining the structure of a bill, the stu-
dent will see that the only prayer contained in it is that 
for the suhpmna, and that the clause of which we are now 
treating is inserted in order to ~ho\v to the court how far, 
and in what respect, its assistance is required. rfhis is es-
sential, in order to point out to the court and opposite 
party the definite object for which the bill is filed, that the 
former may know distinctly \vhat it is called upon to 
decide, and the latter what to defend. 
66. At comn1on law, the settled forms of action ren-
La] 10 Ves. 290. 11 Ves. 301. 
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der this part unnecessary in the declaration, as every case
has its express remedy provided; but it is otherwise in
equity, where the mode and degree of relief cannot, from
the nature of the thing, be bounded or prescribed by any
determinate rules, but must be adjusted to the circum-
stances of every individual case, “secundum mquum et
bonmn.” In the former instance, the premises allowed,
the law draws the inevitable conclusion ; in the latter, the
inference is deduced from reason and conscience. It is
therefore proper that the complainant in his bill shall not
leave this inference to be vaguely collected from a diffuse
and sometimes indeterminate statement; but that the
party who is aggrieved should himself set forth the nature
of the redress which he seeks; and it is sometimes ma-
terial, even as a medium of construction, for explaining
equivocal charges in the body of the bill. [a] \
67, The relief sought, again, subdivides itself into
two kinds: first, the collateral and auxiliary assistance of
the court for the redress of immediate and prevention of
threatening injury, pending a course of litigation, or the
avoiding a probable future grievance—such as an injunc-
tian, a “ne eoceat regno,” a commission to examine wit_'
nesses who are ‘abroad, in aid of a trial at law, and the ex-
amination of witnesses “ in perpetuam rei memoriam.”
- The second species of relief is that which is properly so
called, and is founded upon the decree of the court, pro-
nounced upon hearing and deciding on the ultimate claims
of the respective parties.
'68, A bill may be framed for all or any of these pur-
poses conjointly, as for an answer and injunction, or an
answer, injunction and decree; only it is to be observed
that such original bills as call for the decree of the court













































































































































FOURTH, OR INTERROGATING PART. 55 
der this part unnecessary in the declaration, as every case 
has its express remedy provided; but it is otherwise in 
equity, where the mode and degree of relief cannot, from 
the nature of the thing, be bounded or prescribed by any 
determinate rules, but must be adj nsted to the circum-
stances of every individual case, " secundum mquu,m et 
bonum." In the former instance, the premises allowed, 
the law draws the inevitable conclusion; in the latter, the · 
inference is deduced from reason and conscience. It is 
therefore proper that the complainant in his bill shall not 
leave this inference to be vaguely collected from a diffuse 
and sometimes indetertninate statement; but that the 
party who is aggrieved should himse]f set forth the nature 
of the redress which he seeks ; and it is sometimes ma-
terial, even as a medium of construction, for explaining 
equivocal charges in the body of the bill. [a] · 
67 .. The relief sought, again, subdivides itself into 
two kinds: first, the col.lateral and auxiliary assistance of 
the court for the redress of in1mediat.e and prevention of 
threatening injury, pending a course of litigation, or the 
avoiding a probable future grievance-such as an injunc-
tian, a'' ne exeat regno,'' a commission to examine wit-· 
nesses who are ·abroad, in aid of a trial at law, and the ex-
amination of witnesses '"in perpetuam rei tnemoriam." 
. The second species of relief is that which is properly so 
called, and is founded upon the decree of the court, pro-
nounced upon hearing and deciding on the ultimate claims 
of the respective parties. 
68. A bill may be framed for all or any of these pur-
poses conjo'intly, as for an answer and injunction, or an 
answer, injauction and decree; only it is to be observed 
that sllch original bills as call for the decree of the court 
[a] 18 Ves. 80. 
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are alone termed bills for relief In many instances a
complainant is entitled to a discovery, and even to the col-
lateral aid of the court by injunction, or an order for com-
mission, etc., where the court could not decree relief; and
in such case care must be taken not to frame the bill as a
bill for relief, for otherwise it would be demurrable. .[a]
Hence the student must be acquainted with the nature
and extent of the authority of a court of equity, as well as
with the subjects of its jurisdiction ; that from the one he
may learn what injuries the court can redress, from the
other, the manner of effecting it. Upon this, and the na-
ture of the injury sustained, or the grievance complained
of, must depend the form of the remedy to be applied. If
it be an injury arising from the subtraction of a duty, the
direct and substantial relief will be a decree for the restor-
ation of the right (wherever that can be effected), accom-
panied by such ancdlary directions as will tend to effectu-
ate that object. If the assistance of the court he required
to redress a grievance, or remove a‘ difiiculty flowing out
of the relative situation of the parties, then such relief
must be sought as accords with the practice of the court,
ascertained by a series of decisions in similar or analogous
cases.
69, After the statement of the particular relief
sought, there is always added a general suggestion that
the complainant “may have such further or other relief
in the premises as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require;” and the court, acting upon this sug-
gestion, will vary the relief according to its discretion, so
as to meet the justice of the case; [b] provided, such relief
[a] 2 Bro, C. C. 319. 6 Ves. 62. 11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. &
Beames, 328.













































































































































56 EQUITY PLEADING. 
are alone termed billa for relief. In many instances a 
complainant is entitled to a discovery, and even to the col-
lateral aid of the court by injunction, or an order for com-
mission, etc., where the court could uot decree relief; and 
in such case care must be taken not to frame the bill as a 
bill for relief, for otherwise it would be detnnrrable. .[a] 
Hence the student must be acquainted with the nature 
and extent of the authority of a court of equity, as well as 
with the subjects of its jurisdiction; that from the one he 
may learn what injuries the court can redress, from the 
other, the manner of effecting it.. Upon this, and the na-
ture of the injury sustained, or the grievance complained 
of, must depend the form of the remedy to be applied. If 
it be an injury arising from the subtraction of a duty, the 
direct .and substantial relief will be a decree for the restor-
ation of the right (wherever that can be effected), accom-
panied by such anc,llary directions as will tend to effectu-
ate that object. If the assistance of the court be required 
to redress a grievance, or remove a· difficulty flowing out 
of the relative situation of the parties, then such relief 
must be sought as accords with the practice of the court, 
ascertained by a series of decisions in similar or analogous 
cases. 
69. After the statement of the particular relief 
sought, there is always added a general suggestion that 
the complainant "may have such further or other relief 
in the premises as the nature and circumstances of the 
case may require;'' and the court, acting upon this sug-
gestion, \viii vary the relief according to its discretion, so 
as to meet the justice of the case ; [ b] provided, such relief 
[a] 2 Bro, C. C. 319. 6 Ves. 62. 11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. & 
Beames, 328. 
[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 401. 5 Ves. 495. 
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be not incompatible with that sought by the bill; [a] and
the reason of this last rule is, that as the relief required
must grow out of the statement of the injury sustained, of
the nature of which, therefore, it will be a fair construc-
tion, it would be absurd as well as unjust towards the
-defendant to make a decree in favor of the complainant
inconsistent with his own case. But there is an exception
to this rule in the case of an information by the attorney
general, suing on behalf of a charity, [b] or where a bill
is filed by an infant; [c] in the former instance, because
the interest of the charity ought not to suffer from the ne-
glect or default of a public officer; in the latter, because
an infant, having no discretion of his own, the court is
bound to protect his rights, without any regard to mistake
or error in point of form. The draftsman should therefore
use the utmost caution in this part of the bill; and if he
doubts the complainant’s title to the relief he wishes to
pray, the bill may be framed with a double aspect, that if
the court determines against him in one view of the case,
it may yet afford him assistance in another. [d]
[a] 2 Atk. 141. 1 Ves. Jun. 426. 3 Ves. 416. 12 Ves. 48.
13 Ves. 114.
[b] l Atk. 355. 2 Ves. 426. 11 Ves. 247, 367.
[c] 1Atk. 6.













































































































































FOURTH, OR lNTERROGATlNG :I?AltT. 57 
be not incompatible with that sought by the bill; [a] and 
the reason of this last rule is, that as the relief required 
must grow out of the statement of the injury sustained, of 
the nature of which, therefore, it will be a fair construc-
tion, it would be absurd as well as unjust towards the 
. defendant to make a decree in favor of the complainant 
inconsistent with his own case. But there is an exception 
to this rule in the case of an information by the attorney 
general, suing on behalf of a charity, [b] or where a bill 
is filed by an infant; [ c] in the former instance, because 
the interest of the charity ought not to suffer from the ne-
glect or default of a public officer; in the latter, because 
an infant, having no discretion of his own, the court is 
bound to protect his rights, without any regard to mistake 
or error in point of form. The draftsman should therefore 
use the utmost caution in this part of the bill ; and if he 
doubts the complainant's title to the relief he wishes to 
pra.y, the bill may be framed with a double aspect, that if 
the court determines against him in one view of the case, 
it may yet afford him assistance in another. [d] 
[a] 2 Atk. 141. 1 Ves. Jun. 426. 8 Ves. 416. 12 Ves. 48. 
13 Ves. 114. 
[b] 1 Atk. 855. 2 Ves. 426. 11 Ves. 247, 367. 
[o] 1 Atk. 6. 




70, Having thus gone through the several parts of
an ordinary bill, it only remains to notice some peculiari-
ties in the structure of such bills as are not original, but
which are the consequence of, or have some reference to,
a former bill; and the peculiarities we shall point out in
each, will at the same time be illustrative of the general
doctrine.
71, In the progress of a suit, circumstances may
arise Which will cause such a change in the state of the
relation between the parties as to render it necessary to
add new incidents to the former relation, or to state an
entirely new relation, which will, however, have a refer-
ence to the former, inasmuch as it grows out of the former
subject of litigation. The same may likewise occur after
the termination of a suit, and before the execution of the
decree. In any of these cases a new bill must be filed,
which, as it of course refers to the former bill, and the
subsequent proceedings thereon, is therefore distinguished
from the original bill, and termed “ not original.” So far
as such bill merely adds new incidents to a still subsisting
relation, it is supplemental; where it states a new relation
between new parties, it is either a revivor, or in the nature
of revivor, or supplement.
72, We have already seeh that the use of a supple-
mental bill is either, 1st, to supply the place of amend-














































































































































OF SECONDARY BILLS. 
70. Having thus gone through the several parts of 
an ordinary bill, it only remains to notice some peculiari-
ties in the structure of such bills as are not original, but 
which are the consequence of,. or have some reference to, 
a former bill ; and the peculiarities we shall point out in 
each, will at the same time be illustrative of the general 
doctrine. 
71. In the progress of a suit, circumstances may 
arise which will cause such a change in the state of the 
relation between the parties as to render it Q.ecessary to 
add new incidents to the former relation, or to state an 
entirely new relation, which will, however, have a refer-
er,ce to the former, inasmuch as it grows out of the former 
subject of litigation. The same may likewise occur after 
the termination of a suit, and before the execution of the 
decree. In any of these cases a new bill must be filed, 
which, as it of course refers to the former bill, and the 
subsequent proceedings thereon, is therefore distinguished 
from the original bill, and termed ''not original.'' So far 
as such bill merely adds new incidents to a still subsisting 
relation, it is supplemental; where it states a new relation 
between new parties, it is either a revivor, or in the nature 
of revivor, or Bupplement. 
72. We have already seen that the use of a supple-
mental bill is either, 1st, to supply the place of amend-
ment at that state of the proceedings when amendment 
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will not be permitted, o1', 2d, to add such cirotitrilsfirinjie\
which have occurred subsequent to the filing of the origi-
nal bill, as may either have caused a change in the terms
of the relation subsisting between ‘the original parties,
and. consequently in the rights and duties flowing from it;
or an alteration in the parties, by means of which new
parties to the suit must be brought before the court.
From this circumstance of the alteration of the parties to
the relation, the principal difiiculty arises as to when a
suit becomes abated, and when merely defective, and con-
sequentlyin what cases a supplemental bill will sufiice.
We shall here, therefore, endeavor to apply the principles
we before laid down concerning relations, as an attempt




Of Abatement, and the Distinction between Suits abated,
and those become merely defective.
73, All persons who have such an interest in the
matters in litigation, as that their rights might be affected
by the decree‘, should strictly be parties to the suit. [a]
This is the general rule adopted by a court of equity,
which, as it does not confine its decree to the mere decision
of the question at issue between the principal parties, but
determines all points of controversy which may arise out
of the principal question, and gives direction thereupon,
which may affect persons remotely or consequentially con-
cerned in interest, will not make such decree, unless the
persons so concerned are brought before the court, to
assert or defend their particular rights. [b]
[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 2 Atk. 296, 515. 7 Ves. 563. 1 Meriv.
262. 16 Ves. 325.
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OF ABATEMENT. ~~ 59 
\. . "" }'~ will not be permitted, or, 2d, to add such ciffitrms~ 
which have occurred subsequent to the filing of tb.e btig .. 
"' nal bill, as may either have caused a change in the terms 
of the relation subsisting between 'the original parties, 
and. consequently in the rights and duties flowing from it; 
or an alteration in the parties, by means of which new 
parties to the suit must be brought before the court. 
From this circumstance of the alteration of the part-ies to 
the relation, the principal difficulty arises as to when a 
suit becomes abated, and when merely defective. apd con-
sequently in what cases a supplemental bill will suffice. 
We shall here, therefore, endeavor to apply the principles 
we before laid down concerning relations, as an attempt 
at a solution of the present difficulty . 
SECTION I. 
Of Abatement, and the Distinction between Suits abated, 
and those become merely defective. 
73. All persons who have such an interest in the 
matters in litigation, as that their rights might be affected 
by the decree, should strictly be parties to the suit. [a] 
This is t.he general rule adopted by a court of equity, 
which, as it does not confine its decree to the mere decision 
of the question at issue between the principal parties, but 
determines all points of controversy which may arise out 
of the principal question, and gives direction thereupon, 
which may affect persons rernotely or consequentially con-
cerned in interest, will not make such decree, unless the 
persons so concerned ar~ brought before the court, to 
assert or defend their particular rights. [b] 
[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 2 Atk. 296,515. 7 Ves. 563. 1 Meriv. 
262. 16 Ves. 825. 
[b] 3 P._Wms. 333. Mit. 134. 
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74, This rule, however, is not so strict but that it
- may in some cases, be dispensed with—as where, from the
multitude of the parties, it would be inconvenient or im-
practicable—“ the court preferring to go as far as possible
towards justice, rather than to deny it altogether.” [a]
So, where the interest of the party is very remote, [b] or
his rights depend upon the establishment of prior claims,
[c] or where there is already before the court a person
competent to protect them, and in general it may be put
negatively, that none are required to be parties who are
not bound by the decree, [d] as, on the other hand, none
are bound by the decree who are not parties to the suit.
[6]
75, Thus, then, all persons whose rights are neces-
sarily involved in the litigation before the court, are
necessary parties. But their rights must flow from some
relation existing between them and the principal parties
to the suit. Relations, we have seen, are either, first,
original; or, second, derivative; or, third, collateral. [f ]
It is clear that all those who are parties to the original re-
lation must also be parties to the suit commenced by any
of them touching such relation, or the incidents belonging
to it, unless such parties as may be passed over from re-
moteness of interest—as a remainder-man, after a vested
estate of inheritance. [g] So all derivative parties, so far
as their newly acquired rights may be affected by the
question between the original parties, or their acquisition
of new rights may affect the original rights. So, likewise,
[a] 16 Ves. 329: per Ld. Eldon, C.
[b] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 166. Mitf. 139.
[e] Mitf. 142. 2 Vern. 527. Amb. 564. 16 Ves. 327.
[d] 3 P. \Vms. 310, in note.
[e] 1 Ball. & Beatty, 447.














































































































































60 EQUITY PLEADING. 
74. This rule, however, is not so strict but that it . 
. may in some cases, be dispensed with-as where, from the 
multitude of the parties, it would be inconvenient or itn-
practicable-" the court preferring to go ~s far as possible 
towards justice, rather than to deny it altogether." [a] 
So, where the interest of the party is very remote, [ b] or 
his rights depend upon the establishment of prior clain1s, 
[c] or where there is already before the court a person 
competent to protect them, and in general it may be pnt 
negatively, that none are required to be parties who are 
not bound by the decree, [d] as, on the other hand, none 
are bound by the decree who are not parties to the suit. 
[e] 
75. Thus, then, all persons whose rights are neces-
sarily involved in the litigation before the court, are 
necessary parties. But their rights must flow from some 
relation existing between them and the principal parties 
to the suit. Relations, we have seen, are either, first, 
origi'i~Jal,· or, second, derivative,· or, third, collateral. [f] 
It is clear that all those who are parties to the original re-
lation must also be parties to the suit commenced by any 
of them touching such relation, or the incidents belonging 
to it, unless such parties as may be passed over from re-
moteness of interest-as a remainder-man, after a vested 
estate of inheritance. [g] So all derivative parties, so far 
as their newly acquired rights may be affected by the 
question between the original parties, or their acquisition 
of new rights may affect the original rights.. So, likewise, 
taJ 16 Ves. 329: per Ld. Eldon, C. 
[b] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 166. Mitf. 139. 
[c] Mitf. 142. 2 Vern. 527. Amb. 564. 16 Ves. 327. 
[d] 3 P. 'Vms. 310, in note. 
[e] 1 Ball. & Beatty, 447. 
[j] Vide ante, p. 198. 
Lg] Mitf. 141. 
or ABATEMENT. 61
if a derivative party commence a suit against any of the
original parties, it may be necessary to bring his collater-
als before the court, if their collateral rights may be en-
dangered or called in question by the suit—as where the
devisee is compelled to make the heir-at-law a party when
he claims to have the will established. [a] It is upon col-
lateral rights that cross_bills are generally filed.
76, We have thus far ascertained, at least in gen-
eral terms, what parties ought to be named in the original
bill; and if any such should be omitted, they may be
added at any period afterwards, by way of amendment.
[b] But where any of the parties to the original relation
come into existence after the bill is filed—as on the birth of
a tenant in tail, [c] or where the derivative relation, which
makes the addition of a new party necessary, is created
subsequent to the commencement of the suit; or if the
collateral relation accrues by an event subsequent, there
must be a supplemental bill to bring such new parties
before the court. [d] This is, however, only in case the
new parties are required to be added merely to the origi-
nal suit, and who should have been named as parties in
the original bill, or might have been made parties by
amendment afterwards, had such parties been in exist-
ence, or had the derivative or collateral relation occurred
before the bill was filed; and this is the true test for ascer-
taining when new parties may be added by supplement
merely.
77- ‘ Abatement is either of the suit, or as to a party.
A suit is said to abate when, in consequence of some
event, there is no longer any person before the court, by
[a] 2 Ves. 431.
[b] Vide anteI p. 65_6.
[c] Mitt‘. 49.













































































































































OF ABATEMENT. 61 
if a derivative part.y commence a suit against any of the 
original parties, it may be necessary to bring his collater-
als before the court, if their collateral rights may be en-
dangered or called in question by the suit-as where the 
devisee is compelled to make the heir-at-law a party when 
he claims to have the will established. [a] It is upon col-
lateral rights that cross-bills are generally filed. 
76. We have thus far ascertained, at least in gen-
eral ·terms, what parties ought to be named in the original 
bill; and if any such should be omitted, they may be 
added at any period afterwards, by way of amendment. 
[b] But where any of the parties to the original relation 
come into existence after the bill is filed-as on the birth of 
a tenant in tail, [c] or where the derivative relation, which 
makes the addition of .a ne\v party necessary, is created 
subsequent to the commencement of the suit; or if the 
collateral relation accrues by an event subsequent, there 
must be a supplemental bill to bring such new parties 
before the court. [d] This is, however, only in case the 
new parties are required to be added merely to the origi-
nal suit, and who should have been named as parties in 
the original bill, or might have been made parties by 
amendment afterwards, had such parties been in exist-
ence, or had the derivative or collateral relation occurred 
before the bill was filed; and this is the true test for ascer-
taining when new parties may be added by supplement 
merely. 
77. ' Abatement is either of the suit, or as to a party. 
A suit ·is said to abate when, in consequence of some 
event, there is no longer any person before the court, by 
[a] 2 Vee. 431. 
[b] Vide ante, p. 65-6. 
[c] Mitf. 49. 
[ d] Ante, p. 137. 
. 62 EQUITY PLEADING.
or against whom the proceedings can be carried forward.
Abatement as to a party is, where the interest and title,
or liability of the party, having ceased, it is no longer
necessary to have such party before the court. When, in
consequence of some derivative relation, a new party is
required to be substituted in the room of one of the origi-
nal parties, and not added only, it is clear, that the substi-
tution works an abatement, as far as regards the original
party. Now, derivative relations are produced, either,
first, by the death of a party; second, by a voluntary
transfer ofinterest; third, by the act oflaw; or, lastly, by
succession.
78, As to the first, it is obvious that where derivative
rights have devolved upon a new party by the death of
an original party, there is necessarily an abatement as to
the party, and the substitution of the new party will be a
revivor as to him; but unless the deceased had been a sole
complainant or defendant, even though he be a principal
party, the suit has not abated by the death, because there
are still before the court parties, by or against whom the
proceedings may be carried forward. Nevertheless, if
in such case the interest of the deceased party is trans-
mitted to his representatives, so that it is necessary to
have such representatives before the court, the suit be-
comes to that extent defective, and can only be continued
by a revivor as to the representatives of the deceased
party. [a]
79,' A derivative relation, by the voluntary act of
the party, can only be created by an assignment of inter-
est in the matters in litigation; if it be an assignment of
part only of his interest, the new party, in respect of his
new rights, ought to be added to the suit, by way of sup-
plement; and here it is clear there is no abatement. If













































































































































. 62 EQUITY PLEADING. 
or against whom the proceedings can be carried forward. 
Abatement as to a p"arty is, where the interest and title, 
or liability of the party, having ceased, it is no longer 
necessary to have such party before the court. When, in 
consequence of so1ne derivative relation, a new party is 
required to be substituted in the room of one of the origi-
nal parties, and not added only, it is clear, that the ~ubsti­
tution works an abatement, as far as regards the original 
party. Now, derivative relations are produced, either, 
:first, by the death of a party; second, by a voluntary 
transfer of" interest; third, by the act of law; or, lastly, by 
succession. 
78. As to the first, it is obv!ous that where derivative 
rights have devolved upon a new party by the death of 
an original party, there is necessarily an abatement as to 
the party, and the substitution of the new party will be a 
revivor as t.o him; but unless the deceased had been a sole 
complainant or defendant, even though he be a principal 
party, the suit has not abated by the death, because there 
are still before the court parties, by or against whom the 
proceedings may be carried forward. Nevertheless, if 
in such case the interest of the deceased party is trans-
mitted to his representatives, so that it is necessary to 
have such representatives before the court, the suit be-
comes to that extent defective, and can only be continued 
by a revivor as to the representatives of the ~eceased 
party. [a] 
79. · A derivative relation, by the voluntary act of' 
the party, can only be created by an assignn1ent of inter-
est in the matters in litigation ; if it be an assign n1en t of 
part only of his interest, the new party, in respect of his 
new rights, ought to be added to the suit, by way of sup-
plement'; and here it is clear there is no abatement. If 
[a] Boddy v. Kent, 1 Meriv. 564. 
or ABATEMENT. 63
the assignment be of the party’s whole interest, as it is no
longer necessary to have such party before the court,
there will be an abatement as to the party whenever the
assignee is substituted, but not until then, for, in effect, if
the alienation of the propertypendente lite be not dis-
closed, the suit will proceed without the addition or sub-
stitution of the derivative parties, who will, notwithstand-
ing, be bound by the decree, since they thus tacitly submit
to purchase the property, under all its circumstances of
hazard, and subject to the event of the suit. [a] If, there-
fore, their newly acquired rights are materially affected
by the decree, their only remedy will be an original bill,
something in the nature of a cross bill. [b] On the other
hand, if their newly acquired rights so far affect the origi-
nal rights as that the decree cannot be put in force without
making them parties, on this fact being discovered, they
must be added by supplemental bill, to carry the decree
in to execution. [c] '
80, Thus, though when a party assigns his whole in-
terestpendente lite, and the assignee is made party to the
suit in his room, there is an abatement as to the party as-
signor; yet in no case, even where the party assigning his
whole interest is sole complainant, does such assignment
cause ipso facto an abatement of the suit; for an abatement
of the suit only happens where there is no longer any per-
son before the court, by or against whom the proceedings
can be carried forward. But we have just seen that the
suit may be proceeded with, notwithstanding the assign-
ment of the party’s entire interest. Indeed, the principle
[a] “Pendente lite nihtl innovetur.” Oo. Litt. 344, b. and
ride 2 Atk. 174. Ambl. 676. 11 Ves. 195. 2Ves. & Beames, 204,
ct seq.














































































































































OF ABATEMENT. 63 
the assignment be of the party's whole interest, ns it is no 
longer necessary to have such party before the court, 
there will be an abatement as to the party whenever the 
assignee is substituted, but not until then, for, in effect, if 
the alienation of the property pendente lite be not dis-
closed, the suit will proceed without the addition or sub-
stitution of the derivative parties, who \\·ill, notwithstand-
ing, be bound by the decree, since they thus tacitly submit 
to purchase the property, under all its circumstances of 
hazard, and subject to the event of the suit. [a] If, there-
fore, their newly acquired rights are materially _affected 
by the decree, their only retnedy will be an ~riginal bill, 
something in the nature of a cross bill. [b] On the other 
hand, if their newly fl.Cquired rights so far affect the origi-
nal rights as that the decree cannot be put in force without 
making them parties, on this fact being discovered, they 
must be added by supplemental, bill, to carry the decree 
in to execution. [c] 
80. Thu~1 though when a party assigns his whole in- · 
terest pendente lite, and the assignee is made party to the 
suit in his rconi, there is an abatement as to the party as-
signor; yet i~ no case, even where the party assigning his 
whole interest is sole complainant, does such assignment 
c~use ipso facto an abatement of the suit; for an abatement 
of the suit only happens where there is no longer any per-
son before the court, by or against \Vhom the proceedings 
can be carried forward. But we have just seen that the 
suit may be proceeded with, notwithstanding the assign-
ment of the party's entire interest. Indeed, the principle 
[a] "Pendente lite nihil innovetur.'' Co. Litt. 344, b. and 
vide 2 Atk. 174. Ambl. 676. 11 Ves. 195. 2 Ves. & Beames, 204, 
et seq. 
[b] Mitf. 58. 2 Atk. 174. 3 Atk. 57. 
[c] Mitf. 57. 
64 EQUITY PLEADING.
is carried to such an extent that it seems a man may bring
two bills at his own expense, making use of the name of
his assignor in one; nor can the court say he shall be
stopped in that one. [a]
81, If, indeed, the suit be proceeded with, notwith-
standing the assignment, and such assignment beknown,
the want of interest may be used in the defence as a plea
in bar; and, therefore, if the assignment be on the part of
a sole complainant, the suit in his name will necessarily
be rendered ineffectual, not because there is no longer
before the court a person competent to conduct it, but
because the cause of action is transferred to another.
This, though it in effect puts an end to the suit, is not
however, an abatement. and if three terms elapse without
any further proceeding, the bill may be dismissed. The
assignee of the complainant may, in the meantime, how-
-ever, commence a new suit in respect of his acquired in-
terest, which will have a reference, so far, to the original
proceedings, as that he may crave the benefit of them.
The bill necessary to be filed by the assignee of a sole
complainant, therefore, will be an original bill, in the na-
ture of a supplemental bill. [b]
82, If the assignment be on the part of a sole defend-
ant, though there is an abatement as to the party, there is
. no abatement of the suit, and consequently the complain-
ant may file a bill, stating the change of interest which
has occurred, and substituting the assignee as the new de-
fendant; but such bill being only in continuation of the
former, will be supplemental merely, though in the nature

















































































































































64 EQUITY PLEADING. 
is carried to such an extent that it seems a man may bring 
two hills at his own expense, making use of the name of 
his assignor in one ; nor can the court say he shall be 
stopped in that one. [a] 
81. If, indeed, the suit. be proceeded with, notwith-
standing the assignment, and such assignment be . known, 
the want of interest may be used in t-he defence as a plea 
in bar; and, therefore, if the assignment be on t.he part of 
a sole co1nplainant, the suit in his name will necessarily 
be rendered ineffectual, not because there is no longer 
before the court a person competent to conduct it, but 
because the cause of action is transferred to another. 
This, though it in effect puts an end to the suit, is not 
however, an abatement, and if three terms elapse without 
any further proceeding, the bill may be dismissed. The 
assignee of the complainant may, in the tneantime, how-
. ever, commence a new suit in respect of his acquired in-
terest, which will have a reference, so far, to the original 
proceedings, as that he may crave the benefit of thetn. 
The bill necessary to be filed by the assignee of a sole 
complainant~ therefore, will be an or1ginal bill, in the na-
ture of a supplemental bill. [ b] 
82. If the assignment be on the part of a sole defend-
ant, though there is an abatement aJ to the party, there is 
. no abatement of the suit, and consequently the complain-
ant may file a bill, stating the change of interest which 
has occurred, and substituting the assignee as the new de-
fendant; but such bill being only in cor1tinuation of the 
former, will be supplemental merely, though in the nature 
of a bill of revivor, so far as regards the abatement as to 
the party. 
[a] Ambl. 546. 
[b] Mitf. 51. 
EQ. PL.-17. 
or ABATEMENT. 65
83, This difference between a sole complainant and
a sole defendant is father accounted for on this principle,
that the defendant shall not be allowed to-take advantage
of his own act to bar the complainant’s right during the
pendency of a suit, but the suit will continue against the
assignee of the interest, who takes it with all the liabili-
ties attached. [a] The distinction between the marriage
of a feme plaintiff and a feme defendant, as it effects the
suit, rests upon similar grounds. If a feme plaintiff‘ mar-
ries pendente lite, although her interest in the subject of
litigation be not gone, yet she voluntarily deprives her-
self of all title to sue alone, in consequence of which the
suit becomes abated, and the husband, jure uxoris, to-
gether with the wife in respect of the interest remaining in
her (being but one personin contemplation of law), must
be substituted for the feme sole complainant, by revivor.
[b] On the other hand, a feme sole defendant cannot by
her own voluntary act discharge herselffrom liability; [c]
but such liability is annexed to the person of her husband,
who should therefore -be named.in all subsequent proceed-
ings; [d] and such is manifestly no abatement of the
suit. '
84, In general terms, it may be stated, that no cir-
cumstance causes an abatement of a suit, which would
not be valid as a plea in abatement, although such circum-
stance may produce an abatement as to a party, and
although the suit may thereby be barred. It is a want of
attention to this distinction between a suit being abated
and a suit being barred, which has caused all the un-
[a] Ambl. 676. 2 Ves. & Beames, 200.
[b] 1 Vern. 318. 1 Ves. 182.















































































































































OF ABATEMENT. 65 
83. This difference between a sole complainant and 
~ sole defendant is father accounted for on this principle, 
that the defendant shall not be allowed to· take advantage· • 
of his own act to bar the complainant's right during the 
pendency of a suit, but the suit will continue against the 
assignee of the interest, who ta~es it with all the liabili-
ties attached. [a] The distinction between the marriage 
of a feme plaintiff and a feme defendant, as it effects the 
suit, rests upon similar grounds. If a feme plaintiff ~ar-
ries pendente lite, although her interest in the subject of 
litigation be not gone, yet she voluntarily deprives her-
self of all title to sue alone, in consequence of which the 
suit becomes abated, and the husband, jure uworia, to-
gether with the wife in respect of the interest remaining in 
her ·(being but one person "in contemplation of Jaw), must 
be aubatit.uted for the feme sole complainant, by revivor. 
[b] On the other hand, a feme sole defendant cannot by 
her own voluntary act discharge herselffrom liability; [c] 
but such liability is annexed to the person of her husba~d, 
who sho~ld therefore pe named .in all sub~quent proceed-
·ings; [d] aud such is manifestly no abatement of the 
suit. 
. 
84. In general terms, it may be stated, that no cir-
cumstance causes an abatement of a suit, which would 
not be valid ~s a plea in abatement, although such circum-
stance may produce an abatement aa to a party, and 
although the suit may thAreby be barred. It is a want of 
attention to this distinction between a suit being abated 
and a suit being barred, which has caused all the un-
[a] Ambl. 676. 2 Ves. & Beames, 200. 
[b] 1 Vern. 318. 1 Ves. 182. 




certainty and contradiction as to the effect of bankruptcy,
or insolvency, pending a suit. [a]
85, The property of a bankrupt, or insolvent, is, by
law, transferred to assignees, chosen in a particular way,
who hold such property in trust for the benefit of the
creditors, and ultimately for the bankrupt or insolvent. [b]
This transfer of property'produces the third class of deri-
vative relations above enumerated, namely, by act of law.
Now, bankruptcy, or insolvency, can only be taken advan-
tage of by plea in bar, [c] and consequently they cause'
no abatement of the suit. [d] Nor do they even, strictly
speaking, produce an abatement as to the party, for as the
assignees are in the character of trustees, they hold the
property committed to them, not in their own right, but \
I in the right of the bankrupt or insolvent, and are the rep-
resentatives of whatever interest remains in him. That
some interest continues in him is clear, for after payment
of his debts he will be entitled to the surplus of property,
if any; [e] and in some instances the bankrupt is per-
mitted to follow up the suit in his own name, [f] though
in such case he must bring the assignees before the court.
[9] In all cases, therefore, even where the bankrupt or
insolvent is the sole complainant, his assignees may come
before the court and have the benefit of the former pro-
[a] Vide Beames’ E1. of Pleas, 286, et seq., and the cases
there cited.
[b] 6 Ves. 485. 15 Ves. 8.
[c] Mr. Beames classes bankruptcy and insolvency among
pleas to the person ; in which he professes to follow Lord Redes-
dale. (El. Pleas, 120.) But Lord Redesdale expressly makes it
a plea in bar, under the head of want of interest. Mitf. 189; and
see the next chapter.
[d] Cooper, Tr. 75.
[e] 15 Ves. 8.
[f] Mitf. 52. 1 Atk. 263.













































































































































66 EQUITY PJ ... EADING. 
certainty and contradiction as to the effect of bankruptcy, 
or insolvency, pending a snit. [a] 
85. 'The property of a bankrupt, or insolvent, is, by 
I a w, transferred to assignee~, chosen in a particular way, 
who hold such property in trust for the benefit of the 
creditors, and ultimately for the banl\:rupt or insolvent. [b] 
This transfer of pro~erty ·produces the third class of deri-
vative relations above enumerated, namely~ by act of law. 
Now, bankruptcy, or insolvency, can only be taken advan-
tage of by plea ·in bar, [c] and consequently they cause· 
no abatement of the suit. [d] Nor do they even, strictly 
speaking, produce an abatement as to the party, for as the 
assignees are in the character of trustees, they hold the 
property committed to them, not in their own right, but 
in the right of the bankrupt or insolvent, and are the rep-
resentatives of whatever interest remains in him. That 
some interest continues in him is clear, for after payment 
of his debts he will be entitled to the surplus of property, 
if any; [e] and in some instances the bankrupt is per-
mitted to follaw up the suit in his own name, [f] though 
in such case he must bring the assignees be~ore the court. 
[.q] In all cases, therefore, even where the bankrupt or 
insolvent is the sole complainant, his assignees may come 
before the court and have the benefit of the former pro-
[a] Vide Beames' El. of Pleas, 286, et Beq., and the cases 
there cited. 
[b] 6 Ves. 485. 15 Ves. 8. 
[c] Mr. Beames classes bankruptcy and insolvency among 
pleas to the person ; in which. he professes to follow Lord Redes-
dale. (El. Pleas, 120.) But Lord Redesdale expressly makes it 
a plea in bar, under the head of want of interest. Mitt. 189; and 
~ 
see the next chapter. 
[ d] Cooper, 'l,r. 75. 
[e] 15 Ves. 8. 
[/] Mitf. 52. 1 Atk. 263. 
[g] 18 V es. 424. 
FORM AND STRUCTURE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS.
ceedings, by supplemental bill; [a] for as they come
in merely in a representative character, it is rather a
change of persons than of parties to the suit, which re-
mains exactly in the same condition as before. For the
same reason, if any parties, suing or sued en auter droit,
are changed or removed, their successors in the same right
continue the litigation by supplement only. [b]
86- The last species of derivative relations men-
tioned above is that which accrues by succession, or where
a new party comes in to the same interest, but by a dif-
ferent title—as in the case of succession to a benefice.
This must happen either by the death or removal of the
former party‘. On the principles already established, it
is clear that in case of death the suit is abated; in case of
removal, the suit is barred; and in all cases there is an
abatement as to the party when the successor is substi-
tuted. Here, therefore, the parties must commence the
proceedings de now, and the original proceedings will be
of no further avail than that, on being referred to, they
may be a groundwork for the court to adopt similar pro-
ceedings in the new suit. [c] Such original bill is there-
fore said to be in the nature of a supplemental bill.
.
SECTION II.
Of the Form and Structure of Supplemental Bills.
87, The subject of -every kind of bill, is the state-
ment of some grievance or hardship, arising out of the
relative position of the parties, and the grounds on which
it calls upon the court for relief. Now, in a supplemental
bill, the grievance complained of is, that there exists.
[a] Coop. Tr. 76; and see 1 Ves. & Beames, 500. See 1
Atk. 263. 4 Ves. 387. '
[b] 1 Atk. 88. 3 Atk. 218.













































































































































FORM AND STRUCTURE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. 67 
ceedings, by supplemental bill; [a] for as they come 
in merely in a representative character, it is rather a 
change of persona than of parties to the suit, which re-
mains exactly in the same condition as before. For the 
same reason, if any parties, suing or sued en auter droit, 
are changed or removed, their successors in the same right 
cont.i~ue the litigation by supplement ~nly. fb] 
86. The last species of derivative relations men-
tioned above is that which accrues by succession, or where 
a new party comes in to the same interest, but by a dif-
ferent title-as in the case of succession to a benefice. 
This must happen either by the death or removal of the 
former party·. On the principles already established, it 
is clear that in case of death the suit is abated ; in case of 
removal, the suit is barred; and in all cases there is an 
abatement as to the party when the successor is aubati · 
tuted. Here, therefore, the parties must commence the 
proceedings de novo, and the original proceedings will be 
of no further avail than that, on being referred to, they 
may be a groundwork for the court to adopt similar pro-
ceedings in the new suit. [ c] Such original bill is there-
fore said to be in the nature of a supplemental bill. 
SECTION II. 
Of the Form and Structure of Supple1nental Billa. 
87. The subject of· every kind of bill, is the state-
ment of some grievance or hardship, arising out of the 
relative position of the parties, and the grounds on which 
it ca.lls upon the court for relief. Now, in a supplemental 
bill, the grievance complained of is, that there exists . 
La] Coop. Tr. 76; and see 1 Ves. & Beames, 500. See 1 
Atk. 268. 4 Ves. 387. · 
[b] 1 Atk. 88. 3 Atk. 218. 
[c] Mitf. 57; and see 9 Ves. 37 to 67. 
68 EQUITY PLEADING.
some defect in the suit already before the court, by means
of which complete justice cannot be attained; but which,
nevertheless, cannot, from the nature of it, or from the
state of the proceedings, be remedied in the ordinary way
of amendment.
88, We have seen that the bill should, in all cases,
commence by stating the relation between the parties;
and next deduce therefrom cause of complaint. In a
supplemental bill, the cause of complaint grows out of the
position of the parties to the original suit, and therefore
the statement of the relation in a supplemental bill, will
be a statement of the original bill, and of the proceedings
thereon; the statement of grievance will be of the new
matter which causes the defect in the original suit. This
is alwaysintroduced by the words: “ and your orator fur-
ther showeth, by way of supplement, to your Lordship.”
The bill then proceeds to pray for a subpoena, to the end
that the defendant may answer the new supplemental
matter thus put in issue, and that the court may grant
further relief, grounded on the supplemental statement;
or if the defect in the suit arises from a change of parties,
a subpwna is prayed against the new parties, to the end
that they may answer the premises, and that the com-
plainant may have the benefit of the former proceedings
as against them, and the same relief as he would be en-
titled to against the original parties.
89, Here, it is obvious, the third part of the bill, ac-
cording to our division, that which contains the pretences
and charges, need in no case be inserted, unless where the
supplemental matter seeks for further discovery; and the
formal clause of equity, which suggests the jurisdiction
of the court, is of course unnecessary, since the supple-
mental bill is only in continuation of the proceedings al-













































































































































68 EQUITY PLEADING. 
some defect in the suit already before the court, by means 
of which cotnplete justice cannot be attained; but which, 
nevertheless, cannot, from the nature of it, or from the 
state of the proceedings, be remedied in the ordinary way 
of amendment. 
88. We have seen that the bill should, in all cases, 
commence by stating the relation between the parties; 
and next deduce therefrom cause of complaint. In a 
supplemental bill, the cause of complaint grows out of the 
po~ition of the parties to the original suit, and therefore 
the statement of the relation in a supplemental bill, will 
be a statement of the original bill, and of the proceedings 
thereon; the statement of grievance will be of the new 
matter which causes the defect in the ?riginal suit. This 
is always· introduced by the words.: ,~,and your orator fur-
ther showeth, by way of supplement, to your Lordship." 
lhe bill then proceeds to pray for a auhpmna, to the end 
that the defendant may answer the new supplemental 
matter thus put in issue, and that the court may grant 
further relief, grounded on the supplemental statement; 
or if the defect in the suit arises from a· change of parties, 
a aubpmna is. prayed against the new parties, to the end 
that they may answer the premises, and that the com-
plainant may have the bene~t of the former proceedings 
as against them, and the same relief as he would be en-
titled to against the original parties. 
89. Here, it is obvious, the third part of the bill, ac-
cording to our division, that which contains the pretences 
and charges, need in no case be inserted, unless where the 
supplemental matter seeks for further discovery ; and the 
formal cfause of equity, which suggests the jurisdiction 
of the court, is of course unnecessary; since the supple-
mental bill is only in continuation of the proceedings al-
ready before the court. Indeed. it has been shown, in a 
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former page, that these parts are not essential,even to the
original bill; and thus a supplemental bill is, in all res-
pects, analogous in its structure to an ordinary bill, and
V‘.-
corroborates the principles we have before laid down con-
' cerning bills in general.
Sscrron III.
Of the Form and Structure of Bills of Revivor, and of
Bills in the Nature of Bills of Revivor.
90, In those cases where a bill of revivor may be
filed, the hardship complained of is, that by the abate-
ment of the suit, the complainant would be compelled to
renew the same proceedings against persons who stand in
'precisely the same relation as the parties to the original
suit, and against whom, therefore, he has the same claims,
unless the court shall apply a remedy, by allowing the
original proceedings to be revived, for or against the new
parties. To make out such relation, therefore, the bill of .
revivor must state theoriginal bill, and the proceedings
upon it; and further, that the new parties hold exactly
the same place in the original relation as the persons
through whom they derive, and therefore are invested
with similar rights and duties.
91, This is always the case where the new parties
come in after abatement, by the act of law—such as the
the heir at law, who comes in as the representative of the
deceased, in regard to his real estate; the executor or ad-
ministrator, who represents him as far as regards the per-
sonality; ‘ and the husband,jure uacoris, who must join
with the feme plaintiff to sustain the suit. In all these
cases, therefore, the relation will be sufliciently made out
. to give a title to revivor, by merely stating that the new













































































































































~ORM AND STRUCTURE OF BILLS OF REVIVOR. 69 
former page, that these parts are not essential, even to the 
original bill; and thus a supp)emental bill is, in all r~s-_ 
pects, analogous in its structure to an ordinary bill, and 
corroborates the principles we have before laid down con-
. cer~ing billR in ~eneral. 
SECTION III. 
Of the Form ~nd Structure of Billa of Revivor, and of 
Bills in the Nature of Billa of RevivO'I\ 
90. In those cases where a bill of revivor may be 
filed, the hardship complained of is, that by the abate-
ment of the suit, the_ complainant would be compelled to 
renew the same proceedings against persons who stand in 
precisely the same relation as the parties to the original 
suit, and against whom, therefore, he has the same claims, 
unless the court shall apply a re~edy, by allowing the 
original proceedings to be revived, for or against the new 
parties. To make out such relation, therefore, the bill of 
revivor must state the· original bill, and the proceedings 
·upon it; and further, that the new parties hold exactly 
the same place in the original relation as the persons 
through whom they derive, and therefore are. invested 
with similar rights and duties. 
91. This is always the case where the new parties . 
come in after abatement, by the aqt of law-:such as the 
the heir at law, who comes in as the representative of the • 
deceased, in regard to his r~al est~te; the executor or ad-
ministrator, who represents him as far as regards the per-
sonality;·· and the husband,ju1'e uxoris, who m~st join 
with the feme plaintiff to sustain the suit. In all these 
cases, therefore, the relation will be sufficiently made out 
to give a title to revivor, by merely stating that the new 
party is the heir _at law; or executor; or administrator, or 
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the husband of the feme plaintiff, and there is no question
put in issue but as to the person of the party. This is the
case of a bill of revivor, properly so called, which there-
upon proceeds to state, “ that the complainant is, as he is
advised, entitled to have the said suit revived against the
defendant, and restored to the same plight and conditiou
as previously to, and at the time of the abatement and
therefore prays a subpoena against the defendant to ap-
pear and show cause, if he can, why the suit and proceed-
ings should not stand and be revived against him, to the
end that the suit may be revived.”
92, When the new party comes in after abatement,
not by the act of law, but by the act of the part;/—as in
the case of la devisee, who comes in under the will of the
testator—to make out such a relation as will entitle to re-
vive, it will be necessary to go one step farther, and to
show not only the state of the former proceedings, and
that the new party is the devisee, but also that the act of
the party, by which the rights and duties have devolved
upon him, is valid ; and here, it is manifest, a considerable
question is put in issue, until which is disposed of, either
by admission or by proof, the title to revive is not fully
established. This, therefore, is no longer a bill of revivor
merely, but an original bill in the nature of a bill of re-
vivor. This kind of bill, then, after showing the abate-
ment and the transmission of interest to the new party,
proceeds to state that, notwithstanding such abatement,
the complainant is, as he is advised, entitled to have the
same relief against the defendant as might have been de-
creed between the parties in the original suit; and then
expressly charges the validity of the instrument by which
the interest of the new party has. been transmitted.
93, Here we are furnished with an exemplification













































































































































70 EQUITY PLEADING. 
the husband of the feme plaintiff, and there is no question 
put in issue but as to the person of the party. This is the 
case of a bill of revivor, properly so called, which there-
upon proceeds to state, '" that the complainant is .. as he is 
ad vised, entitled to have the said suit revived against the 
defendant, and restored to the same plight and condition 
as previously to, and at the time of the abatement and 
therefore prays a aubpmna against the defendant to ap· 
pear and show caus~, if he can, why the suit and proceed-
ings should not stand and be revived against him, to the 
end that the suit may be revived." 
92. When the new party comes in after abatement, 
not by the act of law, but by the act of the party--as in 
the case of 'a devisee, who comes in under the will of the 
testator-to mal{e out such a relation as will entitle tore-
vive, it will be necessary to go one step farther, and to 
show not only the state of the former proceedings, and 
that the new party is the devisee, but also that the act of 
the party, by which the rights and duties have devolved 
upon him .. is valid; and here, it is manifest, a considera~le 
question is put in issue, until which is disposed of, either 
by admission or by proof, the title to revive is not fully 
estabJished. This, therefore, is no longer a bill of revivor 
merely, but an or·iginal bill in the natu1·e of a bill vf re-
vivo1'. This kind of bill, then, after showing the abate-
ment and the translnission of interest to the new party, 
proceeds to st.ate that, notwithstanding such abatement, 
the cotnplainant is, as he is advised, entitled to have the 
same relief against the defendant as n1ight have been de-
creed between the parties in the original suit; and then 
expressly charges the validity of the instrument by which 
the interest of the new party has. been transmitted. 
93. Here we are furnished with an exemplification 
of "'·hat \Ve have laid ·down in a former part of this chap-
ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL.
' ter. concerning the nature and use of the charging part
of a bill. Thus, the relation is here sufficiently made out,
by merely showing the abatement and devise, so as to
give a prima facie title, which is the proper function of
the stating part of the bill; and the charge is introduced
to anticipate and controvert the defence which may be set
up, viz: that although such a devise was made, yet that it
was not valid and effectual in law (as, for instance, that
the testator was not empowered to dispose of his real es-
tate by will) ; which brings the point at once to issue be-
tween the parties; and such, we have seen, is the peculiar
province of the charging part. ‘
94, The bill next goes on to pray for a subpoena, in
the common form, to the end that the defendant may an-
swer the premises, and that the same benefit may be had
- of the old suit as if it had not abated, or that the defen-
dant may show good cause to the contrary.
95, A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of
revivor, is similar in principle to this last, except that, not
being the consequence of an abatement of the suit, it
partakes somewhat of the qualities of a supplemental
and not an original bill.
Sscrron IV.
Of the Form and Structure of the Original Bill in the
Nature of a Supplemental Bill.
96, In the bills we have just described, the mere
statement of a valid transmission of interest to the new
party is sufficient to establish such a relation as will give
a title to the benefit of the former proceedings, because
the new parties to such bills are.derivative parties, by
privity of blood, or representation, or contract; and in













































































































































ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 71 
ter,. concerning the nature and use of the chargin.q part 
of a bill. Thus, the rel~tion is here sufficiently made out, 
by Ine~ely showing the abate1nent and devise, so as to 
give a prima facie title, which is the proper function of 
the stating part of the bill ; and the charge is introduced 
to anticip.ate and controvert the defence which 1nay be set 
up, viz: that although such a devise was made, yet that it 
was not valid and effectual in law (as, for instance, that 
the testator was not empowered to dispose of his real es-
tate by will) ; which brings the point at once to issue be-
tween ·the parties; and such, we have seen, is the peculiar 
province of the charging part. 
94. The bill next goes on to pl'ay for a aubpmna, in 
. the common form, to the end that the defenda.nt may an-
swer the premises, and that the same benefit may be had 
·of the old suit as if it had not abated, or that the defen-
dant rnay show good cause to the contrary. 
95. .A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of 
.revivor, is similar in principle to this last, except that, not 
being the consequence of an abatement of the suit, it 
partakes somewhat of the qualities of a supplemental 
and not an original bill. 
SECTION IV. 
Of tn.e Form and Structure of the .Or(qinal Bill in the 
Nature of a Supplemental Bill. 
96. In the bills we have just des~ribed, the mere 
statement of a valid transn1ission of interest to the new 
party is sufficient to. establish such a relation as will give 
a title to the benefit of the former proceedings, because 
the new parties to such bills are. derivative parties, by 
privity of blood, or representation, or contract,· and in 
such cases the derivative interest carries along with it the 
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original title and liability. But where the new parties
are derivative by privity of estate only—as in the case of
a successor to a benefice, or of a remainder-man to a ten-
ant in tail, the acquisition of interest is not accompanied
with either the old title or the old liability; but a new
title, and a new liability will spring from the possession
of the estate, which may, perchance, be similar to the for-
mer, as arising out of the same matter of litigation.
97, In such case, therefore, there must be a new
suit altogether, and if in the new suit the injury com-
plained of, and the redress sought, be similar to the former
bill, in general the complainant will have the benefit of
the former proceedings, so far as to have the new suit
considered as supplemental to the original suit. To obtain
this end, however, it will not be enough to show that there
has been a transmission of interest, but it will be neces-
sary to state such a new relation as will prove that the
new title, or the new liability, is similar to the old, and
that the complainant is in consequence entitled to similar
relief; or, in other words, that the new suit is the same in
substance as the original one, and therefore may be made
supplemental to it. This bears a strong analogy to the
practice of consolidating suits, which is done on special
motion for a reference to the master, to see if two suits
\are for the same purpose. [a]
98, The Original Bill in the nature of a Supple-
mental Bill, states, therefore, the original bill at full
length, with the proceedings. upon it; the manner in
which the succession of interest has accrued; next, the
circumstances which make the relation similar; and,
finally, it prays for a subpaena against the defendant, to
the end that he may answer the premises,‘and that the













































































































































72 EQUITY PLEADING. 
original title and liability. But where the new parties 
are derivative by privity of estate only-as in the case of 
a successor to a benefice, or of a remainder-man to. a ten-
ant in tail, the acquisition of interest is not accompanied 
with either the old title or the old liability; but a new 
title, and a new liability will spring from the possession 
of the estate, which may, pe~cltance, be similar to the for-
mer, as arising out of the same matter of litigation. 
97. In such case, therefore, there must be a new 
suit altogether, and if in the new suit the injury com-
pl.ained of, ~nd the redress sought, be similar to the former 
bill, in general the complainant will have the benefit of 
the for1ner proceedings, so far as to have the new suit 
considered as supplemental to the original suit. To obtain 
this end, however, it will not be enough to show that thet;e 
has been a transmission of interest, but it will be neces-
sary to state such a new relation as will prove that the 
new title, or the new liability, is similar to the old, and 
that the complainant is in consequence entitled to similar 
relief; or, in other word~, that the new suit is the same in 
substance as the original one, and therefore may be made 
supplemental to it. This bears a strong analogy to the 
practice of consolidating suits, which is done ori special 
motion for a reference to the tnaster, to see if two suits 
.. are for the same purpose. [a] 
98. 'The Original Bill in the natu'l'e of a Supple-
mental Bill, states, therefore, the original bill at full 
length, with the proceedings upon it; the manner in 
which the succession of interest has accrued; next, the 
circurnstances '\Vhich make the relation similar; and, 
finally, it pr~ys for a subp(JJna against the defendant, to 
tlte end that he may answer the premises,.and that the 
[a] 16 Ves. 344. 
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complainant may havesimilar relief against him to that
which was prayed in the original bill.
.
SECTION V.
Form and Structure of Bills in the Nature of Original
Bills.
99, We shall now briefly notice the structure of the
remaining bills of such nature, that though they are
strictly not original bills, yet the injury they complain of
proceeds out of a former suit. - These are cross_bills-bills
of review—bills to set aside a decree obtained by fraud-
bills to suspend a decree, and bills to carry a decree into
execution.
100, A cross-bill is a species of defence used for the
purpose of obtaining a discovery necessary to the de-
fence, [a] or when it would be too late to use the same
defence by way of plea ; [b] or, lastly, to obtain some re-
lief founded on the collateral claims of the party defen-
dant to the original suit. [c]
101, In the first of these cases, the former suit
causes the relation on which is founded the right to dis-
covery; and, consequently, that suit and the proceedings
upon it must be stated in the cross-bill. The discovery,
when obtained, if material, must be added to the original
answer by way of supplement; for the answer to the
cross-bill cannot be read as a defence at the hearing of the
original cause. [d]
102, In the second instance, the cross_bill is in the
nature of a ple puisdarrein continuance—as, for example,
[a] Mitf. 64. 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382.
[b] Mitf. 64. 3 Oh. Rep. 19.
[c] 2 Cox, 78.
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complainant may have· sin1ilar relief against hiJn to that 
which was prayed in the original bill. 
SECTION v. 
Fo1 1m and Structure of Billa in the Nature of Original 
Billa. 
99. We shall now b~iefly notice the structure of the 
remaining bills of such nature, that thou~h they are 
strictly not original bills, yet the injury they complain of 
proceeds out of a former suit .. These _are cross-bills-bills 
of review-bills to set aside a decree obtained by fraud-
bills to suspend a decree, and bills to carry a decree into 
execution. 
100. A cross-bill is a species of defence used for the 
purpose of obtaining a discovery necessary to the de-
fence, [a] or when it would be too late to use the same 
defence by way of plea; [b] or, lastly, to obtain some re· 
lief founded on the collateral claims of the party defen-
dant to the original suit. [c] 
101. In the first of these cases, the former suit 
causes the relation on which is founded the right to dis-
covery; and, consequently, that suit and the proceedings 
upon it must be stated in the cross-bill. The discovery, 
when obtained, if material, must be added to the original 
answer by way of supJ?lement; for the answer to the 
cross-bill cannot be read as a defence at the hearing of the 
original cause. [ d] 
102. ·In the second instance, the cross-bill is in the 
nature of aple puia.dar-rein continuance-as, for example, 
[a] Mitf. 64. 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382. 
[b] Mitf. 64. 3 Ch. Rep. 19. 
[c] 2 Cox, 78. 
(dl 2 Ves. & Beames, 16. 
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where some occurrence has happened after the cause is at
issue, which would have been a good ground of plea in
bar—such as a release from the plaintiff. Here the state-
ment of relation is of the former bill and proceedings,
and the new occurrence which creates the bar; the injury
is, that the suit is notwithstanding proceeded with, and
that the complainant, in the cross-bill, cannot use the de-
fence as a plea in bar; and he therefore prays a subpoena,
to the end that the premises may be answered and that
the new defence may be declared a sufficient bar to any
further proceedings ; and that, therefore, the original bill
may be forthwith dismissed with costs. This kind of
cross bill is necessary, in order to put the new defence in
issue, without which the court could have no judicial
cognizance of it at the hearing. [a]
103, A cross-bill, filed for the last purpose above
mentioned, viz: for collateral relief, differs in no respect
from the common form of an original bill, but must state
the collateral relation—the injury sought to be redressed,
in which part is generally included the reference to the
former bill; pretences and charges, when necessary, being
for the most part, pretences of some of the allegations in
the original bill, and charges to the contrary; and, lastly,
the prayer for subpoena, to the end that the defendant may
answer the premises, and the‘court may decree such relief
as the nature of the case may require. As a cross_bill is
considered merely as a species of defence, [b] and con-
cerns matters already in litigation before the court, it will
not be necessary, at least as against the complainant to
the original suit, to show any ground of equity to support
the jurisdiction of the court. [c]
[a] 3 Ch. Rep. 19.














































































































































74 EQUITY PLEADING. 
where some occurrence has happened after the cause is at 
issue, which would have been a good ground of plea in 
bar-such as a release from the plaintiff. Here the state-
ment of relation is of the former bill and proceedings, 
and the new occurrence which creates the bar; the injury 
is, that the suit is notwithstanding proceeded with, and 
that the complainant, in the cross- bill, cannot use the de-
fence as a plea in bar; and he therefore prays a subpmna, 
to the end that the premises may be answered and that 
the new defence rnay be declared a sufficient bar to any 
further proceedings ; ·and that., therefore, the original bill 
may be forthwith dismissed with costs. This kind of 
cross bill is necessary, in order to put the new defence in 
issue, without which the court could have no judicial 
cognizance of it at the hearing. [a] 
103. A cross-bill, filed for the last purpose above 
mentioned, viz: for collateral relief, differs in no respect 
from the common form of an original bill, but must state 
the collateral reiation-the injury sought to be redressed, 
in which part is generally included the reference to the 
former bill; pretences and charges, when necessary, being 
for the most part, pretences of some of ~he allegations in 
the original bill, and charges to the contrary; and, lastly, 
the prayer for subpmna, to the end that the defendant may 
answer the premises, and the• court may decree such relief 
as the na,ture of the case may require. As a cross-bill is 
considered merely as a species of defence, [ b] and con-
cerns matters already in litigation before the court, it will 
not be necessary, at least as against the complainant to 
the original suit, to show any ground of equity to support 
the jurisdiction of the court. [ c] 
[a] 3 Ch. Rep. 19. 
[ b] 3 Atk. 812. Mos. 382. 
[c] Hardr. 160. 
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104. A bill of review is either on error apparent, or
on discovery of new matter. When it is brought for error
apparent, after reciting the former proceedings, and the
substance of the decree pronounced in which the error
appears, it proceeds to state that “the said decree has
since been duly signed and enrolled, and which said de-
cree the complainant humbly insists is erroneous, and
ought to be reviewed, reversed and set aside, for many
apparent errors and imperfections, inasmuch as it ap
pears,” etc. Then, after showing the errors relied on, a
subpoena is prayed, to the end that the statement may be
answered, and that the decree may be reviewed, reversed
and set aside, and no further proceedings taken thereon.
105, When the bill of review is brought on the dis-
covery of new matter, after stating the enrollment of the
decree, the bill proceeds: “ and your orator showeth unto
your Lordship, by leave of this honorable court, first had
and obtained for that purpose, by way of supplement,
that since the signing of the said decree, your orator has
discovered, as the fact is,” etc., stating the new matter
relied on as a ground for reviewing and reversing the
decree. “And your orator is advised and humbly insists,‘
under the circumstances aforesaid, that the said decree, in
consequence of the discovery of such new matter as
aforesaid, ought to be reviewed and reversed.” It next
prays a subpoena, to the end that the defendant may an-
swer, and that the decree may be set aside; and that fur-
ther directions be added, if required, on the supplemental
matter, and for such general relief as the circumstances of
the case may require.
106, A bill to impeach a decree on the ground of
fraud, is in many respects similar to the last ment1oned,only
the circumstances explanatory of the fraud charged must













































































































































BILLS IN THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL BILLS. 75 
104. A bill of review is either on error apparent, or 
on discovery of new matter. When it is brought for error 
apparent, after reciting the former proceedings, and the 
substance of the decree pronounced in which the error 
appears, it proceeds to state that "the said decree has 
since been duly signed and enrolled, and which said de-
cree the .complainant humbly insists is erroneous, and 
ought to be reviewed, reversed and set aside, for many 
apparent errors and imperfections, inasmuch as it ap 
pears," etc. Then, after showing the errors relied on, a 
aubpmna is prayed, to the end that the staternent may be 
answered, and that the decree may be reviewed, reversed 
and set aside, and no further proceedings taken thereon. 
105. When the bill of review is brought on the dis-
covery of new matter, after stating the enrollment of the 
decree, the bill proceeds: " and your orator showeth unto 
your Lordship, by leave of thi8 honorable court, first had 
and obtained for that purpose, by way of supplement, 
that since the signing of the said decree, your orator has 
discovered, as the fact is,'' etc., stating the new matter 
relied on as a ground for reviewing and reversing the 
decree. ''And your orator is advised and humbly insists; 
under the circumstances aforesaid, that the said decree, in 
consequence of the discovery of such new matter as 
aforesaid, ought to be reviewed and reverRed." It next 
prays a subpcena, to the end that the defendant may an-
swer, and that the decree may be set aside; and that fur-
ther directions be added, if required, on the supplemental 
matter, and for such gen~ral relief as the circumstances of 
. the case may require. 
106. A bill to impeach a decree on the gro·und of 
fraud, is in many respects similar to the last ment1oned,only 
the circumstances explanatory of the fraud charged must 
be stated by way of inducement to the relation arising 
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out of the proceedings, and the decree alleged to be fraud-
ulantly obtained. The complainant must then set out the
circumstances of fraud under which the decree was ob-
tained, and that having lately discovered the same, he
applied to the defendant for redress, and not to insist on
the decree. The injuw complained of is, the defendant’s
refusal to comply with this request; to which is always
added a pretence to the validity of the decree (which an-
ticipates the defence), and a charge to controvert it;
together with whatever other charges may corroborate
the statement of fraud. The subpoena is prayed to the
end that the defendant may put in his answer, and that
the decree may be set asideand declared fraudulant and
void; and for such other relief as the case may require.
107- The remaining two species of bills above
enumerated, viz: bills to suspend, and bills to carry a de-
cree into execution, are merelyin the nature of a petition
in the cause; only thatthe cause being concluded by the
pronouncing of the final decree, the parties must again be
brought before the court by an original bill.
. In the former, the complainant must show the special
circumstances on.which he grounds his title to have the
decree suspended; and then state that he is, as he is ad_ >
vised, entitled to have the decree, or part of it, suspended
as against him, upon such equitable terms as he thereby
oifers, and so pray accordingly.
In the latter, the complainant must set out a sufficient
reason why the decree has not been carried into execu-
tion, and also the circumstances which impede the execu-
tion of it at the time of filing the bill; and state that
though “ he is desirous of having the said decree forth-
with carried into execution, yet, thatfrom the circum-
stances aforesaid, he is advised that the same cannot be













































































































































76 EQUITY PLEADING.· 
out of the proceedings, and the decree alleged to be fraud-
ulantly obtained. The complainant muRt then set ou~ the 
circumstances of fraud under which the decree was ob-
taiPed, and that having lately discovered the same, he 
applied to the defendant for redress, and not to insist on 
the decree. The injury complained of is, the defendant's 
refusal to comply with this request; to which is always 
added a pretence to the validity of the decree (which an-
ticipates the defence), and a charge to controvert it; 
together with whatever other charges 1nay corroborate 
the statement of fraud. 'rhe subp(8na is prayed to the 
end that the defendant may put in his answer, and that 
the decree may be set aside· and declared fraudulant and 
void; and for such other relief as the case may require. 
107. The ren1aining two species of bi~ls above 
enumerated, viz : bills to suspend, and bills to carry a de-
cree into eaJecution, are merely 'in the nature of a petition 
in the cause; only that the cause being concluded by the 
pronouncing of the final decree, tht) parties must again be 
brought before the court by an original bill. 
In the former, the complainant must show the special 
circumstances on.which he grounds his title to have the 
decree suspended; and then state that he is, as he is ad-
vised, entitled to have the decree, or part of it, suspended 
as against him, upon such equitable terms as he thereby 
offers, and so pray accordingly. 
In the latter, the complainant must set out a sufficient 
reason why the decree has not been carried into execu-
tion, and also the circumstances which impede the execu-
tion of it at the time of filing the bill ; and state that 
though "he is desirous of having the said decree forth-
with carried into execution, yet, that. from the circum-
stances aforesaid, he is advised that the same cannot be 
done without the assis.tance of the court;" which he prays 
BILLS IN THE NATURE or ORIGINAL BILLS. 77
accordingly, ". and that the defendant may be ordered to
do and concur in all necessary acts for that purpose.”
.
108, We have thus endeavored to explain in gen_ ‘
eral terms the form and structure of a bill in chancery, so
that the student may be at no loss to apply the general
. . principles to the particular case which comes before him;
and we have also pointed.out the ‘peculiarities in the
frame of secondary bills, which, however, form no excep-
tion to the general rules, but are rather particular in-
stances illustrative of the universal theory. As informa-
tions differ in no respect from ordinary bills, but in their
form, we have not thought it necessary to give them a
separate consideration. It only remains for us at present
to add such orders in chancery as relate to the mere
drawing of the bill.
109, .~1n Lord Bacon’s Ordinances, published in open
court in the year 1618, the 55th and 56th sections are as
follows: “ 55. If any bill, answer, replication, or rejoin-
der, shall be found of an immoderate length, both the
party, and the counsel under whose hand it passed, shall
be fined.” “ 56. If there be contained in any bill, an-
swer, or other pleadings or interrogatory, any matter
libellous or slanderous against any one that is not party to
the suit, or against such as are parties to the suit, upon
matters impertinent, or in derogation of the settled au-
thorities of any of his Majesty’s ‘courts, such bills,
answers, pleadings, or interrogatories, shall be taken off
the file and suppressed, and the parties severally pun-
ished by commitment or ignominy, as shall be thought fit,
for the abuse of the court; and the counselors at law who
have set their-hands, shall likewise receive reproof or
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accordingly,'' and that the defendant may be ordered to 
do and concur in all necessary acts for that purpose.,' 
108. We have thus endeavored to explain in gen- · 
eral terms the form and structure of a bill in chancery, so • 
that the student may be at no loss t.o apply the general 
principles to the particular case which comes before him; 
and we have also pointed. out the ·pecutiarities in the 
frame of secondary bills, which, however, form no excep-
tion to the general rules, but are rather particular in-
stances illustrative of the universal theory. As informa-
tions differ in no respect from ordinary bills, but in their · 
form, we have not thought it necessary to give them a 
separate consideration. It only. remains for us at present 
to add such orders in chancery as relate to the mere 
· drawing of the bill. 
109. .-ln Lord Bacon's Ordinances, published in open 
court in the year 1618, the 55th and 56th section~ are as 
follows : " 5o. If any bill, answer, replication, or rejoin-
der,. shall be found of an immoderate length, both the 
party, and the counsel under whose hand it passed, shall 
be fined." "56. If there be contained in any bill, an-
swer, or other pleadings or interrogatory, any matter 
libellous or slanderous against any one that is not party to 
the suit, or against such as are parties to the suit, upon 
matters impertinent, or ip derogation of the set~led au-
thorities of any of his Majesty's ·courts, such bills, 
answers, pleadings, or interrogatories, shall be taken off 
the file and suppressed~ and the parties severally pun-
ished by commitment or igno1niny, as shall be thought fit, 
for the abuse of the court; and the counselors at law who 
have set their. hands, shall likewise receive reproof or 
punishment, if cause be." 
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110, These regulations were further enlarged by
Lord Coventry in the orders published by him, A. D. 1635,
and subsequently adopted by Lord Clarendon, in 1661.
In the collection of rules and orders that go under his
name, under the title “Bills," it is ordered, “That no
counsellor do put his hand to any bill, answer, or other
pleading. unless it be drawn, or at least perused by him-
self in the paper draft, before it be engrossed (which they
shall do well for their own discharge to sign also after
perusal), and counsel are to take care that the same be
not stuffed with repetition of deeds, writings, or records
in [me verba ; but the effect and substance of so much of
them only as it is pertinent and material to be set down;
and that in brief terms, without long and needless tra-
verses of points not traversable, tautologies, multiplica-
tion of words, or other impertinencies, occasioning need-
less prolixity; to the end, the ancient brevity and suc-
cinctness in bills and other pleadings may be restored and
observed; much less may any counsel insert therein
matter merely criminous or scandalous, under the penalty
of good costs to be laid on such counsel, to be paid to the
party grieved, before such counsel be heard in court.”
“ If there be matter scandalous in a bill, a master of
chancery is to expunge it, and to tax costs for the party
scandalized; but if on such reference the master reports
the bill not scandalous, the party procuring such refer-
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110. 'rhese regulations were further enlarged by 
Lord Coventry in the orders published by him, A. D. 1635, 
and subsequently adopted by Lord Clarendon, in 1661. 
In the collection of rules and orders that go under his 
name, under the title "'Bills,'' it is ordered, "That no 
counsellor do put his hand t0 any bill, answer, or other 
pleading. unless it be drawn, or at least perused by him-
self in the paper draft, ~efore it be engrossed (which th9y 
shall do well for their own discharge to sign also after 
perusal), and counsel are to take care that the same be 
not stuffed with repetition of deeds, writings, or records 
in luBe verba; but the effect and substance of so much of 
them only as it is pertinent and material to be set down ; 
and that in brief terms, without long and needless tra-
verses of points not traversable, tautologies, multiplica-
tion of words, or other impertinencies, occasioning need-
less prolixity; to the end, the ancient brevity and suc-
cinctness in bills and other pleadings may be restored and 
ob~erved; much less may any counsel insert therein 
matter merely criminous or scanrlalous, under the penalty 
of good costs to be laid on such counsel, to be paid to the 
party grieved, before such counsel be heard in court." 
'"If there be matter scandalous in a bill, a master of 
chancery is to expunge it, and to tax costs for the party 
scandalized; but if on such reference the master reports 
the bill not scandalous, the party procuring such refer-
ence shall pay costs to the plaintiff for such his reference." 
CHAPTER IV.
PLEAS AND DEMURRERS.
111, We now come to those pleadings which are
used on the defence, and which either submit to answer
and contest the suit, or which show some reason why the
defendant is not called upon to answer; as that the court
has notjurisdiction ,‘ or that the suit has abated, or is.de-
fectire, or barred. When the defendant submits to con-
test the suit, he puts in an answer; he shows cause against
answering by either demurrer or plea. As the plea in bar
likewise contests the suit, so far as it insists that the cause
of action either never existed, or is gone; so, in many
cases, where the defendant does not require to protect
himself from discovery, or that he must answer as to other
particulars, he may insist upon the bar by answer, as
, effectually as by plea. [a] As pleas and demurrers are
used as objections to the being compelled to answer, we
shall commence our observations with them, and after-
wards treat of the form and general requisites of' an-
swers.
Sncrron I.
Of the General Nature of the Defence by Plea or
' Demurrer,
112, In a preceding chapter we have pointed out the
distinction between pleas and demurrers in.‘ equity, and
their analogy to the same species of defence at common
law; and it there appears that the essential difference be-














































































































































PLEAS .AND DEM:URRERS. 
111. We now come to those pleadings which are 
used on the defence, and which either submit to answer 
and contest the suit, or which sho\V some reason why the 
defendant is not called upon to answer; as that the court 
has not jurisdiction; or that the su~t has abated, or is. de-
fective, or barred. When the defendant submits to con .. 
test the suit, he .put.s in an answer,· he shows cause against 
answering by either demurrer or plea. As the plea in bar 
liltewise contests the suit, so far as it insists that the cause 
of action either never existed, or is gone ; so, in many 
cases, where the defendant does not require to protect 
himself from discovery, or that he must answer as to other 
particulars, he may insist upon the bar by answer, as 
. effectually as by plea. [a] As pleas and demurrers are 
used as objections to the being compelled to answer, we 
shall commence our observations with them, and after-
wards treat of the form and general requisites of an-
swers. 
SECTION I. 
Of the General Nat~~re of the .Defence by Plea or 
.Demurrer. 
112. In a preceding chapter \Ve have pointed out the 
distinction between pleas and demurrers in .. equity, and 
their analogy to the same species of defence at common 
law; and it there appears that the essential difference be-
[ a] Mitf .. 249. 1 Atk. 54~ 2 P. Wms. lotS . 
• 
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tween a plea and a demurrer is, that the latter is merely
an issue in law on the complainant’s own showing; the
former always puts matter of fact, as well as of law, in
issue. Hence, wherever the objection to answer is founded
on a matter of fact not admitted by the bill, and which,
therefore, may be disputed, advantage of‘ such objection
must be taken by plea, in order that the complainant may
have an opportunity to reply, and so take issue upon it.
If the objection is apparent on the face of the adverse
pleading, and therefore no question of fact can arise, the
defendant may-demur. With the restriction just men-
tioned; the objections taken, both by plea and demurrer,
are the same; so that in this point of view, the ensuing
observations will apply equally to both.
113, The student will recollect that we formerly
laid down the propositions of a bill to be: 1st, That from
the relation stated accrues the right to disc0r;er_1/, and such
relief as is prayed for; 2d, That the relation stated is that
which actually exists, and that these propositions admit
of any defence which either, first, denies the right either
to discovery, or relief, or both ; or second, denies the rela-
tion ; or third, invalidates the relation, or bars the right.
114, First, as to the denial of the right. This is
analogous to the first mode of defence at law, mentioned
in the chapter before alluded to, which. admitting the facts
of the case, denies the inference or the rule of law sought
‘ , as we have seen, constitute a de-
murrer. ner, this defence in equity, while it
takes this ent in the bill as true, yet insists that
the facts, even as stated by the complainant himself, do
not give him a right to discovery or to relief.
.
115, In equity there are many cases where, though
the court will not assume a jurisdiction to give relief, yet
















































































































































80 EQUITY PLEADING. 
tween a plea and a demurrer is. that the latter is merely 
an issu,e in law on the complainant's own showing; the 
former always puts matter of .fact, as well as of law, in 
issue. Hence, wherever the objection to answer is founded 
on a matter of fact not admitted by the bill, and which, 
therefore, may be disputed, advantage of such objection 
must be taken by plea, in order that the complainant may 
have an opportunity to reply, and so take issue upon it. 
If the objection is apparent on the face of the adverse 
pleading, and therefore no que~tion of fact can arise, the 
defendant may demur. With the restriction just men-.. 
tioned; the objections taken, both by plea and demurrer, 
are the same; so that in this point of view, the ensuing 
observations will apply equally to both. 
113. The student will recollect that we formerly 
laid down the propositions of a bill to be: 1st, That from 
the relation stated accrues the right to discmJery, and such 
relief as is prayed for; 2d, That the relation stated is that 
which actually exists, and that these propositions admit 
of any defence which either, first, denies the right either 
to discovery, or relief, or both ; or second, denies the rela-
tion ; or tldrd, invalidates the relation, or bars the right. 
114. First, as to the denial of the right. This is 
analogous to the first mode of defence at law, mentioned 
in the chapter before alluded to, which. admitting the facts 
of the case, denies the inference or the rule of law sought 
to be established, w · , as we have seen, constitute a de-
murrer. In li ~ ner, this defence in equity, while it 
takes L 1e s at ent h1.. the bill as true, yet insists that 
the facts, e~en as Rtat:ed by the complainant hi~self, do 
not give him a right to discovery or to relief. 
115. In equity there are many cases where, though 
the court will not assume a jurisdiction to give relief, yet 
the complainant will be entitled to a discovery in aid of 
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thejurisdiction of other courts. [a] In such cases, how-
ever, the bill must be a bill of discovery only; and if it
should seek any relief beyond the mere collateral relief
of an injunction, or a commission to examine witnesses,
[b] and the like, it may be demurred to. [c] In other in-
stances the court will not interfere even for the purpose
of discovery; and if the bill should state a case not en-
titling the complainant to discovery, it may be demurred
to as a bill of discovery merely. [/1] But discovery being,
as before stated, incidental to relief where the complain-
ant has a right to the assistance of the court, no demurrer
will hold to the discovery, [e] unless, indeed, it be to a
point which might subject the defendant to penalties or
‘ forfeiture, which is a good ground of demurrer: or if he
does not think proper to defend himself from the discov-
ery, by demurrer or plea, according to the circumstances
of the case, he may by answer insist that he is not obliged
to make the discovery. [f]
116, Second: The defence in equity, which denies
the relation assumed, or, in other words, denies the truth
of the facts stated in the bill, is analogous to the plea of
the general issue stated at common law, and is taken ad-
vantage of by way of answer, which puts the complain-
ant on the necessity of proving the allegations denied, if
material to support his case. In like manner, the same
defence, and with a similar analogy to common law, may be
[a] Mitf. 42, 149. 2 Ves. 398.
[b] 1 Bro. C. C. 471. 2 Ves. Jun. 514.
[c] Mitf. 149, and the cases there cited. See also, 6 Ves. 62 ,
11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. & Beames, 328.
[d] Mitf. 150.
[e] Ibtd, and see Forest’s Rep. in Exchequer, 129. 6 Ves.
37-8. 1 Swanst. 29-1.
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. the jurisdiction of other courts. [a] In such cases, how-
ever, the bill must be a bill of discovery only; and if it 
should seak any relief beyond the mere collateral relief 
of· an injrinction, or a coin mission to examine witnesses, 
[b] and tlie like, it may be demurred to. [o] In other in-
stances the court will not interfere even for the purpose 
of discovery; and if the bill should state a case not en-
titling the complainant to discovery, it may be demurred 
to as a bill of discovery merely. [d] But discovery being, 
as before stated, incidental to relief where the complain-
ant has a right to the assistance of the court, no demurrer 
will hold to the discovery, [e] unless, indeed, it be to a 
pOint which might RUbject the defendant to penalties or 
. forfeiture, whirh is a good ground of demurrer: or if he 
does not think proper to defend himself from the discov-
ery, by demurrer or plea, according to the circumstances 
of the case, he may by answer insist that he is not obliged 
to make the discoverf". [f] 
116. Second: The defence in equity, which d~nies 
the relation assumed, or, in other words, denies the truth 
of the facts stated in the bill, is analogous to the plea of 
the general issue stated at common law, and is taken ad-
vantage of by way of answer, which puts the complain-
ant on the necessity of proving the allegations denied, jf 
material to support his case. In like manner, the same 
defence, and with a similar analogy t~ comtnon law, may be 
[a] Mitf. 42, 149. 2 Ves. 398. 
[b] 1 Bro. C. C. 471. 2 Ves. Jun. 514. 
[c] Mitf. 149, and the cases there oited. See also, 6 Ves. 62, 
11 Ves. 509. 2 Ves. & Beames, 328. 
[ d] Mitf. 150. 
[ e] Ibid, and see Forest's Rep. in Exchequer, 129. 6 Vee. 
37-8. 1 Swanst. 294. 




made by denying some particular fact on which the whole
relation, and consequently the right, is founded. This
last is used by plea, the negative averments of which
must be supported by answer also, for the reasons assigned
in a previous chapter.
117, Third: The defence which invalidates the rela-
tion, or bars the right, is similarin all respects to a special
plea in bar, at common law. To invalidate the relation,
therefore, some new matter must be stated, which may
show that the parties were incapacitated from contracting
the relation, or are incapable to continue it ; or that the
subject matter was insufiicient or illegal, or had undergone
some alteration; or that the right, being incidental, had
not accrued—as where a condition precedent had not been
performed. Again, new matter may be stated to show
that the right, though once existing, is barred by the act
of theparty, by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act 0f
Gad, or unavoidable calamity. In all these cases, as new
matter must be put in issue, the defence must be by plea.
118, It is to be observed, that according to the first
proposition of the bill stated above, the right of which we
here speak and which the defence either denies or invali-
dates, is the right to discovery and relief, which may be
termed the general right, to contra-distinguish it from the
particular rig/zts flowing from the relation sought to be
established, and which are included in the relief required.
It is clear that the right to discovery and relief involves
the consideration of the mode of applying for redress,
since, if this latter be defective, the court will not inter-
fere, at least, until the defect be remedied. All those ob-
jections, therefore, which we have noticed before [a] as
the subject of pleas in abatement, and to the jurisdiction,
are equally applicable as modes of defence in equity,
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made by denying some particular fact on \Vhich the whole 
relation, and consequently the right, is fot1nded. '!"his 
last is used by plea, the negative averments of \Vhich 
must be supported by answer also, for the reasons assigned 
in a previous ch~pter. 
117. Third: The defence whieh invalidates the rela-
tion, or hars the right, is similar in all respects to a special 
plea in bar, at common law. To invalidate the relation, 
therefore, some new matter must be stated, whicl1 1nay 
show that the pa1'tiea \Vere incapacitated from contracting 
the relation, or are incapable to continue it; or that the 
subject matter was insufficient or illegal, or had undergone 
some alteration ; or that the rig4t, being incidental, had 
not accrued-as where a condition precedent had not been 
performed. Again, new matter may be stated to show 
that the right, though once existing, is barred by the act 
of the party, by the act of law; or, lastly, by the act of 
God, or unavoidable calamity. In all these cases, as new 
matter must be put in issue, ~he defence must be by plea. 
118. It is to be observed, that according to the first 
proposition of the bill stated above, the ri,qht o.f which we 
here speak and which the defence either denies or invali-
dates, is the right to diacovery and relief, which may be 
termed the general right, to contra-distinguish it from the 
particular rights flowing from the relat.ion sought to be 
established, and which are included in the relief required. 
It is clear that the right to discovery and relief involves 
the consideration of the mode of applying for redress, 
since, if this latter be defective, the court will not inter-
fere, at least, until the defect be remedied. All those ob-
jections, therefore, which we have noticed before [a] as 
the subject of pleas in abatement, and to the jurisdiction, 
are equally applicable as modes of defence in equity, 
[a] Cap. I, Sec. 1. 
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whether by demurrer or plea. In point of fact, there is
this distinction to be taken between those modes of de-
fence as used at common law, and as used in equity: that
in the former case, general demurrers and pleas in bar are
considered as effective answers to contest the suit; in
equity, as has been already stated, pleas and demurers of
all kinds are more in the nature of exceptions to answer-
ing or contesting the suit, either because the court has not
jurisdiction, or the suit has abated, or is defective, or
barred. And this difference arises from the double char-
acter as formerly noticed, which is sustained by the an-
swer in equity—-it being a pleading so far as it denies, and
a proof so far as it admits, the allegations of the bill.
119. There is a close affinity between the method of
the Roman law and that adopted by the common law of
England. Our trial byjury is, in reality, nothing more
than giving judges, under the Roman law, after the pre-
liminary pleadings have been decided by the court; and,
in many cases, the law is so interwoven with the fact, that
the jury are, of necessity, the judges of both; and in one
case more particularly, that of libel, by express act of
parliament. In like manner, in equity, the masters in
chancery,. who were anciently the counsel and assistants
to our clerical chancellors, were some of them given as
judges; and this is the foundation of the judicial authority
of the master of the rolls, who is the head of the masters
in chancery, and, as such, entrusted with the keeping of
the rolls of the court, whence he derives his name. [a]
So, also, at the present day, all matters of account and
such like are at once referred to a master, to be decided by
him. Anciently, when the cause was remitted, to the
master of the rolls, he used to examine the witnesses him-
[ct] Vide Sir Jos. Jekyll’s Treaties on the Judicial Author-













































































































































DEFENCE BY PLEA OR DE1nJRRER. 83 
whether by demurrer or plea. In point of fact, there is 
this distinction to be taken between those modes of de-
fence as used at common law, and as used in equity: that 
in the former case, general demurrers and pleas in bar are 
considered as effective answers to contest the suit; in 
equity, as has been already stated .. pleas and demurers of 
all kinds are more in the nature of exceptions to answer· 
ing or contesting the suit, either because the court has nat 
juriadiotion, or the suit has abated, or is defective, or 
barred. And this difference arises from the double char-
acter as formerly noticed; which is sustained by the an-
swer in equity-it being a pleading so far as it denies, and 
. a proof so far as it admits, the allegations of the bill. 
119- There is a close affinity between the method of 
the Roman law and that adopted by the.common law of 
England. Our trial by jury is, in reality, nothing more 
than giving judges, under the Rornan law, after the pre-
liminary pleadings have been decided by the court; _and, 
in many cases, the law is so interwoven with the fact, that 
the jury_ are, of necessity, the judges of .both; and in one 
case more particularly, that of libel, by express act of 
parliament. In like manner, in equity, the masters in 
chancery,, who were anciently the counsel and assistants 
to our clerical chancellors, were sotne of them given as 
judges; and ~his is the foundation of the judicial authority 
of the master of the rolls, who is the head of the masters 
in chancery, and, as such, entrusted with the keeping of 
the rolls of the court, whence he derives his name. [a] . 
So, also, at the present day, all matters of account and 
such like are at once referred to a master, to be decided by 
him. Anciently, when the cause was remitted, to the 
master of the rolls, he used to examine the witnesses him-
(a] Vide Sir Jos. Jekyll'~ 'rreaties on the Judicial Author· 
ity of the Master of the Rolls. 
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self; but in course of time that duty devolved upon office-
ers deputed by him, and thence called examiners [a] (for
which reason he has the nomination to that appointment
to this day); and hence this proceeding in chancery is still
a remnant of the practice of giving judges to inquire into
matters of fact, although the court retains to itself the
ultimate decision of the cause upon the proofs and argu-
ments at the hearing.
.
Sscrrtm II.
Of the subject matter of Pleas and Demurrers, both to the
Discovery and Relief.
120, Having th-us made it appear that in equity, at
least, demurrers and pleas are used for the purpose of
showing that the suit ought not to be further contested, it
remains now to see what objections will be deemed avail-
able to that end. It has been already shown that what-
ever objection holds against the relief sought by a bill, is
equally valid against the discovery prayed by the same
bill,the latter being incidental to the former. But as bills
are sometimes filed for discovery only, there are some ob-
jections which extend to mere discovery. We shall,
therefore, take each in its turn ; and first of the ob-
jections to relief.
I. It is material to observe here, that as pleas in
equity may be either in abatement or in bar, since the
right to discovery and relief may be met by objections
that go in abatement as well as in bar, so demurrers also,
which deny that right, may be sustained on either of those
grounds. It is different, however, as to answer, because
the want of relation is an objection in bar, and conse-
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self; but in course o~ tin1e that duty devolved upon office-
ers deputed by him, and thence called examiners [a] (for 
which·reason he ha~ the nomination to that appointment 
to this day); and hence this proceeding in chancery is still 
a remnant of the practice of giving judges to inquire into 
matters of fact, although the court retains to itself the 
ultimate decision of the cause upon the proofs and argu-
ments at the hearing. 
SECTION II. 
_Of the subject matter of Pleas and Demurrers, both to the 
Discovery and Relief. 
120. Having thus made it appear that in equity, at 
least, demurrers and pleas are used for the purpose of 
showing that the suit ought not to be further contested, it 
remains now to see what objections will be deemed avail-
able to that end. It has been a~ready shown that what-
ever objection holds against the relief sought by a bill, is 
equally valid again~t the discovery prayed by the. same-
bill, the latter being incidental to the former. But as bills 
are sometimes filed for discovery only, there are some ob-
jections which extend to mere discovery. We shall, 
therefore, take each in its turn ; and first of the ob-
jections to relief. 
· I. It is material to observe here, that as pleas in 
equity may be either in abatement or in bar, si~ce the 
right to discovery and relief may be met by objections 
that go in abatement as well as in bar, so demurrers also, 
which deny that right .. may be sustained on either of those 
grounds. It is different, however, as to answer, because 
the want of relation is an objection in bar, and conse-
quently, the answer, the use of which is to deny, or inval-
[a] Ibid. 
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idate the relation, is in bar only, [a] and cannot insist
upon an objection in abatement.
121, The annexed synopsis will exhibit, at one view,
all the modes of defence to the relief, ‘which may be used
in equity; any of which may be taken advantage of, as
preliminary objections, by plea or demurrer, to the de-
fendant’s answering or contesting the suit, with the ex-
ception ofxthat mode which denies the relation.; which,
being in reality the very Zitis contestatio itself, must be
done by answer, unless where the same thing can be
effected by means of the negative plea. It was formerly,‘
indeed, matter of doubt how far the negative plea ought to
be allowed in equity [b] since it was thought that the
answer was the most fitting mode of contesting the
character in which the complainant sued, and on which
his supposed claim was founded. But it has since been
determined, and justly, that the negative plea is good;
for otherwise, any person assuming a fictitious character
might force a discovery from a defendant, to which, in his
real capacity, he would have no right. [c] For it is an in-
variable rule. that when a defendant does not plead or de-
mur, but submits to answer, he must answer fully. [d]
122, II. We next come to those objections which
hold even to discovery, without any relief being prayed;
and first, We may lay it down as a general rule, that, what-
ever objections are valid to avoid a discovery, are a forti-
ori good as against relief; or negatively, that where there
[a] "An answer is that which the defendant pleadethI or
saith in bar, to avoid the plaintifi"s bill or action, either by con-
fessing, and avoiding, or traversing and denying, the material
parts thereof.” West’s Symb. 104. Hinde, 196.
[b] Beames’ Pleas, 123, et seq. and Mitf. 187, 188.
[0] Ibid.
[d] Mazzaredo v. Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70. And see 11
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idate the 'relation, is in bar only, [aJ and cannot insist 
upon an objection in abatement. 
121. The annexed synopsis will exhibit, at one view, 
all the modes of defence to the relief, .,vhich may be used 
in equity; any of which may be taken advantage of, as 
prelin1inary objections, by plea or demurrer, to the de-
fendant's answering or cor~testing the suit, with the ex· 
I 
ception of that mode which denies the relation·; which, 
being in reality the very litis contestatio itself, must be 
done by answer, unless \Vhere the same thing can be 
effected by means of the ne.qative plea. It was formerly; 
indeed, matter of doubt how far the negative plea ought to 
be allowed in equity [b] since it was thought that the 
an~wer was the most fitting mode of contesting the 
character in which the complainant sued, and o.n which 
his supposed claim was founded. But it has since been 
determined, and justly, that the negative plea is good; 
for otherwise, any person assuming a fictitious character 
might force a discovery from a defendant, to which, in his 
real capacity, he would have no right. [c] For it is an in-
variable rule. that when a defendant does not plead or de-
mur, but submits to ans\ver, he must answer fully. [d] 
122. II. We next come to those objections which 
hold even to discovery, without any relief being prayed.; 
and first, we may lay it down as a general rule, that, what.-
ever objections ar~ valid to avoid a discovery, are a forti· 
ori good as a~ainst relief; or negatively, that where there 
[a] "An answer is that which the defendant pleadeth, ?r 
saith in bar, to avoid the plaintiff's bill or action, eit~er by con-
fessing, and avoiding, or traversing and deuying, the material 
parts thereof." W~qt's Syn1b. 104. Hinde, 196. 
[b] Beames' Pleas, 19.3, et seq. and Mitf. 187, 188. ·· · 
[c] Ibid. 
[d] Mazzaredo !'· Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70. And see 11 
Ves. 395, and 16 Ves. 382. 
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is no objection to relief, there can be none to discovery,
unless where such discovery might subject the party to a
penalty or forfeiture. But the converse of this proposi-
tion does not hold; for there may be no objection to the
discovery and yet an objection to the relief; or, in other
words, that which is an objection to a bill for relief, may
yet be no objection to a bill of discovery. For as a bill
for a mere discovery seeks no decree, so want of equity or
want of proper parties would be no objection. [aj But as
the discovery in a bill for relief is only subsidiary to the
relief, if there be a valid objection to the latter, the dis- -
covery, though otherwise proper. must fall with it. [b]
Care must be taken, therefore, that the bill do not pray
relief when the complainant has a right only to discovery.
[c] And it appears that even where the answer to a bill
of discovery might furnish ground for supposing that re-
lief was in equity, not in law, yet that the bill cannot be
amended by adding a prayer for relief, but that it would
be better to direct the complainant to pay the costs and
bring a new bill; and if in that cause any useis to be made
of the discovery given by the first answer, to let it be read
as an answer to a bill of discovery, as evidence, not as
part of the defence, or admission, upon which the bill
proceeds. [d] .
123, A bill of mere discovery is always brought in
support of defence of a civil suit, either in the court itself
or in some other court. In this respect, therefore, the
[a] Mitf. 163.
[b] Mitf. 149. Beames’ Pleas, 250, and the cases there cited.
See also 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Beames, 539.
[0] But a mere prayer for general relief, or for the collateral
relief of an injunction, commission, and the like, will not ren-
der a bill of discovery demurrable. 2 Ves. jun. 514.














































































































































86 EQUITY PLEADING. 
is no objection to relief, there can be none to discovery, 
unless where such discovery might Muhject the party to a 
penalty or forfeiture. But the converse of this proposi-
tion does not hold ; for there may be no objection to the 
discovery and yet an objection to the relief; or, in other 
words, that which is an objection to a bill for relief, may 
yet be no objection to a bill of discovery. ~,or as a bill 
for a mere discovery seeks no decree, so want of equity or 
want of proper parties would be no objection. [a] But as 
the discovery in a bill for reliet is only subsidiary to the 
relief, if there be a valid objection to the latter, the dis. · 
covery, though otherwise proper .. must fall with it.. [b] 
Care must be taken, therefore, that the bill do not pray 
relief when the cotnplainant has a right only to discovery. 
[c] And it appears that even where the answer to a bill 
of discovery might furnish ground for supposing that re-
lief was in equity, not in law, yet that the bill cannot be 
amended by adding a prayer for relief, but that it would 
be better to direct the complainant to pay the costs and 
bring a new bill; and if in that cause any use is to be made 
of the discovery given by the first answer, to let it be read 
as an answer to a bill of discovery, as evidence, not as 
part of the defence, or admission, upon which the bill 
proceeds. [d] · 
123. A bill of mere discovery is al\vays brought in 
support of defence of a civil suit, either in the court itself 
or in some other court. In this respect, therefore, the 
[a] Mitf. 16~l. 
[b] 1\Iitf. 149. Bearnes' Pleas, 25~, and the cases there cited. 
See also 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Bean1es, 539. 
[ c] But a mere prayer for general relief, or for the collateral 
relief of an injunction, commission, and the like, will not ren-
der a bill of discovery demurrable. 2 V~s. jun. 514. 
' [ d] See the observations of Lord Eldon, in Butterworth v. 
Bailey,l5 Ves. 358. 
nrscovrnr AND BELIEF. 87
court of equity assumes a jurisdiction to compel discovery,
even where it has not authority to extend relief. Conse-
quently, the want of equity will be no good ground to
avoid an answer. But if a mere discovery be sought,
where the court has not even jurisdiction to that extent-
as if the discovery be sought in aid of a court of criminal
jurisprudence, [a] or of a court which has itself authority
to compel the discovery, [b] the defendant may plead or
demur to the jurisdiction.
124. All pleas to the person extend to the discovery,
as well as to relief; for they are objections to show that
the complainant cannot institute a suit in any court. But,
on the other hand, no plea in abatement, on the ground of
the mode of proceeding being defective, can be used as
an objection to a bill of discovery; because such a bill
seeks no decree from the court. Multifariousness ought,
perhaps, to be made an exception. [c] that the defendant
may not be uselessly harrassed.
125, Next, as to the objections in bar. As the dis-
covery is only for the purpose of obtaining relief, either
in the same or in another court of justice, any objection
which shows that the complainant can have no right to
relief, either in the same or any other court, will bar his
right to discovery. All the objections in bar for relief,
therefore, in equity, will be equally valid against discov-
ery in aid of relief there. [d] Yet there is one seeming
exception to this rule, namely, as to the objection which
denies that the defendant has such an interest as can
make him liable; for persons, not otherwise interested,
[al 2 Ves. 398.
[b] 1 Atk. 288. 1 Ves. 205. 2 Ves. 451.
[c] Mitt‘. 163.
[d] 2 Ves. 71. 3 Meriv. 175. 1 Ves. & Beames, 539. And













































































































































DISCOVERY AND RELIEF. 87 
cou.rt of equity assumes a jurisdiction to compel discovery, 
even where it has not authority to extend relief. Conse-
quently, the want of equity will be no good ground to 
avoid an answer. But if a mere discovery be sought, 
where the court has not even jurisdiction to that extent-
as if the discovery be sought in aid of a court of criminal 
jurisprudence, [a] or of a court which has itself authority 
to compel the di~covery, [b] the defendant may plead or 
demur to thejurisdiction. 
·124. All pleas to the person extend to the discovery, 
as well as to relief; for they are objections to show that 
the complainant cannot institute a suit in any court. But, 
on the other hand, n~ plea in abatement, on the ground of 
the mode of proceedin,q being defective, can be used as 
an objection to a bill of discovery; because such a bill 
seeks no decree from the court. Multifariousness ought, 
perhaps, to be made an exception .. [c] that the defendant 
may not be uselessly harrassed. 
125. Next, as to the objections in bar. As the dis· 
covery is only for the purpose of obtaining relief, either 
in the same or· in another court of justice, any objection 
which shows that the complainant can have· no right to 
relief, either in the same or an.v other court, will bar his 
right to discovery. All the objections in bar for relief, 
therefore, in equity, will be equally valid against discov-
ery in aid of relief there. [d] Yet there is one seeming 
exception to this rule, namely, as to the objection which 
denies that the defendant ltas such. an interest as can 
make !tim liable; for per~ons, not otherwise interested, 
[aj 2 Ves. 398. 
[b] 1 Atk. 288. 1 Ves. 205. 2 Ves. 451. 
[ c] :Mit f. 163. 
[d] 2 Ves-. 71. 3 Meriv. 175. I Ves. & Beames, 539. And 
see Lord Alvanley's observations, in 8 Ves. 347. 
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are frequently made parties for the mere purpose of dis-
covery; such as the oflicers of the corporation (which, as
it answers under seal, cannot be indicted for perjury) or
attorneys, auctioneers, agents and arbitrators, when
charged with being parties to a fraud. But further, if the
complainant has no right of action in any other court, he
can have no title to discovery in this ; and the want of
. such right may be pleaded in bar, or objected by demurrer.
[a] And even though the complainant should have such
right, yet if the defendant has an equal claim to protec-
tion—as where he is a purchaser for valuable considera-
tion, without notice, the court will not interpose, even to
compel a discovery. This last plea, therefore, is equally a
bar to discovery, in aid of the jurisdiction of other courts,
as it is to relief, and consequently to discovery, in this. [b]
126, There are yet some objections peculiar to dis-
covery, asregarded in the light of an examination. Thus,
a defendant may refuse to answer any question that
would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, [c] unless
such forfeiture be waived by the person competent to do
so, [d] or that would cause a breach of the confidence re-
posed in him, as counsel, attorney, or arbitrator. [e] And
this arises from the peculiar nature of a bill, which is both
a pleading and an examination. The objections on such
grounds may be taken to the bill, iI1 its character of a
pleading, by plea or demurrer; but as it is also on exami-
nation, the defendant may, without demurring or plead-
[a] Mitfl 152. 3 Bro. C. C. 154. 3 Ves. jun. 494. 13 Ves.
240. '
[bl 2 Cha. Ca. 72. 1 Vern. 27. 1 Ventr. 198. 2 Ves.jun.
454.
[c] 1 Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Ves. 389. 2 Atk. 392.
[d] 1 Vern. 109, 129, 306. 1 Chan. Rep. 144. 2 Atk. 393.













































































































































88 EQUITY PLEADING. 
are frequently made parties for the mere purpose of dis-
covery; such as the officers of the corporation (which, as 
it answers under seal, cann~t be indicted for perjuty) or 
attorneys, auctioneers, agents and arbitrators, when 
charged with being parties to a fraud. But further, if the · 
complainant has no right of acti_on in any other court .. he 
can have no title to discovery in this; and the want of 
such right may be pleaded in bar, or objected by demurrer. 
[a] And even though the complainant should have such 
right, yet if the defendant has an equal claim to pro.tec-
tion-as where he is a pu1'chaser for valuable considera-
tion, without notice, the court will not interpose, e\en to 
compel a discovery. This last plea, therefore, is equally a 
bar to discovery, in aid of the jurisdiction of other courts, 
as it is to relief, and consequently to discovery, in this. [b] 
126. There are yet some objections peculiar to dis-
covery, as·regarded in the li~ht of an examination. Thus, 
a defendant may refuse to answer any question that 
would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, [c] unless 
such forfeiture be waived by the person competent to do 
so, [d] or that would cause a breach of the confidence re-
posed in him, as counsel, attorney, or arbitrator. [e] And 
this arises from the peculiar nature of a bill, which is both 
a pleading and an exa1nination. The objections on such 
grounds may be taken to the bill, in its character of a 
pleading, by plea or demurrer; but as it is also on exami-
nation, the defendant 1nay, without demurri~g or plead-
[a] Mitf~ 152. 3 Bro. C. C. I54. 3 Ves. jun. 494. I3 Ves. 
~0. 
454. 
[bl 2 Cha. Ca. 72. I Vern. 27. 1 Ventr. 198. 2 Ves. jun. 
[ c] I Bro. C. C. 98. 1 Atk. 529. 2 Ves. 389. 2 Atk. 392. 
[d] I Vern. 109, 129, 306. 1 Chan. Rep. 144. 2 Atk. 393. 
[e] Cha. Ca. 277. Finch. Rep. 82. 
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ing, decline answering to the objectionable parts. [a]
And this is the only exception to the general rule that
when a defendant submits to answer, and neither pleads
nor demurs, he must answer fully. [h] For reasons
grounded on similar principles, if the discovery sought be
immaterial to the relief required, either in the same or
another court, the bill, which seeks such discovery, may
be demurred to; or matter may he pleaded to show that
the discovery, when obtained, would be immaterial. [c]
SECTION III.
Of the Defence to Bills not Original.
127; The objections which are peculiar to the bills
not original, are chiefly in the nature of objections to the
form of proceeding—as where a devisee files a bill of re-
vivor, [d] when, as we have before seen,‘ his proper course
would be by original bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor:
or where a complainant states, by way of supplemental
bill, facts which might have been added by amendment;
[e] or amends his original bill by adding new facts which
had occurred sinc-e the institutin of the suit, and which
therefore are the subject of supplemental matter'only. [f]
128, So, in like manner, if a person not a party or
privy to the original suit brings a bill of review, the de-
fendant may demur; or if such bill be brought against a
[a] Mitf. 163, 249. 3Br0. 0. o. 40. 2P. Wins. 238. 10 Ves.
450.
[b] 3 Madd. Rep. 70.
[c] Mitf. 155, 156. 1 Bro. C. C. 96. 2 Atk. 387, 394. 2 Ves.
jun. 396.
[d] 1 Cha. Ca. 174.
[e] 3 Atk. 817. 2 Mad. Rep. 240.
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ing, decline answering to the objectionable parts. [a] 
And this is the only ~xception to the general rule that 
when a defendant submits to answer, and neither pleads 
nor demurs, he must answer fully. [h] For reasons 
grounded on similar principles, if the discovery sought be 
immaterial to the relief required, either in the same or 
another court, the bill, which seeks such discovery, may 
be demurred to; or matter may be pleaded to show that 
the discovery, when obtained, would be immaterial. [c] 
SECTION III. 
O.f the Defence to Bills not Ori.qinal. 
127.· The objections which are peculiar to the bills 
not original, are chiefly in the nature of objections to the 
forni of proceeding-as where a devisee files a bill of re-
vivor, [d] when, as we have before seen,' his proper course 
would be by original bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor: 
or where a ·complainant states, by way of supplemental 
bill, facts which might have been added by amendfi:lent; 
[ e] or amends his original bill by adding new facts which 
had occurred sinoe the institution of the suit, and which 
therefore are the subject of supplemental matter· only. [f] 
128. So, in like manner, if a person n<;>t a party or 
privy to the original suit brings a bill of review, the de-
fendan.t may demur; or if such bill be brought against a 
[a] Mitf. 163, 249. 3 Bro. C. C. 40. 2 P. W1ns. 238. 10 Ves. 
450. 
[ b] 3 Mad d. Rep. 70. 
[c) Mitf. 155, 156. 1 Bro. C. C. 96. 2 Atk. 387, 394. 2 Ves. 
jun. 396. 
[d] 1 Chn. Ca. 174. 
[e] 8 Atk. 817. 2 Mad. Rep. 240. 
l!] 1 Atk. 291. 
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defendant not a party to the original bill. [a] But any
matter which shows that the right, though existing at the
time when the original bill was filed, had been subse-
quently barred—as by release, fine, and non-claim, [b]
statute of limitations, [c] or decree enrolled twenty years
-—]d] may be pleaded against the secondary bill. Where-
ever new matter is introduced, either by supplement or in
a bill of review, such new matter is liable to any objec-
tion which might be 1nade to it, if stated in the original
bill. [e]
129, The proper defence to a bill of revivor is by
plea or demurrer, because if the party makes the same
objection by. answer, it cannot be determined till the hear-
ing. Nevertheless, if at the hearing it does not appear
that the complainant had a title to revive, although the
defendant did not take advantage of the objection in any
manner, he shall gain nothing by his bill. [f]
130, The regular defence to a bill of review for error
apparent, is to plead the decree in bar to the new suit,
and demur to opening the enrolment, [g] on the ground
that the errors assigned are not such as to entitle the com
plainant to have the decree reviewed, much less reversed.
The first question therefore, is, whether the enrolment
should be opened, and the decree reviewed, and this is
argued apon the demurrer, when nothing can be read but
what appears upon the face of the decree; if the demurrer
[a] Gilb. For. Rom. 186. 1 Chan. Ca. 123.
[b] 2 Vern. 190.
[c] 1 P. \Vms. 742.
[d] 5 Brown. P. C. 466. 6 Brown. P. C. 395. 1 Vern. 287.
1 Ves. & Beames. 536.
[e] Mitf. 236.
[f] 3 P. Wms. 348.
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defendant not a party to the original bill. [a] But any 
matter which shows that t~e right, though existing at the 
time when the original bill was filed, had been subse-
quently barred-as by release, fine, and non-claim, [b] 
statute of limitations, [c] or decree enrolled twenty years 
-]d] may be pleaded against the secondary bill. Where-
ever new tnatter is introduced, either by supplement or in 
a bill of review, such new matter is liable to any objec-
tion which might be made to it, if stated in the original 
bill. [e] 
129. The proper defence to a bill of revivor is by 
plea or demurrer, because if the party makes the same 
objection by· answer, it cannot be determined till the hear. 
ing. Nevertheless, if at the hearing it does not appear 
that the co1nplainant had a title to revive, although the 
defendant did not take advanta~e of the objection in any 
manner, he shall gain nothing by his bil1. [f] 
130. The regular defence to a bill of review for e;v,.or 
apparent, is to plead the decree in bar to the new suit, 
and demur to opening the enrolment, [.q] on the ground 
that the errors assigned are not such as to entitle the com 
plainant to have the decree reviewed, much less reversed. 
The first question therefore, is, whether the enrolment 
should be opened, and the decree reviewed, and this is 
argued apon the demurrer, w~en nothing can be read but 
what appears upon the face of the decree; if the demurrer 
[a] Gilb. For. Rom. 186. I Chan. Ca. 123. 
[b] 2 Vern. 190. 
[c] 1 P. 'Vms. 742. 
[d] 5 Brown. P. C. 466. 6 Brown. P. C. 395. 1 Vert:~. 287. 
1 Ves. & Beames. 536. 
[ e] Mitf. 236. 
[f] 3 P. Wms. '348. 
[g] 1 Vern. 392. 2 Atk. 534. 
EQ. PL.-19. 
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be overruled, then arises the second question, whether the
decree ought to be reversed; and the complainant is at
liberty to read bill and answer, or any other evidence, as
at a rehearing, the cause being equally open. [a]
131, The plea of the decree is proper in this case,
and because it is the very foundation of the defence which .
is provable by the record; and although it appears on
the face of the bill, yet it is there sought to be impeached
on the ground of error apparent, which error being a
question of law only, is rightly denied by demurrer; as
likewise in a similar manner, when a bill is brought to set
aside a decree on the ground of fraud, the decree itself is
pleaded in bar, and the fraud, which is a question of fact,
is denied by answer, in support of the plea, as well as by
negative averments in the plea.
132, Where a bill of review is brought on discovery
of new matter, a case can scarcely occur where it will be
necessary to plead or demur, as the leave of the court
must be had before the bill is filed. The fact of the dis-
covery, however, may be contradicted by plea, or traversed
by answer; and, in general, the new matter is liable to
any objection which would have been good ground of de-
fence to it in the original bill. [12].
133, A demurrer for want of equity will not hold to
a cross bill, for the defendant being drawn into court by
the complainant in the original bill, he may avail himself
of the assistance of the court, without being obliged to
show a ground of equity to support its jurisdiction. [c]
For the same reason, such bills are not liable to any ob-
jections to the person, except the informality of the bill
[a] 1Atk.290.
[b] Mitf. 236.
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be overruled, then arises the second question, whether the 
decree ought to be reversed; and the complainant is at 
liberty to read bill and answer, or any other evidence, as 
at a rehearing, the cause being equally open. [a] 
131. The plea of the decree .is proper in this case, 
and because it is the very foundation of the defence which . 
is provable by the record; and although it appeat·s on 
the face of the bill, yet it is there sought to be impeached 
on the ground of error apparent, which error being a 
question of law only, is rightly denied by demurrer; as 
likewise in a similar manner, when a bill is brought to set 
aside a decree on the ground of fraud, the decree itself is 
pleaded in bar, and the fraud, which is a question of fact, 
is denied by answer, in support of the plea, as well. as by 
negative averments in the plea. 
132. Where a bill of review is brought on discovery 
of new matter, a case can scarcely occur where it will be 
necessary to plead ·or demur, as the leave of the court 
must be had before the bill is filed. The fact of the dis-
covery, however, may be contradicted by plea, or traversed 
by answer ; and, in general, the new matter is liable to 
any objection which would have been good ground of de-
fence to it in the original bill. [b]. 
133. A demurrer for want of equity will not hold to 
a cross bill, for the defendant being drawn into court by 
the complainant in the original bill, he may avail himself 
of the assistance of the court, without being obliged to 
show a ground of equity to support its jurisdiction. [c] 
For the same reason, such bills are not liable to any ob-
jections to the person, except the informality of the bill 
[a] 1 Atk. 290. 
[b] Mitf. 236. 
[ c] Hartl. 160. 8 Atk. 812. 
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being exhibited in the name of a person who is incapable
of instituting a suit alone. [a]
.
SECTION IV.
Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and
Demurrers.
134, Our next consideration will be, as to the form
and general requisites of pleas and demurrers. The de-
fendant being called upon by the subpana to answer the
interrogatories in the bill, must do so or show good cause
to the contrary; the office of pleas and demurrers is to
state such cause. Hence the substance of all pleas and
demurrers is, in effect, nothing more than the statement,
with certainty and precision, of some of those objections
which. are to be found in the synopsis of the modes of de-
fence, “ wherefore the defendant demands the judgment
of the court, whether he shall be compelled to answer and
contest the suit; and prays to be dismissed, with his
reasonable costs.”
135, Thus the derhurrer contends that the case
made by the bill (admitting it for the sake of argument
to be correct), [b] is yet not such as to entitle the com-
plainant to an answer, [c] either because the case, as
stated, does not contain some essential ingredient neces-
sary to establish the right, or because some fact is therein
stated which operates as an avoidance to the right. [d]
Again. the plea admits, for the sake of argument, that the
facts stated in the bill are true, [e] and that the legal in-
ference drawn is correct; but it avers that there are
other circumstances connected with the case which dis-
[a] Hinde. 190.
[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 95.
[c] 3 Meriv. 503.
[d] 3 Ves. 255.
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being exhibited in the name of a person who is incapable 
of instituting a snit alone. [a] 
SECTION IV. 
Of the General Form and Structure of Pleas and 
Dem1.trrers. 
134. Our next consideration will be, as to the form 
and general requisites of pleas and demurrers. rThe de-
fendant being called upon by the subpmna to answer the 
interrogatories in the bill, must do so or show good cause 
to the contrary; the office of pleas and demurrers is to 
state such cause. Hence the substance of all pleas and 
demurrers is, in effect, nothing more than the statement, 
with c,ertainty and precision, of some of those objections 
which. are to be found in the synopsis of the modes of de-
fence, "wherefore the defendant demands the judgment 
of the court, whether he shall be compelled to answer and 
contest the suit; and prays to be distnissed, with his 
reasonable costs." 
135. 'rhus the de~urrer contends that the case 
made by the bill (admitting it for the sake of argument 
to be correct), [b] is yet not such as to entitle the com-
plainant to an answer, [c] either because the case, as 
stated, does not contain some essential ingredient neces-
sary to establish the right, or becaule some fact is therein 
stated which operates as an avoidance to the right. [d] 
Again, the plea ad1nits, for the sake of ar.qument, that the 
facts stated in the bill are true, [ e] and that the ~egal in-
ference drawn is correct; but it avers that there are 
other circumstances connected \Vith the case which dis .. 
[a] Hinde. 190. 
[b] 2 Ves. Jun. 95. 
[c] S Meriv. 503. 
[d] 3 Ves. 255. 
[ e] 2 Atk. 51, 
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place the equity, [a] or which, in other words, by chang-
ing the nature of. the relation between the parties, avoid
the right established by the bill. The negativeplea '
differs only in this, that instead of averring new facts, it
denies some one essential position of the bill, admitting,
for the sake of argument, that all the rest of the facts
relied upon are true.
136, From this view it is apparent that the essential
part of a plea or demurrer is the assignment of the reasons
on which the defendant relies for not answering; and this
is the substance and body of the pleading, which consists
of the enumeration of the causes of demurrer, or the aver-
ment of the facts which constitute the plea. There are,
besides, a formal commencement and conclusion, each of
which performs distinct funct.ions, and therefore the plead-
ing may, with sufiicient convenience, be devided into three
parts: first, the commencement; second, the body; and,
third, the conclusion. We shall here subjoin the skeleton
form of a demurrer, and of a plea, and then add some re-
marks upon each part in its order.
137, The Demurrer of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill
of Complaint of A. B., Complainant.
[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing
or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in
the said complain'ant’s bill contained to be true, in such
manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth
demur thereto; [B] and for cause of demurrer showeth,
that [the said complainant hath not by his own showing
made out a case which establishes his right, title, or inter-
est; or that he hath admitted and acknowledged, by his
said'bill, certain facts which, by the known rules of the
law, avoid his right to an answer.] [C] Wherefore, and
for divers other defects and causes of demurrer appearing
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place the equity, [a] or which, in other words, by chang-
ing the nature of. the relatiol1 between the parties, avoid 
the right established by the bill. Th·e negative· plea 
differs only in this, that instead of averring new facts, it 
denies some one essential position of the bill, admitting, 
for the sake of argument, that all the rest of the facts 
relied upon are true. 
136. From this view it is apparent that the essential 
part of a plea or demurrer is the assignment o~ the reasons 
on which the defendant relies for not anHwering; and this 
is the substance and body <?f the pleading, which consists 
of the enumeration of the causes of dem?..errer, or the aver-
ment of the facts which constitute the plea. There are, 
besides, a· formal commencement and conclusion, each of 
which performs distinct functions, and therefore the plead-
ing may, with sufficient convenience, be devided into three 
parts: first, the commencement; second, the body; .and, 
third, t~e conclusion. We shall here subjoin the skeleton 
form of a demurrer, and of a plea, and then add sotne re .. 
marks upon each part in its order. 
137. The Demurrer of 0. D., Defendant, to the Bill 
of Complaint of A. B., Complainant. 
fA] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing 
or acknowleJging all or any of the matters and things in 
the said comp~ainant's bill contained to be true, in such 
manner and for1n as the same are therein set forth, doth 
demur thereto; [B] and for cause of demurrer showeth, 
that [the said complainant hath not by his own showing 
made out a case which establishes his right, title, or inter-
est; or that he hath admitted and acl{rio,vledged, by his 
said· bill, certain facts which, by the. known rules of the 
law, avoid his right to an answer.] [0] Wlierefore, and 
for divers other defects and causes of dem).lrrer appearing 
[a] 1 Bro. C. C. 417. 1 Atk. 54. 3 Atk. 341. 15 Ves. 376. 
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in the said complainant’s said bill, this defendant doth
demur thereto, and humbly demands the judgment of this
honorable court whether he shall be compelled to make
any answer to the said bill; and prays to be hence dis-
missed, with his reasonable costs in this behalf most
wrongfully sustained.
The Plea of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill of Complaint
of A. B., Complainant.
[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing
or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in
the said complainant’s bill contained, to be true, in such
manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth
plead to the said bill; [B] and for plea saith, that [there
are certain incidents affecting the relation between the
parties, omitted (or song/at to be invalidated) in the said
bill, but which, when stated (or discharged from impeach-
ment), show that this defendant ought not be compelled
to answer the said bill]; and this defendant avers [all
necessary circumstances to avoid ambiguity and exclude
unfavorable construction]. [C] All which matters and
things this defendant doth aver to be true; and therefore
he doth plead the same to the said bill as aforesaid, and
humbly demands the judgment of this honorable court
whether he shall be compelled to make any further or
other answer to the said bill; and prays to be hence dis-




138, [1] As to the commencement: We see that
both pleas and demurrers begin with a protestation against













































































































































94 EQUITY PLEADING. 
in the said complainant's said bill, thie defendant doth 
den1ur thereto, and humbly demands the judgment of this 
honorable court whether he shall be compelled to make 
any answer to the said bill ; and prays to be hence dis-
missed, with his t·easonable costs in this behalf most 
wrongfully sustained. 
The Plea of C. D., Defendant, to the Bill of Complaint 
of A. B., Complainant. 
[A] This defendant, by protestation, not confessing 
or acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in 
the said complainant's bill contained, to be tt·ue, in such 
manner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth 
plead to the said bill ; [ B] and for plea saith~ that [there 
are certain incidents affecting the relation between the 
parties, omitted (or sou.qht to be invalidated) in the said 
bill, but which, when stated (or discn.arged from impeach-
1nent), show that this defendant ought not be compelled 
to answer the said bill]; and this defendant avers [all 
necessary circumstances to avoid ambiguity and exclude 
unfavorable construction]. [0] All which matters· and 
things this defendant doth aver to be true; and therefore 
he doth plead the same to the said bill as aforesaid,.and 
humbly demands the judgment of this honorable court 
whether he shall be compelled to make any further or 
other answer to the said bill ; and prays to be hence dis· 
missed, with his reasonable costs in this behalf 1nost 
wrongfully sustained. 
SECTION V. 
Of the Commencement. 
138. [1] As to the commencement: We see that 
both pleas and demurrers begin with a protestation against 
confessing the facts, as stated in the ~ill,. to be true. This 
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is a form frequently used at common law, when the party
pleading wishes to avoid the inference that he admits any-
thing which he has not an opportunity of putting in issue
in that cause; and Lord Coke therefore defines it to be '
“ the exclusion of a conclusion.” [a] The use of the pro-
testation of the commencement of the plea and demurrer
in equity is to save the defendant from being concluded
by his implied admission of the truth of the facts stated
in the bill, and is a kind of declaration in limine that such
facts are only admitted for the sake of the argument; for
if subsequently his plea or demurrer should be ,overruled
on argument, he is then to make a new defence, and may
by answer deny or explain away the statement, which the
plea or demurrer had by implication allowed. [b]
139, Aprotestando to the same effect is not neces-
sary at common law, because there the plea in bar or de-
murrer, being an effective litis contestatio, is conclusive
either way; and the plea in abatement (on which, being
overruled, thejudgment is respondent auster) [c] does not
bring into question the merits of the case, and, conse-
quently, neither admits nor denies the facts stated in the
declaration. But, as we have already seen, in equity,
pleas and demurrers are more in the nature of objections
to answer, and proceed upon the ground that, even grant-
ing that the complainants statement be true, still there is
some reason, either apparent or stated, in the plea, why
he has not the right to dicovery, or to the relief as prayed.
140, If the demurrer or plea be allowed, therefore,
it is in effect the decision of the court, that the com-
plainant has no right to discovery or relief, and conse-
quently the bill is dismissed. [d] In case, however, it be
[a] C0. Litt. 124, b.
[b] Mitf. 14.
[0] 2 Saund. 211. a. n. [3]













































































































































OF THE COMMENCEMENT. 95 
is a form frequently us.ed at con1mon law, when the party 
pleading wishes to avoid the inference that he admits any .. 
thing which he has not an opportunity of putting in issue 
in that cause; and Lord Coke therefore defines it to be ~··/ -
"'the exclusion of a conclusion." [a] The use of the pro-
testation of the commencement of the plea and demurrer 
in equity is to save the defendant from being concluded 
by his implied admission of the truth of the facts stated 
.in the bill, and is a kind of declaration in limine that such 
facts are only admitted for the aake of th.e a?Y}U/In.ent; for 
if subsequently his plea or demurrer should be .overruled 
on argument, he is then to make a new defence, and may 
by answer deny or explain away the statement, which the 
plea or demurrer had by implication allo\ved. [b] 
139. Aproteatando to the same effect is not neces-
sary at cornmon law, because there the plea in bar or de-
murrer, being an effective litis conteBtatio, is conclusive 
either way; and the plea in abatement (on which, being 
overruled, the judgment is reapondent auater) [ c] does not 
bring into question the merits of the case .. and, conse-
quently, neither admits nor denies the facts stated in the 
declaration. Bu~, as we have already seen, in equity, 
pleas and demurrers are more in the nature of objections 
to answer .. and proceed upon the ground that, even ,qrant-
ing tn.at the complainant'a statement be true, still there ~s 
some reason, either apparent or stated, in the plea, why 
he has not the right to dicovery, or to the relief as prayed. 
140. If the demurrer or plea be allowed, therefore, 
it is in effect the decision of the court, that the com-
plainant bas no right to discovery or relief, and conse-
quently the bill is dismissed. [d] In case, however, it be 
[a] Co. Litt. 124, b. 
[b] Mitf. 14. 
[c] 2 Saund. 211. a. n. [3] 
[d] 3 P. Wms. 95. Mitf. 175. 
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not a dismissal on the merits, such dismissal will not pre-
clude the complainant trom bringing a new bill, when the
disability is removed, or informality rectified; [a] and if
this latter can be effected by amendment, the court might
make a special order to that effect, without dismissing the
bill. [b] On the other hand, with respect to a plea, though
the opinion of the court on argument should be favorable
to the defendant, this does not terminate the proceedings ;
for, though the~ reasoning in law may be correct. the facts
on which the rule of law is founded, may be untrue; to
put which in issue, the complainant may reply, even after
the plea has been allowed; [c] and if at the hearing it
shall appear that the defendant has not proved his case,
the plea is of no avail, and the defendant must answer
interrogatories to supply the place of that discovery to
which the complainant, but for the plea, would have been
entitled by answer. [d]
141, From the complex nature of a bill in equity, it
is obvious that the same defence may not be applicable to
every part, but that it may be expedient to demur, or
plead to one part of the bill, and answer to the rest; or to
demur, plead, and answer to different parts; and some-
times it may be necessary to have separate demurrers or
separate pleas to distinct portions of the bill. Whenever,
therefore, the demurrer or plea does not extend to the
whole bill, it should clearly express what part of the bill
it is intended to cover, and what it is the party refuses to
answer, [e] otherwise the court would be put to great
difficulty, and be obliged to refer to the ‘bill and answer,
to ascertain how far the pleading was meant to go; as, on
[a] Ibid.
[b] Mitf. 13, n, (p) 175.
[c] Mitf. 244. Beames’ Pleas. 317.
[d] 2 Ves. 247.













































































































































96 EQUITY PLEADING. 
not a dismissal on the merits, such dismissal will not pre-
clude the complainant from bringing a new bill, when the 
disability is removed, or informality rectified; [a] and if 
this latter can be effected by amendment, the court might 
make a special order to that effect, without dismissing the 
bill. [b] On the other hand~ with respect to a plea, though 
the opinion of the court on argument should be favorable 
to the defendant, this does not tern1inate the proceedin~s ; 
for, though the· reasoning in law may be correct,. the facts 
on which the rule of law is founded, may be untrue; to 
put which in issue, the complainant may reply, even after 
the plea has been allowed; [ c] and if at the hearing it 
shall appear that the defendant has not proved his case, 
the plea is of no avail, and the defendant must ans·wer 
interrogatories to supply the place of that discovery to 
which the complainant, but for the plea, would have been 
entitled by answer. [d] 
141. From the con1plex nature of a bill in equity, it 
is obvious that the satne defenc.e may not be applicable to 
every part, but that it may be expedient to demur, or 
plead to one part of the bill, and answer to the rest; or to 
demur, plead, and answer to different .parts; and some-
times it may be necessary to have separate detnurrers or 
separate pleas to distinct portions of the bill. Whenever, 
therefore, the demurrer or plea does not extend to the 
whole bill, it should clearly express what part of the bill 
it is intended to cover, and what it is the party refuses to 
answer,· [ e] otherwise the court would be put to great 
difficulty, and be obliged to refer to the ·bill and answer, 
to ascertain how far the pleading was meant to go; as, on 
[a] Ibid. 
[b] Mitf. 13, n, (p) 175. 
[c] Mitf. 244. Beames' Pleas. 317. 
[d] 2 Ves. 247. 
[e] 2 Ves. 108, 450. 
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the other hand, in case of a reference of the answer to a
master, upon exceptions, he would be at a loss to deter-
mine, precisely, whether the answer was sufficient or not.
[a] And it would not be enough, in such case, to say that
the defendant answers to such and such facts, and pleads
or demurs to all the rest of the bill; for a pleading of this
sort would be overruled for being too general. [b] It is in
the commencement of the plea or demurrer, immediately
after the protestation, that the statement is introduced of
What part of the bill is sought to be covered by the plead-
ing. The commencement in such case runs thus: This
defendant, by protestation, etc., doth demur (or plead) to
so much and such part of the said bill as prays, etc., (or
seeks a discovery from the defendant, whether, etc.”)
142, Great care, however, must be taken not to
make the demurrer extend to any part of the bill to which
it will not be a good defence; for a demurrer cannot be
good in part, and bad in part; [c] that is, if there be any
part of the bill sought to be covered by the demurrer, to
which the demurrer does not extend, the whole demurrer
must be overruled; [d] because the court will not be at
the trouble of examining to which part of the bill the de-
murrer is applicable ; yet the defendant is not thereby
barred of his defence, because he may afterwards, with the
leave of the court, file a new demurrer of less extent. [e]
But if a defendant has demurred to part only ofa bill, and
answered other parts, it is no objection to the allowance
of the demurrer that it is equally applicable to the whole
of the bill. [f] So, where there are separate demurrers to
[a] 2 Sch. & Lefr. 207.
[b] Ibid. and ride 3 Atk. 70. Mos. 40. 1 Ves. & Beames'
[c] 1 Atk. 451. 2 Atk. 388. 5 Ves. 173.
[d] 17 Ves. 280. 1 Swanst. 304. '
[6] Mitf. 14. 11 Ves. 68.















































































































































OF THE COMMENCEMENT. 97 
the other hand, in case of a reference of the answer to a 
master, upon exceptions, he would be at a loss to deter-
mine, precisely, whether the answer was sufficient or not. 
[a] And it would not be enough, in such case, to say that 
the defendant answers to such and such facts, and pleads 
or demurs to all the rest of the bill; for a pleading of this 
sort would be overruled for being too general. [b] It is in 
the commencement of the plea or demurrer, immediately 
after the protestation, that the statement is ~ntroduced of 
what part of the bill is sought to be covered by the plead-
ing. The commencement in such case runs thus: This 
defendant, by protestation, etc., doth demur (or plead) to 
so much and such part of the said bill as prays, etc., (or 
seeks a discovery from tlte defendant, whether, etc.") 
142. Great care, however, must be taken not to 
make the de1nurrer extend to any part of the bill to which 
it will not be a good defence; for a demurrer cannot be 
good in part, and bad in part; [c] that is, if there be any 
part of the bill sought to b~ covered by the demurrer, to 
which the demurrer does not extend, the whole demurrer 
must be overruled; [d] because the court will not be at 
the trouble of examining to which part of the bill the de-
murrer is applicable; yet the defendant is not thereby 
barred of his defence, because he may afterwards, with the 
leave of the court, file a new demurrer of less extent. [e] 
But if a defendant has demurred to part only of a bill, and 
answered other parts, it is no objection to the allowance 
of the demurrer that it is equally applicable to the whole 
of the bill. [f] So, where there are separate demurrers to 
[a] 2 Sch. & Lefr. 207. 
[b] Ibid. and vide 3 Atk. 70. Mos. 40. 1 Ves. & Beames' 
514. 
[c] 1 Atk. 451. 2 Atk. 388. 5 Ves. 178. 
[d] 17 Ves. 280. 1 Swanst. 304. 
r e] Mitf. 14. 11 Ves. 68. 
[/] 1 Cox, 416. 
7 
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distinct parts of the bill, one demurrer may be overruled
upon argument and another allowed. [a]
143, But with respect to pleas, the rule is different;
for a plea may be good in part and bad in part; [b] or,
in other words, if the plea cover too much, it will never-
theless be allowed to the eactent to which it is applicable,
[c] and the reason that the rule with regard to demurrers
does not extend to pleas, is that the latter, being special
answers to the bill, as we have seen by the definition
formerly quoted, it may conveniently enough be ascer-
tained to what part of the bill the plea is an answer, and
whether any other part requires a further defence. In-
deed, the usual course in such case is to allow the plea to
stand for an answer, with liberty to except. [d]
.
Sscnox VI.
Of the Body, and herein of Averments and lntendments.
144, II. The body of the pleading consists of the
assignment of the various causes of demurrer, or the state-
ment of those facts which constitute the plea. A de-
murrer is the negation of the rule of law laid down in the
first proposition of the bill, namely, that the right to dis-
covery and relief results from the relation assumed; or
rather, since the causes of demurrer must be assigned, it
is a negative proposition that from the Complainant’s own
showing, he has not the right to discovery and relief, either
because the relation stated by him is not adequate, or
because there are some of the objections to answering
which are classified in the Synopsis, apparent on the face
of the bill. Thus, an issue in law is joined, not in the
[a] Mitf. 174. 3 P. Wms. 158. 1 Atk. 544.
[b] 4 Bro. C. O. 254. 8 Ves. 403. 11 Ves. 70.














































































































































98 EQUITY PLEADING: 
distinct parts of the bill, one demurrer may be overruled 
upon argument and another allowed. [a] 
143. But with respect to pleas, the rule is different; 
for a plea may be .r;ood in part and bad in part,· [ b] or, 
in other words, if the plea cover too much, it will never-
theless be allowed to the eaJtent to which it is applicable, 
[c] and the reason that the rule with regard to demurrers 
does not extend to pleas, is that the latter, being special 
ansu:ers to the bill, as we have seen by the definition 
formerly quoted, it may conveniently enough be ascer-
tained to what part of the bill the plea is an answer, and 
whether any other part requires a further defence.. In-
deed, the usual course in such case is to allow the plea to 
sta~d for an answer, with liberty to except. [d] 
SECTION VI. 
Of the Body, and herein of Averments and Intendments. 
144. II. The body of the pleading consists of the 
assignment of the various causes of demurrer, or the state-
ment of those facts which constitute the plea. A de-
murrer is the negation of the rule of law laid down in the 
first proposition of the bill, namely, that the right to dis-
covery and relief results from the relation assumed ; or 
rather, since the causes of demurrer must be assign~d, it 
is a negative proposition that from the Complainant's own 
showing, he has not the right to discovery and relief, either 
because the relation stated by him is not adequate, or 
because there are some of the objections to answering 
which are classified in the Synopsis, apparent on the face 
of the bill. Thus, an issue in law is joined, not in the 
[a] Mitf. 174. 8 P. Wms. 158. 1 Atk. 544. 
[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 254. 8 Ves. 408. 11 Ves. 70. 
[c] Mltf. 240. 2 Atk. 284. 
[d] 6 Ves. 580. 
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first instance on the complainant’s right, 5 ~the
validity of the causes assigned; and if any 0 osgoaiflés
be allowed on argument, the right is necessarilyl'§:€frlel*3.' .1
145, The statement of the causes of demurrer, there-
fore, will be nothing more than a reference to the bill, and
an enumeration of the objections appearing on the face of
it, on which the defendant means to rely. Hence arise
two questions: whether the objection, as stated, really
exists; and whether such objection is valid. The first is,
generally, a question of the adequateness of the relation
stated by the bill; the latter is a question on the rule of
law; and the defendant should, in assigning the causes of
demurrer, clearly point out the nature of the objection
which he takes, and how it appears on the adverse
pleading.
146, It is a general rule, that a speaking demurrer
is bad; i. e., when it contains argument in the body of it;
if, for instance, the demurrer say, “in or about the year
1770. which is upwards of twenty years before the bill
filed.” [a] A demurrer, also, to anything but what ap-
pears on the face of the bill,‘ is considered a speaking
demurrer. [b]
147, The defendant may show as many causes of
demurrer as there are objections apparent in the bill. [c]
in which respect a demurrer differs from a plea, which
must not (at least without the leave of the court) be
double; [d] and the reason of this difference is, that one
of the principal advantages of a plea being to save the
parties the expense of going into an examination at large,
[a] 2 Ves. jun. 83.
[b] 2 Ves. 245.
[c] 3 Mad. Rep. 8.
[d] 2 Eq. Abr. 176.
& Beames, 153, 155.
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first instance on the complainant's right,~. the 
validity of the causes assigned; and if any o~\b.;~~i~ 
be allowPd on argument, the right is necessart1j-Vg6ti~! :1~: 1 
'I • ·"' ... 
145. The statement of the causes of demurrer, there-
fore, will be nothing more than a reference to the bill, and 
an enumeration of the objections appearing on the face of 
it, on which the defendant means to rely. Hence arise 
two questions: whether the objection, as stated, really 
exists; and whether such objection is valid. The first is, 
generally, a question of the adequateness of the relation 
st~t.ed by the bill ; the latter is a question on the rule of 
law; and the defendant should, in assigning the causes of 
demurrer, clearly point out the nature of the objection 
which he takes, and how it appears on the adverse 
pleading. 
146. It is a general rule, that a speaking dem·urrer 
is bad; i. e., when it contains argument in the body of i~; 
if, for instance, the demurrer say, ''in or about the year 
1770, which is upwards of twenty yea1"8 before the bill 
filed." [a] A demurrer, also, to anything but what ap-
pears on the face of the bill,· is considered a speaking 
demurrer. [b] 
147. The defendant may show ~s tnany causes of 
detnurrer as there are objections apparent in the bill. [c] 
in which respect a demurrer differs from a plea, which 
must not (at least without the leave of the· court) be 
double; [ d] and the reason of this difference is, that one 
of the principal advantages of a plea being to save the 
parties the expense of going into an examination at large, 
[a] 2 Ves. jun. 83. 
[b] 2 Ves. 245. 
[c) 3 Mad. Rep. 8. 
[d) 2 Eq. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404, and 2 Ves. 
& Beames, 158, 155. 
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that end would be frustrated by permitting the defendant
to put in issue a variety of facts constituting distinct bars,
any of which would have been sufficient; but demurrers
put no facts in issue, and may therefore take every avail-
able exception which can be used on the argument; and
even causes of demurrer may be stated ore tenus, although
not set out in the pleading; [a] but nevertheless, only to
the extent of the demurrer on the record. [b] For example :
if the demurrer be to the discovery, the defendant cannot
ore tenus demur to the examination of witnesses de bene
esse: and much less shall he be allowed to demur at the
bar, when he has only pleaded, and there is no demurrer
in court. [c]
148, As a demurrer collects the negative rule of law
from the complainant’s own statement, so the plea, on the
other hand, deduces the same conclusion from a new state-
ment by the defendant. The body of the plea, therefore,
will consist of a statement of the facts from which the con -
clusion in objection to answering is drawn, [d] and the de-
fendant, in effect, makes out a collateral case, founded on
some one of the modes of defence stated in the Synopsis. >
149, The collateral case made by plea, may, like
the statement of a bill, be resolved into two propositions,
of which one states the rule of law, viz.: 1st, That cer-
tain incidents arfectiny the relation, avoid the complain-
ant’s right to discovery or relief; the other avers the facts.
2d, That such incidents are attached to the relation in
question. Hence arise two questions : the first a question
of law, as to the validity of the objection relied on; the
other a question of fact, as to the truth of those allega-
[a] 1 Vern. 78. 3 P. Wms. 370.
[b] 17 Ves. 213.
[c] 1 Vern. 78.













































































































































100 EQUITY PLEADING. 
that end would be frustrated by permitting the defenuant 
to put in issue a variety of facts constituting distinct ba:rs, 
any of which would have been sufficient;. but demurrers 
put no facts in issue, and 1nay therefore take every avail-
able exception whi.ch can be used on the argument; and 
even causes of demurrer may be stated ore tenus, although 
not set out in the pleading; [a 1 but nevertheless, only to 
t.he extent of the dernurrer on the record. [b] For example: 
• if the demurrer be to the discovery, the· defendant cannot 
ore tenus demur to the examination of witnesses de bene 
eaae: and much less shall he be allowed to demur at the 
ba~, when he has only pleaded, and there is no demurfer 
in court. [c] 
148. As a demurrer collects the negative rule of law 
from the complainant's own statement, so the plea, on the 
other hand, deduces the same conclusion from a new state-
ment by the defendant. The body of the plea, therefore, 
will consist of a statement of the facts from which the con. 
elusion in objection to answering is drawn, [d] and the de-
fendant, in effect, makes out a collateral case, founded on 
some one of the modes of defence stated in the Synopsis. . 
149. The collateral case made by plea, may, like 
the statement of a bill, be resolved into two propositions, 
of which one states the rule of law, viz.: 1st, That cer-
tain incidents affecting tlte relation, avoid the complain-
ant's right to discovery or relief; the other avers the facts. 
2d, That such incidents are attacked to the relation in 
question. Hence arise two questions: the first a question 
of law, as to the validity of the objection relied on; the 
other a question of fact, as to the truth of those allega-
[a] 1 Vern. 78. 3 P. Wms. 370. 
[b] 17 Ves. 213. 
[c] 1 Vern. 78. 
[ d] 3 Atk. 558. 
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tions which constitute the objection. Upon either or both
of these the complainant may take issue; and we have
seen that if the plea on argument be determined against
him, he may reply to the question of fact, and put the de-
fendant on the proof; but if he replies in the firstinstance,
without setting down the plea for argument, he thereby
admits the validity of the rule of law, which is always the
prior question; and he will not afterwards be admitted to
dispute it, since he was contented to rest his case on the
truth or falsehood of the facts alleged by the plea. [a]
150, The statement of the facts then must be direct
and positive, and such as will amount to acomplete equit-
able bar or other objection to answering. [b] It must also
be clear and precise, and contain such subsidiary aver-
ments as are necessary to avoid all ambiguity of meaning;
for the rule of construction is always unfavorable to the
pleader. Hence. averments have been divided into gen-
eral and particular. [c] The first are those which state
generally the collateral case; the latter are such as are
used in explanation of the general averments to exclude
intendments [d] (as they are technically called), which in
all cases are taken most strongly against the pleader.
The meaning of an intendment is, that allowing an aver-
ment to be true, but that at the same time a case may be
supposed consistent with it, which would render the aver-
ment inoperative as a full defence, such case shall be pre-
sumed, unless specifically excluded by particular aver-
ment—as where a proposition in the disjunctive is not
denied in both its parts; or a proposition in the conjunc-
tive, afiirmed in both its parts.
[a] 3 P. Wms. 95.
[b] Mitf. 240. 2 Ves. 245. 3 Atk. 586.














































































































































OF THE BODY. 101 
tions which constitute the objection. Upon either or both 
of these the con1plainant may take issue; and we have 
seen that if the plea on argument. be determined against 
him, he may reply to the question of fact, and put the de-
fendant on the proof; but if he replies in the first instance, 
without setting down the plea for argument, he thereby 
admits the validity of the rule of law, which is always the 
prior question ; and he will not afterwards be admitted to 
dispute it, since he was contented to rest his case on the 
truth or falsehood of the facts alleged by the plea. [a] 
150. The statement of the facts then mQst be direct 
and positive, and such as will amount to a complet~ equit-
able bar or other objection to answering. [b] It must also 
be clear and precise, and contain such subsidiary aver-
menta as are necessary to avoid all ambiguity of meaning; 
for the rule of construction is always unfavorable to the 
pleader. Hence .. averme·nta have been divided into gen-
eral and particular. [c] The first are those which state 
generally the collateral case; the latter are such as are 
used' in explanation of the general averments to exclude 
intendments [d] (as they are technically called), which in 
all cases are taken most strongly against the pleader. 
The meaning of an intendment is, that allowing an aver-
ment to be true, but that at the same time a case may be 
supposed consistent with it, which would render the aver-
ment inoperative as a full defence, such case shall be pre-
sumed, unless specifically excluded by particular aver-
ment-as where a proposition in the dis.junctive is not 
denied in both its parts; or a proposition in the conjunc-
tive, affirmed in both its parts. 
[a] 8 P. Wms. 95. 
[b] Mitf. 240. 2 Ves. 245. 3 Atk. 586. 
(c] Co. Litt. 362 b. 
[d] Mitf. 240. 
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151, The general averments must contain a detailed
statement, in their natural order, of all those circum-
stances, which, taken together, amount to a valid equit-
able defence; [a] and if any of the links in the chain of
facts be wanting, it will be intended against the defendant.
It must be a statement of particular facts, and not of gen-
eral deductions from facts; [b] thus, it is not enough to
say, that a thing was duly or lawfully done or executed,
without setting out the particular manner; for that isa
question for the court to determine, and not for the de-
fendant to assume. This is meant, however, with regard
to such averments only as go to the very substance and
gist of the bar. To take a peculiar example: the bank-
ruptcy of the plaintiff subsequent to the cause of action,
is a good plea in bar, both in law and in equity. [c] It is
not, however, his being declared a bankrupt under the
commission, which constitutes the bar, but his having bona
flde committed an act of bankruptcy, and the proceedings
thereon, including the transfer of his property to the
assignees. For the substance of the bar, in this case, is
the want of interest in the plaintiff, such interest being
vested in the assignees; but if any of the previous steps
be irregular, the assignment is void. It is not sufficient,
therefore, to state that the plaintiff was duly found and
declared a bankrupt under the commission; but his
being a trader under the act, his act of bankruptcy and
the several proceedings thereon seriatim, must be set out
at full length; for although the commissioners may have
declared him a bankrupt non constat, but that their de-
cision may be reversed, and that is for the court and jury
to determine. [d] So also, in pleading a release, the con-
[a] 1 Ves. 243. 1 Bro. C. C. 578.
[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 321. 13 Ves. 29. 2 Sch. & Lefr. 305_6,
[0] 9 Ves. 77. 1 Anstr. 101.
[d] Vide what is said by Lord Eldon, in Carleton 11. Leigh-













































































































































102 EQUITY PLEADING. 
151. The general averments must contain a detailed 
statement, in their natural order, of all those circum-
stances, which, taken together, amount to a valid equit· 
able defence; [a] and if any of the links in the chain of 
facts be wanting, it will be intended against the defendant. 
It must be a statement of particular facta, and not of gen-
eral deductions from facts; [h] thus, it is not enough to 
say, that a thing· was duly or lawfully done or executed, 
without setting out the particular manner; for that is a 
question for the court to determine, and not for the de-
fendant to assume. This is meant, however, with regard 
to such averments only as go to the very substance and 
gist of the bar. To take a peculiar example: the. bank-
ruptcy of the pl~intiff subsequent to the cause of action, 
is a good plea in bar, both in law and in equity. [c] It is 
not, however, his being declared a bankrupt under the 
commission, which constitutes the bar, but his having bona 
fide committed an act of bankruptcy, and the proceedings 
thereon, including the transfer of his property to the 
assignees. For the substance of the bar, in this case, is 
the want of interest in the plaintiff, such interest being 
vested in the assignees; but if any of the previous steps 
be irregular, the assignment is void. It is not sufficient, 
therefore, to state that the plaintiff was duly found and 
declared a bankrupt under the commission; but his . 
being a trader under the act, his act of bankruptcy and 
the several proceedings thereon aeriat·im, must be set out 
at full length; for although the commissioners may have 
declared him a bankrupt non constat,' but that their de-
cision may be reversed, and that is for the court and jury 
to determine. [ d] So also, in pleading a release, the con-
[a] 1 Ves. 243. 1 Bro. C. C. 578. 
[b] 4 Bro. C. C. 321. 13 Ves. 29. 2 Sch. & Lefr. 3~. 
[c] 9.Ves. 77. 1 Anstr. 101. 
[d] Vide what is said by Lord Eldon, in Carleton v. Leigh-
ton, 3 Meriv. 667. 
or THE BODY. 103
sideration must be set out, [a] or otherwise it will be in-
tended to have been made without a sufficient considera-
tion; for the statement in the bill being taken for true,
the demand is acknowledged to be just; and then a re-
lease would not be a good bar, unless the consideration
were equivalent; [b] but that is for the court to decide.
152, If any one of the general averments admits of
an intendment unfavorable to the defendant, such intend-
ment must be excluded by a particular averment. Thus
in outlawry or excommunication, which are pleaded [sub
pede sigilli, [c] it must be averred that they are still in
force, and also that the person named in the record pro-
duced to the court under seal, and the complainant, are
one and the same person. This is similar to the usual
averment of “ guoe est eadem,” in trespass at common law.
In like manner, where the plea has been anticipated and.
impeached by a charge in the bill, the charge must be
negatived by a particular averment [d] to avoid the gen-
eral intendment that the allegations of the bill are true,
and consequently the matter of the plea invalidated. [e]
153, But, as we have explained in a former chapter,
a plea of this nature must be supported by an answer, so
far as to deny the matter of impeachment charged in the
bill, [fj both for the technical reasons which have been
formerly detailed, and for another reason which we shall
mention here, namely: that notwithstanding the plea, the
complainant .is entitled .to discovery, so far as relates to
[a] Hard. 168. 2 Ves. 107. Gilb. For. Rom. 57.
[b] See Lord Redesdale judgment in Roche v. Morgell, 2
Sch. & Lefr. 728.
[0] Beames’ Ord. Chan. 27.
[d] Mitf. 241, 196, et seq.
[6] Mitf. 241. Gilb. For. Rom. 58.' 2 Atk. 124.













































































































































OF THE BODY. 103 
sideration must be set out, [a] or otherwise it ~ill be in-
tended to have been made without a sufficient considera-
tion; for the statement in the b!ll being taken for true, 
the demand is acknowledged to be just; a.nd then a re-
lease would not be a good bar, unless the consideration 
were eq ui valent ; [ b] but that is for the court to d,cide. 
152. If any one of the general ave1'ments admits of 
an intendment unfavorable to the defendant, such intend-
ment must be excluded by a particular averment. Thus 
in outlawry or excommunication, which are pleaded aub 
pede sigilli, [c] it must be averred that they are still in 
force, and also that the person named in the record pro-
duced to the court under seal, and the complainant, are 
one and the same person. This is similar to the usual 
averment of" qum est eadem," in trespass at common law. 
In ·like manner, where the plea has been anticipated and. 
impeached by a charge in the bill, the charge must be 
negatived by a particular averment [d] to avoiQ. the gen-
eral intendment that the allegations of the bill are true,. 
and consequently the matter of the plea invalidated. [e] 
153. But, as we have explained in a former chapter, 
a plea of this ·nature must be supported by an answer, so 
far as to deny the matter of impeachment charged in the 
bill, [fj both for the technical reasons \Vhich have been 
formerly detailed, and for another reason which we shal~ 
mention here, namely: that notwithstanding the plea, the 
complainant ~s entitled .to discovery,.so far as relates to 
[a] Hard. 168. 2 Ves. 107. Gilb. For. Rom. 57. 
[b] See Lord Redesdale judgment in Roche v. Morgell, 2 
Sch. & Lefr. 728. 
[c] Beames' Ord. Chan. 27. 
[d] Mitf. 241, i96, et seq. 
[e] Mitf. 241. Gil b. For. Rom. 58.· 2 Atk. 124. 
[f] Mitf. 192, and the cases cited in the note. 
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the charge, with all its circumstantial interrogations ; [a]
and it is in its character of a proof, and not as a pleading,
that the answer is used in this case. This is the meaning
of the position most correctly laid down by Lord Redes-
dale, when, in combating the notion that there is some-
thing incongruous in this mode of pleading. he says, that
“ the answer is no part of the defence.” [b] The plea alone
is the defence; the answer is but the discovery to which
the complainant is entitled, and which the plea cannot
cover, because the validity of the plea depends in a great
measure on the discovery, to which alone the complainant
can except; and the negative averment in the plea “ does
not require positive assertion.” [c] Answers are thus
used sometimes in support of a plea ; but in other respects,
if a defendant were to answer to parts of the bill, covered
by plea or demurrer—these pleadings being in fact, only
objections to answering—would be thereby waived. [d]
154, From the strictness of the rules regarding pleas,
it is apparent that in order to make the plea a full de-
fence, all the averments must be stated positively; [e]
although in some instances—as in case of negative aver-
ments, and of averment of facts not within the immediate
knowledge of the defendant, he will be permitted to aver
according to the best of his knowledge and belief. [f] A
variety of facts may be averred, provided they all tend to
the same conclusion, and amount to a single objection;
[g] for, if more than one objection were taken, the plea
[al Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 200. 6 Ves. 592.
[b] Vide Mitf. 189, note [h] and ride Beames’ Pleas, 34.
[c] Mitf. 240.
[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. 2 Atk. 155. 1 Anstr. 14. 1 Vern. 90.
[c] 3 Atk. 586.
[f] Mitf. 240.













































































































































104 EQUITY PLEADING. 
the charge, with all its circum8tantial interrogations; [a] 
and it is in its character of a proof, and not as a pleading, 
that the answer is used in this case. This is the meaning 
of the position most correctly laid down by Lord Redes-
dale, when, in combating the notion that there is some-
thing incongruous in this mode of pleading" he says, that 
'' the answer is no part of the defence." [ b] The plea alone 
is the defence; the answer is but the discovery to which 
the complainant is entitled, and which the plea cannot 
cover, because the validity of the plea depends in a great 
measure on the discovery, to which alone the complainant 
can except ; and the negative averment in the plea "'does 
not require positive assertion." [cJ Answers are thus 
used sometimes in support of a plea ; but in other respects, 
if a defendant were to answer to parts of the bill, covered 
by plea or demurrer-these pleadings being in fact, only 
objections to answering-would be thereby waived. [d] 
154. From the strictness of the rules regarding pleas, 
it is apparent that in order to make the plea a full 1e-
fence, all the averments must be stated positively; [e] 
although in some instances-as in case of negative aver-
ments, and of averment of facts not within the immediate 
knowledge of the defendant, he will be pern1itted to aver 
according to the best of his knowledge and belief. [f] A 
variety ·of facts may be averred, provided they all tend to 
the same conclusion, and amount to a single objection; 
[g] for, if more than one objection were taken, the plea 
[a} Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 200. 6 Ve~. 592. 
[b] Vide Mitf. 189, note [h] and vide Beames' Pleas, 34. 
[ c] Mitf. 240. 
[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. 2 Atk. 155. I Anstr. 14. 1 Vern. 90. 
[e] 3 Atk. 586. 
[j] Mitf. 240. 
[g] 1 P. Wm8. 723. 15 Ves. 79. 
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would be bad for duplicity. [a] By the common law, a
double plea, or one which assigned more than one cause
in bar of a suit, was bad; [b] but now, by stat. 4th Ann.
c. 16, two several bars may be pleaded by the leave of the
court in any court of record. The court of,equity not
being a court of record, it was considered that a double
plea in this court would be fatal; but it has lately been
decided that with the leave of the court, the defendant
may plead double; [c] and justly, since it would be con-
trary to all analogy, that the same latitude should not be
allowed in equity as at common law; and the previous




155, III. The conclusion of a plea or demurrer is,
substantially an appeal to the court, whether the defend-
ant, for the reason assigned in the body of the pleading,
ought to be compelled to put in an answer and contest the
suit, or make that discovery which the complainant seeks
by his bill; and it ends with a prayer that the party may
be dismissed from attendance, with his reasonable costs.
The purport and design of pleas and demurrers of all de-
scriptions in equity being to avoid an answer, [d] the same
conclusion is alike applicable to every species. In general,
however, in pleas in bar, the defendant states that he
avers the matter contained in his plea, and pleads the same
[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404. 2 Ves.
& Beames’, 153.
[b] Co. Litt. 304, a.
[c] Gibson 1). Whitehead, 30th July, 1819, before V. C.
LeachI cited in Madd. Chan. Prac. 299.













































































































































Ol' 1'HE CONCLUSION. too 
would be bad for duplicity. [a] By the common law, a 
double plea, or one which assigned more than one cause 
in bar of a suit, was bad; [b] but uow, by stat. 4th Ann. 
c. 16, two several bars may be pleaded by the leave of the 
court in any court of record. The court of .equity not 
being a court of record, it was considered that a double 
plea in this court would be fatal; but it has lately been 
decided that with the leave of the court, the. defendant 
may plead double; [c] and justly, since it \vould be con-
trary to all analogy, that the same latitude should not be 
allowed in equity as at common law; and the previous 
sanction of the court sufficiently guards against abuse. 
SECTION VII. 
Of the Conclusion. 
155. III. 1.'he conclusion of a plea or demurrer is, 
substantially an appeal to the court, whether the defend-
ant, for the reason assigned in the body of the pleading, 
ought to be compelled to put in an answer and cont~st the 
suit, or make that discovery which the complainant seeks 
by his bill ; and it ends with a prayer that the party may 
be dismissed from attendance, with his reasonable costs. 
The purport and design of pleas and demurrers of all de-
scriptions in equity being to avoid an ans·wer, [d] the same 
conclusion is alike applicable to every species. In general, 
however, in pleas in bar, the defendant states that he 
avers the matter contained in his plea, and pleads the same 
[a] 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 176. 1 Atk. 54. 1 Bro. C. C. 404. 2 Ves. 
& Beames7, 153. 
[b] Co. Litt. 304, a. 
[c] Gibson v. Whitehead, 30th July, 1819, before V. C. 
Leach, cited in Madd. Chan. Prac. 299. 
[d] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. 
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in bar; [a] but this, though usual, is not necessary, nor
will the want of it vitiate the plea. [b]
156, At common law, every plea has its apt and
proper ‘conclusion, [c] by which the nature of the plea is
to be judged; and therefore an improper conclusion would
be fatal, there being an essential difference as to the
judgment to be pronounced on each. [d] The slightest
informality will invalidate the plea in abatement; [e] be-
cause the courts discountenance these pleas, which do
not go to the merits; and it is but reasonable that he that
objects upon mere form, shall bejudged by the same rule ;
besides, thejudgment in such case is only interlocutory,
guod respondeat ouster. [f] 1n equity, the decision of the
court with respect to all kinds of ,pleas and demurrers is
the same, viz.: the bill is dismissed, or the defendant is
put to answer over, and contest the suit. In this regard,
all pleas, even such as are in bar in equity, are.analagous
to pleas in abatement at common law, which do not con-
test the suit. In equity, the answer is the only pleading
which effectively contests the suit; and all pleas, whether
dilatory or peremptory, are only objections to answering.
Hence has arisen the doubt, whether there be any pleas
in abatement in equity, as contra-distinguished from pleas
in bar; [9] and certainly it would be more correct to divide
pleas in equity into declinatory, dilatory and peremptory,
in analogy to the civil law, from which the proceedings in
this court are derived. The judgment, in all pleas in
[a] Beames’ Pleas, 49.
[b] This point was raised in the case of Merewether v.
Mellish, 13 Ves. 435 ; but it was not even noticed by the court.
[0] Co. Litt. 303 b.
[d] 1 Saund. 103, a. n. [1].
[e] 3 Term. Rep. 185. 8 Term. Rep. 515.
[f] 2 Saund. 211, a. n. [3].













































































































































106 EQUITY PLEADING. 
in bar,· [a] but this, though usual, is not necessary, nor 
will the want of it vitiate the plea. [b] 
156. At common law, every plea has its apt and 
proper ·conclusion, [c] by which the nature of the plea is 
to be judged; and therefore an improper conclusion would 
be fatal, there being an essential difference as to the 
judgment to be pronounced on each. [d] The slightest 
informality will invalidate the plea in abatement; [e] be-
cause the courts discountenance these vleas; which do 
not go to the merits; and it is but reasonable that he that 
objects upon mere forni, shall be judged by the same rule; 
besides, the judgment in such case is only interlocutory, 
quod respondeat ozester. [f] In equity, the decision of t~e 
court with respect to all kinds of .pleas and demurrers is 
the same, viz.: the bill is dismissed, or the defendant is 
put to answer over, and contest the suit. In this regard, 
all pleas, even such as are in bar in equity, are.analagous 
to pleas in abatentent at common law, which do not con-
test the suit. In equity, the answer is the only pleading 
which effectively contests the suit; and all pleas, whether 
dilatory or peretnptory, are only objections to answering. 
Hence has arisen the doubt, whether there be any pleas 
in abatement in equity, as contra-distinguished from pleas 
in bar; [g] and certainly it would be more correct to divide 
pleas in equity into declinatory, dilatory and peremptory, 
in analogy to the civil law, from which the proceedings in 
this court are derived. The judgment, in all pleas in 
[a] Beames' Pleas, 49. 
[b] This point was raised in the case of Merewether v. 
Mellish, 13 Ves. 435; but it was not even noticed by the court. 
[ c] Co. Litt. 303 b. 
[ d] 1 Saund. 103, a. n. [ 1]. 
[ e] 3 Term. Rep. 185. 8 Term. Rep. 515. 
[/] 2 Saund. 211, a. n. [3]. 
[g] Vide Beames' Pleas, 57, et seq. 
or THE CONCLUSION. 1/07‘
equity, being the same, the conclusion need not be differ-
ent; and, as we have seen, they hear an anology to pleas
in abatement at common law ; so the conclusion is similar
to that of pleas to the person at common law, where the
defendant demands thejudgment of the court si respon-
dere debet. [a] Thus, too, and with the same anology,
pleas of matter in pais, like pleas in abatement at com-
mon law, [b] must be put in upon oath.
157, It has been questioned whether a plea in
equity, which did not conclude by averring the facts to be
true, [c] similar to the “hoc paratus est verificare,” at
common law, would be good; but since the stat. 4 Ann. c.
16, not even at common law can this objection [d] be
taken advantage of, but by special demurrer, and it would
not, it is concluded, be available in equity.
158, When the plea or demurrer extends to part
only of the bill, the conclusion must be conformable
thereto; and as in that case there must be an answer to
the rest of the bill, not covered by the plea or demurrer,
such answer is preceded by a protestation against a waiver
of the plea. So, likewise, when the answer is in support
of the plea, it is expressed to be made for that purpose,
and preceded by a similar protestation. This is, however,
emabundanti cautela, because an answer is only a waiver
to the‘ plea, “ when it puts in issue anything which the
pleawould cover from being put in issue.” [e] Where
an answer is added to a plea or demurrer, the prayer to
be dismissed with costs is inserted at the end of the
answer. In cases of this nature the conclusion runs thus:
[a] 2 Saund. 210,‘note. Tidd, 576.
[b] 2 Str. 705, 738.
[c] Randolph 12. Randolph, Hardr. 160.
[cl] 1 East, 369.













































































































































OF TH.E CONCLUSION. t07' 
equity, being the same, the conclusion need not be differ-
ent; arid, as we have seen, they bear an a no logy to pleas 
in abatement at common law ; so the conclusion is s'imilar 
to that of pleas to the person at common law, where the 
defendant demands the judgment of the court si respon-
dere debet. [a] Thus, too, and with the same analogy, 
pleas of matter in pais, like pleas in abatement at com-
mon law, [h] must be put in upon oath. 
157. It has been questioned whether a plea in 
equity, which did not conclude by averring the facts to be 
true, [ c] similar to the ''hoc paratus eat verificare," at 
comma~ law, would be good; but.since the stat. 4 Ann. c. 
16, not even at common law can this objection [d] be 
taken ad vantage of, but by special demurrer, and it would 
not, it is concluded, be available in equity. 
158. When the plea or demurrer extends ·to part 
only of the bill, the conclusion must be conformable 
thereto; and as in that case there must be an answer to 
the rest of the bill, not covered by the plea or demurrer, 
such answer is preceded by a protestation against a waiver 
of the plea. So~ likewise, when the answer is in support 
of the plea, it is expressed to be made for that purpose, 
and preceded by a similar protestation. 'fhis is, ·however, 
ernabundanti cautela, because an answer is only a waiver 
to the· plea, '' when it puts in issue anything which the 
plea-would cover from being put in issue.'' [e] Where 
an answer is added to a plea or demurrer, the prayer to 
be dis1nissed with costs is inserted at the end of the 
answer. In cases of this nature the conclusion runs thus: 
(a] 2 Saund. 210, note. Tidd, 576. 
[b] 2 Str. 705, 738·. 
[c] Randolph v. Randolph, Hardr. 160. 
( d] 1 East, 369. 
[e] Gilb. For. Rom. 58. Mitf. 195, n. (e]. 
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“ This defendant both plead (or demur) to so much of the
said bill as is hereinbefore mentioned, and humbly de-
mands thejudgment of this honorable court whether he
shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to
so much of the said bill as is hereinbefore pleaded (or
demurred) to. And this defendant, not waiving his said
plea (or demurrer), but relying thereon for answer to the
residue of the said bill, saith,” etc. If the answer be in
support of the plea, “this defendant not waiving his said
plea, but relying thereon, and for better supporting the
same, for answer to so much of the said bill as aforesaid,
saith,” etc. The nature and form of answers will be the













































































































































108 EQUITY PLEADING. 
"This defendant both plead (or demur) to so much of the 
said bill as is hereinbefore mentioned, and humbly de-
mands the judgment of this honorable court whether he 
shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to 
so 1nuch of the said bill as is hereinbefore pleaded (or 
demurred) to. And this defendant, not waiving his said 
plea (or demurrer), but relying thereon for answer to the 
residue of the said bill, saith," etc. If the answer be in 
support of the plea, .,, this defendant not waiving his said 
plea, but relying thereon, and for better supporting the 
same, for answer to so rriuch of the said bill as aforesaid, 
saith," etc. The nature and form of answers will be the 
subject of our consideration in the ensuing chapter. 
CHAPTER V.
ANSWERS.
159, Ifthe defendant cannot protect himselffrom dis-
covery, by either plea or demurrer, he must give a distinct
and full answerto each particular allegation and charge in
the bill. The bill calls on the defendant “ to make full, true,
perfect and distinct answers to all and singular the mat-
ters therein contained ; and that as fully and particularly
as if they were repeated by way of interrogation; ”. and it
then proceeds to interrogate to each point circumstan-
tially. The defendant must therefore answer every part
of the substance of the statement and charges, even though
it should be omitted in the interrogation; and further, as
the use of the interrogating part in the bill is to extract a
full confession and prevent evasion or ambiguity, every
particular question must be answered precisely in all its
bearings and circumstances, provided it be founded upon -
some express allegation in the body of the bill. [a] So
far as the answer is an admission of the facts charged by
the complainant, it stands in place of proof in the cause;
and hence the great object which the complainant has in
view, is to obtain such an answer as will either supply
proof, where the facts rest within the knowledge of the
defendant, and are binding in conscience only, or such as
will aid proof, viz.: where, although he shall be able to
prove the facts by the testimony of others, yet the defend-
ant’s admission will save him the trouble and expense of
examining witnesses to those points which are acknowl-















































































































































159. If the defendant cannot protect himself from dis-
covery, by either plea or demurrer, he must give a distinct 
and full answer to each particular allegation and charge in 
the bill. The bill calls on the defenda.nt" to make full, true, 
perfect and distinct answers to all and singular the mat-
ters therein contained; and that as fully and particularly 
as if they were repeated by wa~ of interrogation; ". and it 
then proceeds to interrogate to each point circumstan-
tially. The defendant must therefore answer every part 
of the substance of the statement and charges, even though 
it should be omitted in the interrogation; and further, as 
the use of the interrogating part in the bill is to extract a 
full confession and prevent evasion o~ ambiguity, every 
particular question must be answered precisely in all its 
bearings and circumstances, provided it be founded upon · 
some express allegation in the body of the bill. [a] So 
·far as the answer is an admission of the facts charged by · 
the complainant, it stands in place of proof in the cause ; 
and hence the great object which the complainant has in 
view, is to obtain such an· answer as will either supply 
proof, where the facts rest within the knowledge of the 
defendant, and are binding in conscience only, or such as 
will aid proof, viz.: where, although he shall be able to 
prove the facts by the testimony of others, yet the defend-
ant's admission will save him the trouble and expense of 
examining witnesses to those points which are acknowl-
[a] 1 Bro. C. 0. 508. 6 Ves. 87-8. 
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edged by the answer. [a] Looked upon in this point of.
view, therefore, the answer must fully and fairly meet
every inquiry in the bill, for if there be any possibility of
evasion, the complainant will accept. For this reason, the
primary consideration with the draftsman is to make the
answer suflicient, and most of the observations we shall
have to make on the subject of answers will relate to this
point.
160, In earlier times, the forms of proceeding in this
court do not appear to have been near so strict as they
are at the present day, although perhaps they were
abundantly sufficient for all purposes at that period when
the authority of the court of chancery was yet in its in-
fancy; and this looseness of form was certainly more
conformable to the notion of equity then entertained,
being considered as a relaxation of the rule of law. Thus
the answer seems to have been little more than a general
and informal statement of the adverse case, in reply to the
bill, accompanied with a traverse of all such points as the
defendant thought it .material to deny, in order to put the
complainant upon the proof, and concluding with a gen-
eral traverse of whatever was not admitted to be true.
This general traverse at the end of the answer, though now
unriecessary, as every point must be answered separately,
is still continued in practice. [b] In like manner the de-
fendant was permitted to answer and plead, or demur, at
the same time, and to the same parts of the bill; because
the answer, being such as we have described it above, was
not considered so much in the light of a discovery, which
the defendant by his plea or demurrer would avoid, as of
a pleading to be used only on the defence. Hence it was
usual to commence the answer with a general reservation
[a] 2 Atk. 241. 2 Ves. 492.













































































































































110 EQUITY PLEADING. 
edged by the answer. [a] Looked upon in this point of. 
view, therefore, the answer must fully and fairly meet 
every inquiry in the bill, for if there be any possibility of 
evasion, the complainant will accept. For this reason, the 
primary consideration with the draftsman is to make the 
answer aullicient, and most of the observations we shall 
have to make on the subject of answers will relate to this 
point. 
160. In earlier times, the forms of proceeding in this 
court do not appear to have been near so strict as they 
are ·at the present day, although perhaps they were 
abundantly sufficient for all purposes at that period when 
the authority of the court of chancery was yet in its in-
fancy; and this looseness of form was certainly more 
conformable to the no.tion of equity then entertafned, 
being considered as a relaxation of the rule of law. Thus 
the answer seems to have been little more than a general 
and informal statement of the adverse case, in reply to the 
bill, accompanied with a traverse of all such points as the 
defendant thought it material to deny, in order to put the 
complainant upon the proof, and concluding with a gen-
eral traverse of whatever was not admitted to be true . 
. This general traverse at the end of the answer, though now 
unnecessary, as every point must be answered separately, . 
is still continued in practice. [b] In like manner the de· 
fendant was permitted to answer and plead, or demur, at 
the same time, and to the same parts of the bill; because 
the answer, being such as we have described it above, was 
not considered so much in the light of a discovery, which 
the defendant by his plea or demurrer would avoid, as of 
a pleading to be used only on the defence. Hence it was 
usual to commence the answer wi~h a general reservation 
[a] 2 Atk. 241. 2 Ves. 492. 
[b] 2 P. Wms. 87. · 
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of the right to except to the complainant’s bill; andal-
though, since the practice of the court has been matured,
the answer would be a waiver of a plea or demurrer, [a]
and consequently no objection can be taken after answer
to the bill, [b] still the old form of commencement is ad-
hered to. The commencement is now, therefore, a mere
technical form, of no further utility than as it serves to
characterize the pleading. In the case of an infant, whose
rights and interests are under the peculiar protection of
the court, this form of reserving the benefit of exceptions,
as well as the usual denial of combination, at the close of
the answer, are omitted. [c]
161, The defendant, by his oath, is bound to answer
according to the best and utmost of his knowledge, remem-
brance, information and belief. That which he is ac-
quainted with of his own knowledge admits of a direct '
answer, either in the affirmative or negative, unless it be
a matter of recollection, in which respect the answer must
be qualified according to the extent of the remembrance.
Such circumstances as are known to the defendant from
information‘ and hearsay only, are the proper subjects of
belief, and on which he in general has formed some
opinion, either of assent or dissent. It is not enough,
therefore, to answer the question by saying he has been
informed, or heard of any particular fact, but he must
state whether or not he believes it to be true. [d] Again,
there may be other facts alleged in the bill, to which the
defendant is a total stranger, and of the truth of which he
[a] Mitf. 258, 3 Anst. 715. 2 Atk. 155.
Lb] But if, after an answer, the complainant amends his
bill, the defendant may, notwithstanding his former answer, put
















































































































































ANSWERS. . 111 
of the right to except to the complainant's bill; and . al-
though, since the practice of the court has been matured, 
the answer would be a waiver of a plea or demurrer, [a] 
and consequently no objection can be taken after answer 
to the bill, [b] still the old form of commencement is ad-
hered to. 'fhe commencement is now, therefore, a mere 
technical form, of no further utility than as it serves to 
characterize the pleading. In the case of an infant, whose 
rights and interests are under the peculiar p·rotection of 
the court, this form of reserving the benefit of exceptions, 
as well as the usual de11ial of combination, at the close of 
the answer, are o1nitted. [ c] 
16l. The defendant, by his oath, is bound to answer 
according to the b~st and utmost of his knowledge, remem-
brance, information and belief. That which he is ac-
quainted with of his own knowledge admits of a direct 
answer, either in the affirmative or negative, unless it be 
a matter of recollection, in which respect the answer must 
be qualified ~ccording to the extent of the remembrance. 
Such circumstances as are known to the defendant from 
information· and hearsay only, are the proper subjects of 
belief, and on which he in general has formed some 
opinion, either of assent or dissent. It is not enough, 
therefore, to answer the question by saying he has been 
informed, or heard of any particular fact, but he must 
state whether or not he believes it to be true. [d] Again, 
there may be other facts alleged in the bill, to which the 
defendant is a total stranger, and of the truth of which he 
[a] Mit f. 258, 3 An st. 715. 2 Atk. 155. 
lb] But if, after an answer, the complainant amends his 
bill, the defendant may, notwithstanding his former answer, put 
in a plea to the amended bill. Vide Ritchie v. Aylwin, 15 Ves. 
79. 
[c] Mitf. 254. 
[dl Hinde, 197. 
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cannot form any opinion. Thus, the answer will be either
a direct admission or denial, or an assent or dissent, or a
declaration that the defendant cannot, as to his belief or
otherwise, form any opinion of the truth or falsehood of
the facts alleged.
162. But there may be statements or charges in the
bill, which though true in part, are yet substantially in-
correct, and which, therefore, it may be necessary to add
to, qualify, or explain. To questions of this nature the
defendant cannot give adirect answer in the first instance ;
but he must state the case according to the fact, and con-
clude by denying that the particular statement or charge
is true, ‘-‘ further or otherwise,” than as he has explained
it. This is the meaning of a traverse in an answer, so
frequently to be met with in the books as contra_dis-
tinguished from a direct denial; and although it is now
marked by the technical words absque hoc, it is, to all in-
tents and purposes, a traverse, being preceded by an in-
ducement of matter inconsistent with the. statement of
the complainant, but which, without the denial in the
conclusion, would not tender an issue ; and this, we have
seen, is the definition of a traverse, as explained in a for-
mer chapter. [a]
163, It is an observation worthy of the student’s
attention, that in order to make all answer sufficient,and
thereby avoid exceptions, the words of the interrogation
ought, as nearly as possible, to be followed, but so as that
the charge may not be answered literally, but in sub-
stance. Thus it should be said, “this defendant admits,
or denies it to be true; ” or, “has been informed and be-
lieves it to be true, that,” etc., following the words of the
bill in the interrogating part. So, likewise, when the
defendant disclaims all knowledge, he should say, “and













































































































































112 EQUITY PLEADING. 
cannot form any opinion. Thus, the answer will be either 
a direct admission or denial, or an assent or dissent, or a 
declaration that the defendant cannot, as to his belief or 
otherwise, form any opinion of the truth or falsehood of 
the facts alleged. 
162. But there may be statements or cha.rges in the 
bill" which though true in part, are yet substantially in-
correct., and which, therefore, it may be necessary t~ add 
to, qualify, or explain. To questions of this nature the 
defendant cannot give a direct answer in the first instance; 
but he must. state the case according to the fact, and con-
clude by denying that the particular statement or charge 
is true,'~ further or otherwise," than as he has explained 
it. This is the meaning of a traverse in an answer, so 
frequently to be met with in the books as contra-dis-
tinguished from a direct denial; and although it is now 
marked by the technical words. absque hoc, it is, to all in-
tents and purposes, a traverse, being preceded by an in-
ducement of matter inconsistent with the. statement of 
the complainant. but which, without the denial in the 
conclusion, would not tender an issue; and this, we have 
seen, is the definition of a traverse, as explained in a for-
mer chapter. [a] 
163. It is an observation worthy of the student's 
attention, that in order to make an answer sufficient,, and 
thereby avoid exceptions, the words of the interrogation 
ought, as nearly as possible, to be followed, but so as that 
the charge may not be answered literally, but in sub-
st::tnce. Thus it should be said, " this defendant admit~, 
or denies it to be true; " or, "has been informed and be-
lieves it to be true, that," etc., following the words of the 
bill in the interrogating part. So, likewise, when the 
defendant disclaims all knowledge, he should say." and 
[a] Vide ante, c. 1. 
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this defendant doth not know, and cannot, as to his belief
or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof by the said
bill, answer or set forth whether,” etc., repeating the
interrogatory. The traverse is in this form: “this defen-
dant, further answering, saith that,” etc. (stating‘his
case), “ and this defendant further, or otherwise than as
aforesaid, denies it to be true that,” etc. (the words of the
interrogatory). If the defendant be interrogated to a
point of law merely, and not of fact, instead of answer-
ing he submits the question to the decision of the court:
“and this defendant submits it to this honorable court,
whether,” etc. We have already seen that many circum-
stances which would have been available as a defence by
way of plea, may be insisted upon by answer—-as where
the defendant does not require to protect himself from
discovery [a] or where it might be doubtful whether the
same defence would hold as a plea; [b] or where, from
the variety of matters to be put in issue, a plea would not
achieve the object of shortening the suit and saving ex-
pense. [c] In this respect the \answer confesses and
avoids the particular allegation of the bill, similarly to
what we have described when treating of pleas: “and
this defendant admits it to be true that, etc., but then
he saith that,” etc. (stating the matter in objection) ; and
it is a common but unnecessary practice to conclude with
insisting upon having the same benefit of the objection so
stated, as if the same were pleaded in bar to the relief, or
demurred to as to the discovery, where it would cause a
penalty or forfeiture, or a breach of confidence in a coun-
sel, attorney, or arbitrator. These are the only cases, as
we have stated in the preceding chapter, in which the
defendant can insist by answer against making a dis-
[a] Mitf. 249.
[b] 2 P. Wms. 145.















































































































































this defendant doth not know, and cannot, as to his belief 
or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof by the said 
bill, answer or set forth whether,'' etc., repeating the 
interrogatory. The traverse is in this form: ''this defen-
dant,. further answering, saith that," etc. (stating • his 
case)," and this defendant further, or otherwise than as 
aforesaid, ~enieM it to be true that.," etc. (the words ·of the 
interrogatory). If the defendant be interrogated to a 
point of law merely, and not of fact, instead of answer-
ing he submits the question to the decision of the court: 
"and this defendant submits it to this honorable court, 
whether," etc. We have already seen that many circum-
stances which would have been available as a defence by 
way of plea, tnay be insisted upon 'by answer-as where 
the defendant does not require to protect hiinself from 
discovery [a] or where it might be doubtful whether the 
same defe11ce would hold as a plea; [b] or where, from 
the variety of matters to be put in issue, a plea would not 
achieve the object of shortening the suit and saving ex-
pense. [c] In this respect the .answer confesses and 
avoids the particular allegation of the bill, similarly to 
what we have described when treating of pleas: "and 
this defendant admits it to be true that, etc., but then 
he saith that," etc. (stating the matter in objecti9n); and 
it is a common but unnecessary practice to conclude with 
insisting upon having the same benefit of the objection so 
stated, as if the sa1ne were pleaded in bar to the relief, or 
demurred to as to the discovery, where it would c~use a 
pena~ty or forfeiture, or a breach of confidence in a coun-
sel, attorney, or arbitrator. These are the only cases .. as 
we have stated in the preceding· chapter, in which the 
defendant can insist by answer against making a dis-
[a] Mitf. 249. 
[b] 2 P. Wms. 145. 
' [c] 1 Atk. 54 .. 
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covery; in all other cases where the defendant submits to
answer, although he might have good ground for pleading
or demurring, he must answer fully. [a]
164, It was formerly thought that if a defendant
denied by his answer the foundation of the bill, as where
he denied the complainant’s title, or where such title had
not been previously established at law, he might decline
making any discovery as to those inquiries in the bill
which rested on the assumption of the matter denied, [b]
as of good title for instance, unless such discovery were
material as affecting the controverted point. This has
been long a multum vexata quaastio, and one which Lord
Eldon termed a “ distracted point” ; [c] for the cases
abound with contradictions and nice and subtle distinc-
tions upon the subject. [d] But the question is now put
completely at rest, it having been recently decided “ that
a defendant cannot by answer object to answering, though
by plea he may;” [e] and Sir John Leach, expressing
his opinion on this point, said,“ I think that this is so
useful a rule, I shall always adhere to it.” The allowing
a contrary rule to prevail, would be to confound all just
distinctions, and to do away all the advantages that result
from adhering to systematic forms.
165, The old practice seems to have obtained from
having allowed too great a latitude of construction to a
different rule, namely: that where there is a series of
questions depending upon a supposition of the fact upon
which they are built being admitted, if that fact be
denied, it would undoubtedly be superfluous to go on and
[a] 3 Madd. Rep. 70.
[b] Mitf. 251_2_3.
[0] Shaw v. Ching, 11 Ves. 306.
[d] 2 Madd. Chan. Prac. 338-9.













































































































































114 EQUITY PLEADING. 
covery; in all other cases \\"here the defendant submits to 
answer, although he might have good ground for pleading 
or demurring, !I.e 1nust answer fully. [a] 
164. It was formerly thought that if a defendant 
denied by his answer the foundation of the bill, as where 
he denied the complainant's title, or where such title had 
not been previously est.ablished at law, he might decline 
making any discovery as to those inquiries in the bill 
which rested on the assumption of the matter denied, [b] 
as of good title for instance, unless such discovery were 
material as affecting the controverted point. This has 
been long a 'll~ultum ve~ata qucsatio, and one which Lord 
Eldon termed a " distracted point" ; [ c] for the cases 
abound with contradictions and nice and subtle distinc-
tions upon the subject. [d] But the question is now put 
completely at rest, it having been recently decided "that 
a defendant cannot by answer object to answering, though 
by plea he may;" [e] and Sir John Leach, expressing 
his opinion on this point, said, " I think that this is so 
useful a rule, I shall always adhere to it." The allowing 
a contrary rule to prevail, would be to confound all just 
distinctions, and to do away all the advantages that result 
from adhering to systematic forms. 
165. The old practice seems to have obtained from 
having allowed too great a latitude of construction to a 
different rule, name~y: that where there is a series of 
questions depending upon a supposition of the fact upon 
which they are built being admitted, if that fact be 
denied, it would undoubtedly be superfluous to go on and 
[a] 3 Madd. Rep. 70. 
[b] Mitf. 251-2-3. 
[c] Shaw v. Ching, 11 Ves. 306. 
[d] 2 Madd. Chan. Prac. 338-9. 
[e] Mazzaredo v. Maitland, 3 Madd. Rep. 70. 
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give a particular negative to each query deduced from
such presumed fact. But this rule relates to a single
allegation and its consequents, and not to a point, which,
if insisted on by a negative plea, would be a good objec-
tion to the discovery of independent matter; and the
reason of this rule is, that the answer may not be ren-
dered needlessly prolix by the insertion of that which is
sufiiciently denied by the previous answer.
166, For the similar purpose of avoiding prolixity,
deeds or other writings should not ordinarily be set out in
hoec verba, even though called for by the bills. [a] It is
sufficient if they are referred to, and left with the clerk in
court, for the complainant to take copies, if he thinks
proper; or the court will order them to be produced on
the examination of witnesses. [b] In all other respects,
however, the answer to each inquiry must be full and
precise; and although general accounts and inventories
and such like, may be set out in schedules annexed to the
answer, and which the defendant prays may be taken as
part thereof, yet any particular question relating to such
account, etc., must be answered specifically, and it will
not be enough to refer generally to the schedule in
answer to such particular query. [c] Most of the rules
relating to the precision of answers are to be found in the
following extract from Lord Glarendon’s orders: [d] “An
answer to a matter charged as a defendant’s own fact,
must regularly be without saying ‘ to his remembrance ; ’
or, ‘ as he believeth,’ if it be laid to be done within seven
years before, unless the court, upon exception taken, shall
find special cause to dispense with so positive an answer;
and if the defendant deny the fact, he must traverse or
[a] Hinde, 198. Beames‘ Ord. Chan. 69, 166.
[b] Hinde, 198.
[c] 1 Bro. C. C. 503.














































































































































give a particular negative to each query deduced from 
such presumed fact. But this rule relates to a single 
allegation and its consequents, aud not to a point, which, 
if insisted on by a negative plea, would be a good objec-
tion to the discovery of independent matter; and the 
reason of this rule is, that the answer may not be ren-
dered needlessly prolix by the insertion of that which is 
sufficiently denied by the preyious answer. 
166. For the similar purpose of avoid·ing prolixity, 
deeds or other writings should not ordinarily be set out in 
hmc verba, even though called for by the bills. [a] It is 
sufficient if they are referred to, and left with the clerk in 
court, for the complainant to take copies, if he thinks 
proper; or the court will order them to be produced on 
the examination of witnesses. [b] In all other respects, 
however, the ans\ver to each inquiry must be full and 
precise; and although general accounts and inventories 
and such like, may be set out in schedules annexed to the 
answer, and which the defendant prays may be taken as 
part thereof, yet any partic~lar question relating to such 
account, etc., must be answered specifically, and it will 
not be enough to refer generally to the schedule in 
answer to such particular query. [c] Most of the rules 
relating to the precision of answers are to be _found in the 
following extract from Lord Clarendon's orders: [d] '-'An 
answer to a matter charged as a defendant's O\Vn fact, 
tnust regularly be without saying 'to his· remembrance;' 
or,' as he believeth,' if it be laid to be done within seven 
years before, unless the court, upon exception taken, s~all 
find special cause to dispense with so positive an answer; 
and if the defendant deny the fact, he must traverse or 
[a] Hinde, 198. Beames' Ord. Chan. 69, 166. 
[b] Hinde, 198. 
[c] 1 Bro. 0. C. 503. 
[d] Beames' Ord. Chan. 179. 
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deny it (as the cause requires) directly and not by way of
negative pregnant. [a] As, if he be charged with a re-
ceipt of a sum of money, he must deny or traverse that
he hath not received that sum or any part thereof, or else
set forth what part he hath received. And if a fact be
laid to be done with divers circumstances, the defendant
must not deny or traverse it literally, as it is laid in the
bill, but must answer the point of substance positively
and certainly.”
167, An answer must not, no more than a plea or
demurrer, be argumentative; [b] but should rely on
matter of fact only. There is one more observation
which the student will do well to recollect, namely: that
when any admission which might operate against the de-
fendant is followed by an avoidance or explanation, this
should be one continuous sentence: for though the
answer, when replied to, cannot be read at the hearing in
support of the defendant’s case, yet if part of any sen-
tence be read by the complainant, the defendant will be
entitled to have the whole of that sentence read; and,
in like manner, when a sentence has a direct reference to
a previous part of the answer, the defendant has a right
to read the part referred to.
168, In order to give the student a general idea of
the form of an answer, we shall here insert an answer to
the skeleton bill given in a former chapter ; and, as far as
it may be done, with its several variations:
[a] A negative pregnant is a negative, implying also an
afiirmative; as if the man being impleaded to have done a
thing on such a day, or in such a place, denieth that he did it
modo et forma declarata, which implieth, nevertheless, that in
some sort he did it.” Oowell. Beames’ Ord. Chan. 179I n. 56.
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deny it (as the cause requires) directly and not by way of , 
negative pregnant. [a] As, if he be charged with a re-
ceipt of a sum of money, he must deny or traverse that 
he hath not received that sum or any part thereof, or else 
set forth what part he hath received. And if a fact be 
laid to be done with divers circumstances, the defendant 
must not deny or traverse it litera1ly, as it is laid in the 
bill, but must answer the point of substance 'positively 
and certainly." 
167. An answer must not, no more than a plea or 
detnurrer, be argumentative; [b] but should rely on 
matter of fact only. rrhere is one more observation 
which the student will do well to recollect, namely: that 
when any admission which might operate against the de-
fendant is followed by an avoidance or explanation, this 
should be one continuous sentence: for though the 
answer, when replied to, cannot be read at the hearing in 
support of the defendant's case, yet if part of any sen-
tence be read by the complainant, the defendant will be 
entitled to have the whole of that sentence read; and, 
in like manner, when a sentence has a direct reference to 
a previous part of the answer, the defendant has a right 
to read the part referred to. 
168. In order to give the student a general idea of 
the form of an answer, we shall here insert an answer to 
the skeleton bill given in a former chapter ; and, as far as 
it may be done, with its several variations : 
[a] A negative pregnant is a negative, implying also an 
affirmative; as if the man .being impleaded to have done a 
thing on such a day, or in such a place, denieth that he did it 
modo et forma declarata, which implieth, nevertheless, that in 
some sort he did it." Cowell. Reames' Ord. Chan. 179, n. 56. 
[b] 11 Ves. 303. 
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- “ The Answer of C. D. Defendant, to the Bill
of Complaint of A. B. Complainant.
“ This defendant saving and reserving to himself, now
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit
and advantage of exception which can or may be had or
taken to the said complainant’s said bill of complaint, for
answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is
advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to
make answer unto. answers and says he believes it to be
true, that at the time in the said bill in that behalf men-
tioned, such events did take place as led to the relation
now existing between the said complainant, A. B., and
this defendant; and he admits it to be true, that such re-
lation does in fact exist. And this defendant, further an-
swering, saith, he admits it to be true, that the said com-
plainant and this defendant are parties to such relation,
under circumstances to which particular equitable inci-
dents are concomitant; but then, he saith, such equitable
incidents depend upon the performance of a condition
precedent; and that such condition has never been per-
formed by the said complainant, although this defendant
hath always been ready and willing, and hereby offers to
perform his part of the contract, whenever the- said com-
plainant shall have complied with terms thereof on his
part. And this defendant, further answering, saith, that
had the said‘ complainant performed the said condition
precedent, such duties as are in the said bill in that behalf
set forth ‘to be performed by this defendant, would have
arisen from the said relation; but further or otherwise
than as aforesaid, this defendant denies it to be true, that
such duties as are in the said bill set forth to be performed
by this defendant, did arise from the said relation. And
this defendant denies it to be true, that the said complain-
ant hath, by himself or his agents, or in any other manner,














































































































































"rrhe .Answer of 0. D. Defendant, to the Bill 
of Complaint of A. B .. Oomplainant. 
''This defendant saving and reserving to himself, now 
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit 
and advantage of exception which can or 1nay be had or 
taken to the said complainant's said bill of complaint, for 
answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is 
advised is in anywise materf~l or necessary for him to 
make answer unto~ answers and says he believes it to be 
true, that at the time in th(, said bill in that behalf men-
tioned, such events did take place as Jed to the relation 
now existing between the said complainant, A. B., and 
this defenrlant; and he admits it to be true, that such re-
lation does in fact exist. And this defendant, further an-
swering, saith, he admits it to be true, that the said com-
plainant and this defendant are parties to such relation, 
under circumstances to which particular equitable inci-
dents are concomitant; but then, be saith, such equitable 
incidents depend upon the performance of a condition 
precedent; and that such condition has never been per-
formed by the said complainant, although this defendant 
hath always been ready and willing, and hereby offers to 
perform his part of the contract, whenever the· said com-
plainant shall have complied with tern1s thereof on his 
part. And this defendant, further answering. saith, that 
had the ·said· complainant performed the said condition 
precedent, such duties as ar.e in the said bill in that behalf 
set forth ·to be performed by this defendant,. would have 
arisen from the said relation ; but further or otherwise 
than as aforesaid, this defendant denies it to be true, that 
such duties as are in the said bill set forth to be performea 
by this defendant, did arise fro1n the said relation. And 
this Jefendant denies it to be true, that the said complain-
ant bath, b.y himself or his agents, or in any other manner, 
made such or the like applications and request.s as are in 
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the said bill in that behalf mentioned, or any applications
and requests in respect of the matters in the said bill men-
tioned. And this defendant doth not know, nor can he as
to his belief or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof
by the said bill, set forth whether the circumstances in the
said bill charged are true, or how otherwise. And this de-
fendant denies all and all manner of unlawful combina-
tion and confederacy, wherewith he is by the said bill
charged; ‘without this, that there is any other matter,
cause, or thiiiggin the said bill of complaint contained
(material or necessary for the defendant to make answer
unto, and not herein and hereby well and sufiiciently
answered, confessed, traversed, and avoided, or denied), is
true, to the knowledge or belief of this defendant; all
which matters and things this defendant is ready and will-
ing to aver, maintain, and prove, as this honorable court
shall direct; and humbly prays to be hence dismissed,
with his reasonable costs and charges in this behalf most
wrongfully sustained.”
169, It can be scarcely necessary to observe that the
above general form is given merely for the example; and
that answers cannot pursue any precise method or ar-
rangement, but must follow the circumstances of the case,
and the allegations of the bill. For further answers, and
the answers to amended bills, which are always considered
as a continuation and part of the former answer, we refer
the student to the Appendix. We have endeavored to
mould the above form so as to give instances of — 1, an
assent; 2, admission; 3, confession and avoidance; 4,
traverse; 5, denial; and 6, disclaimer of knowledge. The
example of denial affords us also an apt illustration of the
rule that it is useless to deny a fact, the negation of which
is necessarily involved‘ in the answer to a former question.













































































































































118 EQUITY PLEADING. 
the said bill in that behalf mentioned, or any applications 
and requests in respect of the matters in the said bill men-
tioned. And this defendant doth not know, nor can he as 
to his belief or otherwise, save as he is informed thereof 
by the said bill, set forth whether the circumstances in the 
said bill charged are true, or how otherwise. And this de-
fendailt denies all and all manner of unlawful combina-
tion a.~~ ' confederacy, wbel-ewith he is by the said bill 
charged·;.- ·without this, that there is any other matter, 
cause, ·or thinef;in the said bill of complaint contained 
(material or necessary for the defendant to make answer 
unto, and not herein and· hereby well and sufficiently 
answered, confessed, traversed, and avoided, or denied), is 
true, to the knowledge or belief of this defendant; all 
which matters and things this defendant is ready and will-
ing to aver, maintain, and prove, as this honorable court 
shall direct; and humbly prays to be hence dismissed, 
with his reasonable costs and charges in this behalf most 
wrongfully sustained." 
169. It can be scarcely necessary to observe that the 
above general form is given merely for the example; and 
that ans\\rers cannot pursue any precise tnethod or ar-
rangement, but must follow the circumstances of the case, 
and the allegations of the bill. For further answers, and 
the answers to amended bills, whicli are always considered 
as a continuation and part of the former answer, we refer 
the student to the Appendix. We have endeavored to 
mould the above form so as to give instances of- 1, an 
assent; 2, admission; 3, confession and avoidance; 4, 
traverse; 5, denial; and 6, disclaimer of knowledge. The 
example of denial affords us also an apt illustration of the 
rule that it is useless to deny a fact, the negation of which 
is necessarily involved· in the answer to a former question. 
l,hus, as the defendant denies that any requests were 
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made to him, it would be utter trifling to say that he did
not refuse to comply with them, or why.
170, The conclusion, which is a common form, and
now quite unnecessary, supplies us with an example of .
the formal traverse, with an absque hoc. This is a general
traverse of every allegation in the bill which the answer
did not specifically meet but formerly it was the custom
to insert, immediately preceding the general traverse, a
particular traverse of those parts of the bill which the de-
fendant meant to deny; the whole foregoing part of the
answer being nothing but inducement, or a statement of
the defendant’s case, inconsistent with that made by the
bill. [a] '
171, As an infant is not bound by the answer put in
for him by his guardian, and as the Attorney General can-
not be compelled to answer at all, [b] such answers cannot
be excepted to; [c] and they are therefore, seldom full.
For the form of those answers, as well as for disclaimers,
which are a species of answer filed by persons made de-
fendants, who claim no interest or concern in the suit, we
must refer the student to the Appendix.
[a] The student will find in the Appendix the precedent
of a bill, and an answer to it in the old form, taken from the
Curcus Cancellariae, p. 125, et seq.
[b] Dick. 730.















































































































































made to him, it would be uttet trifling to say that he did 
not refuse to comply with them, or why. 
170. The conclusion, which is a common form, and 
now quite unnecessary, supplieR us with an example of . 
the fortnal traverse, with an absque hoc. This is a general 
traverse of every allegation in the bill which the answer 
did not specifically meet but forn1erly it was the custom 
to insert, immediately preceding the general traverse, a 
particular traverse of those parts of the bill which the de-
fendant meant to deny ; the whole foregoing part of the 
answer being nothing but inducement, or a statement of 
the defendant's case, inconsistent with that" made by the 
bill. r a] 
171. As an infant is not bound by the answer put in 
for him by his guardian, and as the Attorney General can-
not be compelled to answer at all, [h] such auswera cannot 
be excepted to; [c] and they are therefore, seldom full. 
For the form of those answers, as well as for disclaimers, 
which are a species of anRwer filed by persons made de-
fendants, who claim no interest or concern in the suit, we 
must refer the student to the Appendix. 
[a] The· student will find in the Appendix the precedent 
of a bill, and an ·answer to it in the old form, taken from the 
Cu reus Cancellari~e, p. 125, et seq. 
[b) Dick. 730. 




172, When the answer, according to the practice
which formerly prevailed, was only a statement of the de-
fendant’s case in reply to the bill, and not, as at the pres-
ent day, a full discovery of all the matters charged, it
usually became necessary for the complainant to make a
special replication to such statement in the answer, which
was followed by a special rejoinder, rebutter, and so on,
until a distinct issue wasjoined, as at common law. But,
as the practice now stands, the-answer being a full discov-
ery to every point, the complainant may find sufficient
admissions in the answer, upon which to ground a decree;
whereupon he proceeds to a hearing upon bill and answer
only. If the admissions be accompanied by a statement
in avoidance, the complainant will be allowed, instead of
replying specially to the new matter, to amend his bill and
extract fresh discovery. The amended hill, therefore, and
further answer supply the place of special pleadings,
which are now obsolete and the reason why this practice
has obtained in equity, though not at common law, is that
the great object of special pleading at common law is to
keepthe law and the fact distinct, they being to be tried
by seperate tribunals; but in equity the whole question
comes before the court for its decision, both on the plead-
ings and the proofs.
173, When the defendant, by his answer, denies the
material facts of the bill, an issue is then tendered upon
them, and the complainant mustjoin issue and prove the















































































































































172. When the answer, according to the practic.e 
which formerly prevailed, was only a statement of the de-
fendant''s case in reply to the bill, and not, as at the pres-
ent da.y, a full discovery of all the matters charged, it 
usually becallle necessary for the complainant to make a 
special replication to such statement in the answer, which 
was followed by a special rejoinder, rebutter, and so on, 
until a distinct issue was joined, as at cornmon law. But, 
as the practice now stands, the -answer being a full discov-
ery to every point, the_ complainant may find sufficient 
admissions in the answer, upon which to ground a decree; 
whereupon he proceeds to a hearing upon bill and answer 
only. If the admissions be accompanied by a statement 
in avoidance, the complainant will be allowed, instead of 
replying specially to the new matter, to amend his bill and 
extract fresh discovery. 1,he amended bill, therefore, and 
further answer supply the place of special pleadings, 
which are now obsoiete and the reason why this practice 
has obtained in equity, though not at common law, is that 
the great object of special pleading at common law is to 
keep· the law and the fact distinct, they being to be tried 
by seperate tribunals; but in equity the whole question 
comes before the court for its decision, both on the plead-
ings and the proofs. 
173. When the defendant, by h-is answer, denies the 
material facts of the bill, an issue is then tendered upon 
then1, and the complainant mustjoin issue and prove the 
facts thus disputed by the testimony of two witnesses at 
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least, against the positive oath of the defendant. [a] Such
issue is joined by a general replication, that the complain-
ant aver and prove his bill to be true, certain and suffi-
cient; which is an issue, both as to the law and the facts,
according to the constitution of the court. Whe.n the
answer advances a new statement on behalf of the defend-
ant, the complainant should tender an issue to the new
facts and oblige the defendant to prove them, as otherwise
they will be taken to be true. This also is done by the
general replication, stating that the answer of the defend-
ant is uncertain, untrue and insufiicient, which tenders an
issue, both of law and fact, on which the defendant joins
issue by a formal rejoinder—a pleading which is supposed
to be filed, but is never actually drawn—the practice being
to serve the defendant with the subpoena ad rejungendum
(unless he submits to rejoin gratis), which is equivalent
to a notice of replication, and issue is then joined between
the parties. [b] Hence we find that the replication in
equity only serves as a mere form for producing an issue,
and as such it need not be signed by counsel. [c] The
form of it is as follows:
The Replicatton of A. B., complainant,
to the Answer of C. D., defendant.
This repliant, saving and reserving to himself all and
all manner of advantage of exception to the manifold in-
sufiiciencies of the said answer, for replication thereunto,
saith, that he will aver and prove his said bill to be true,
certain and sufficient, in the law to be answered unto; and
that the said answer of the said defendant is uncertain,
untrue, and insufficient to be replied unto by this repliant;
without this, that any other matter or thing whatsoever in
[a] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 270. 649.














































































































































THE REPLICATION • 121 
. least, against the positive oath of the defendant. [a] Such 
issue is. joined by a general replication, that the .complain-
ant aver and prove his bill to be true, certain and suffi-
cient,· which is an issue, both as to the law and the facts, 
according to the constitution of the court. Whe.n the 
answer advances a new statement on behalf of the defend-
ant, the complainant should tender an issue to the new 
facts and oblige the defendant to prove them, as otherwise 
they will be taken to be true. This also is done by the 
general re!)lication, stating that the answer of the defe1~d­
ant is uncertain, untrue and insuflicient, which tenders an 
.issue, both of law and fact, on which the defendant joins 
issue by a formal rejoinder-a pleading which is supposed 
to be filed, but is never actually drawn-the practice being 
to serve the defendant with. the subpmna ad rejun.qendum 
(unles8 he submits to rejoin gratia), which is equivalent 
to a notice of replication, and issue is then joined between 
the parties. [b] Hence we find that the replication in 
equity only serves as a mere fortp for producing au issue, 
and as such it need not be signed by counsel. [c] The 
form of it is as follows : 
The Replicatton of A. B., complainant, 
to the Answer of C. D., defendant. 
This repliant, savin~ and reserving to himself all and 
all manner of advantage of exception to the manifold in-
sufficiencies of the said answer, for replication thereunto, 
saith, that he will aver and p'rove his said bill to be true, 
certain and suffi.ci~nt, in the la\v to be answered unto; and 
that the said answer of the said defendant is uncertain, 
untrue, and insufficient to be replied unto by this repliant; 
without thia, that any other matter or thing whatsoever in 
[a] 2 Chan. Ca. 8. 1 Vern. 161. 3 Atk. 270. 649. 
[ b] Vide ante, p. 80. Mos. 123, 296. 
[c] Hinde, 285. 
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the said answer contained, material or effectual in the
law, to he replied unto, confessed and avoided, traversed
or denied, is true. All which matters and things this re-
pliant is, and will be, ready to aver, due proof, as this
honorable court shall direct; and humbly prays, as in and
by his said bill he hath already prayed.
The general replication concludes the pleadings in
equity.
174, Having now pointed out the several grounds of
defence to a suit in equity we will for the convenience of
the student give a skeleton synopsis of those defences.
SYNOPSIS OF SEVERAL GROUNDS OF DEFENCE.
I. OBJECTIoNS To THE JURISDICTIoN:-—
1st. Want of equity.
2d. Jurisdiction in some other court of equity.










2d. Mode of preceding defective.
Another suit depending.
Want of proper parties.
Multifariousness.
Splitting of suits.
Want of proper affidavit annexed, etc.
.=n:=~s-’.I~1.~*
III. Onsncnons IN Banz-
lst. To deny the relation assumed by the hill.
1. By answer.
2. By negative plea.
1. Which denies the character attributed to either complainant
or defendant by the bill.
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the said answer contained, material or effectual in the 
law, to be replied unto, confessed and avoided, traversed 
or denied, is true. All which matters and things this re-
pliant is, and will be, ready to aver, due proof, as this 
honorable court shall tlirect; and humbly prays, as in and 
by his said bill he hath a~ready prayed. 
The general replication concludes the pleadings in 
equity. 
174. Having now pointed out the several grounds of 
defence to a suit in equity we will for the convenience of 
the student give a skeleton synopsis of those defencet~. 
SYNOPSIS OF SEVERAL GROUNDS OF DEFENCE. 
I. OBJECTIONS TO THE JURISDICTION:-
1st. Want of equity. 
2d. Jurisdiction in some other court of equity. 
II. OBJECTION IN ABATEMENT:- .-.. 




4. Allen enemy. 
5. Infancy. 
6. Coverture. 
7. Lunacy, or idlotcy. 
' 2d. Mode of preceding detootlve. 
1. Another suit depending •. , 
2. Want of proper parties. · 
8. Multifariousness. 
4. Spllttlnar of suits. 
5. Want or proper aftldavit annexed, etc. 
III. OBJECTIONS IN BAR:-
1st. To deny the relation assumed by the blll. 
1. By answer. 
2. By negatl ve plea. 
1. Which dentes the cha~acter attributed to elther,complalnant 
or defendant by the bill. 
2. Which denies that the defendant has such an Interest as can 
make hlm Hable. 
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211. To inva.lida,te1he relation.
1. Parties incapable to contract.
Alien purchasers, etc.
2. Contract illegal, insufficient, or altered.
illegality. or insuflilciency of the consideration. -
Statute of Frauds.
Want of title in plaintiff ab tnitio,




3. The right being contingent, did not accrue.
The non-performance ofa condition precedent.
3d. That no right ever existed.
1. Want of privity.
2. A purchase for valuable consideration, without notice.
3. Title paramount.
4th. That the right, though once existing, is barred.




2. By the act of law.
1. A fine and non claim.
2. A Recovery.
3. A Judgment.
4. A Decree, or dismissal of the suit.
3. By the act of God.
Contract becomes impossible to be performed.
N. B. The mode of defence which denies the right, is applicable where
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2d. To invaltd~ relation. 
1. Parties incapable ~o contract. 
Allen purchasers, etc. 
2. Contract illegal, insuftlcient, or altered. 
1. Illegality, or lnsufticlency or the consideration. 
2. Statute of Frauds. 
8. Want of title ln plalntltf ab tnitio, 
4. Want of present Interest, 
5. Bankruptcy or Insolvency. 
6. Forfei tore. 
3. The right being contingent, dld not accrue. 
The non·performance of a condition precedent. 
3d. That no right ever existed. 
1. Want of privity. 
2. A purchase for valuable consideration, without notice. 
3. Tl tle paramount. 
4th. That the right, though once existing, Is barred. 
1. By the act of the party. 
1. Stated account. 
2. Award. 
3. Release. 
2. By the act of law. 
1. A fine and non claim. 
2. A Recovery. 
8. A .Judgment. 
4. A Decree, or dismissal of the suit. 
3. By the act or God. 
Contract becomes impossible to be performed. 
N. B. The mode or defence which dentes the right, Is applicable where 




To the Right Honorable the Earl of Eldon, Lord High
Chancellor of Great Britain.
Humbly complaining, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordship.
2. When the Seals are in Commission.
To the Right Honorable A. B., C. D., and E. F., Lords,
Commissioners for the custody of the Great Seal of
Great Britain.
Humbly, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordships.
3. In the Exchequer.
To the Right Honorable Frederick Robinson, Chancellor
and Under Treasurer of His Majesty’s Court of Ex-
chequer at Westminster; the Right Honorable Sir
Richard Richards, Knight, Lord Chief Baron of the
same Court, and the rest of the Barons there.
Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Honors.
4. In the Chancery of Lancaster.
To the Right Honorable Charles Earl of Liverpool, Chan-
cellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and one of his Ma-
jesty’s Most Honorable Privy Council.
Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lordships.
5. In the Great Sessions of Wales.














































































































































BILLS (ADDRESS OF.) 
1. In Chancery. 
'fo the Right Honorable the Earl of Eldon, Lord High 
Chancellor of Great Britain. 
Humbly complaining, etc ............•......... Lordship. 
2. When the Seals are in Commission. 
To the Right Honorable A. B., C. D., and E. F., Lords, 
Commissioners for the custody of the Great Seal of 
Great Britain. 
Humbly, etc ......................•.......••• Lordships. 
3. In the Excltequer.. 
To the Right Honorable Frederick Robinson, Chancellor 
and Under Treasurer of His Majesty's Court of Ex-
chequer at Westminster; the Right Honorable Sir 
Richard Richards, Knight, Lord Chief Baron of the 
same Court, and the rest of the Barons there. 
Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . .....................•.. Honors. 
4. In the Chancery of Lancaster. 
To the Right Honorable uharles Earl of Liverpool, Chan-
cellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and one of his Ma-
jesty's Most Honorable Privy Council. 
H urn bly, etc. . ..................•.........••. Lordships. 
6. In the Great Sessions of Wales. 
To the Honorable A. B. and C. D., Esqrs., his Majesty's 
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Justices of the Great Sessions for the several Counties
of Glamorgan, Brecon and Radnor.
Humbly, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lordships.
I 6. In the Lord Mayor’s Court.
To the Right Honorable A. B., Lord Mayor of the City of
London, and the Worshipful, his Brethren, the Alder-
men of the same City. '
Humbly, etc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lordship and Worships.
COMMENCEMEN T.
1. In Chancery.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your orator, A. B., of ( place of abode and addition), that
etc., etc.
2. In the Exchequer.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Honors, your
orator, A. B., of, etc., debtor and accountant to his Ma-
jesty,as by the records of their honorable court, and other-
wise it doth or may appear, that, etc.
8. By a Peer.
Complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, your ora-
tor, the Right Honorable A. Earl of B., (or as the case may
be), that, etc.
4. By a Body Corporate.
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your
orators, the Mayor, bailiffs, and commonalty of the City
of A., that, etc.
5. By Creditors, Leyatees, etc., on behalf of themselves
and other Creditors.















































































































































Justices of the Great Sessions for the several Counties 
of Glamorgan, Brecon and Radnor. 
Hum\lly, etc ..•.•...•...•...•.•.•...•..••...• Lordships. 
6. ln the Lo1•d Kayor'a Court. 
To the Right Honorable A. B., Lord Mayor of the City of 
Lond~n, anti the Worshipful, his Brethren, the Alder-
men of the same City. 
Humbly, etc ..•••......•..•.•...• Lordship and Worships. 
COMMENCEMENT. 
1. · In Chancery. 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, 
your orator, A. B., of (place of abode and addition), that 
etc., etc. 
~. In the EflJchequer. 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Honora, your 
orator, A. B., of, etc., debtor and accountant to his Ma. 
jesty, as by the records of their honorable court, and other-
wise it doth or may appear, that, etc. 
a. By a; Peer. 
Complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, your ora-
tor, the Right Honorable A. Earl of B., (or aa the caae may 
be), that, etc. 
4,. By a Body Corporate. 
Humbly complainings show unto your Lordship, your 
orators, the Mayor, bailiffs, and commoualty of the Oity 
of A., that, etc. 
6. By Creditors, Legateea, etc., on behalf of tn.emaelvea 
and othe1• Creditors. 
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your 
126 romns.
orators and oratrixes, A. B., of, etc., 0. D., of, etc., E. F.,
of, etc., spinster, G. H., of, etc., on behalf o|‘ themselves
and all other the bond and simple contract creditors (or
legatees or newt of kin) of I. J ., late of, etc., deceased, who
shall come in and contribute to the expenses of this suit,
that, etc.
6. By an Infant.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your orator, A. B., an infant under the age of 21 years,
that is to say, of the age of —— years, or thereabouts, by
C. D., of, etc., his (relation) and next friend, that, etc.
7. By a Feme Covert.
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship,
your orator and oratrix, A. B., of, etc., and (3., his wife,
that, etc.
8. By a Feme Covert, claiming in opposition to her
Husband.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your oratrix, C., the wife of A. B., etc., by D. E., her next
friend, that, etc.
9. By a Feme Covert whose Husband is an Exile, etc.
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship,
your oratrix, A. B., of, etc., the wife of C. B., late of, etc.,
who hath by due course of law been sentenced to trans-
portation to parts beyond the sea, where he now is (or who
hath abjured the realm, or who is an alien enemy). that,
etc.
10. By a Lunatic.
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your
orators, A. B., of, etc., and C. D., late of, etc., but now of
etc., against whom a commission of lunacy has lately been














































































































































orators and oratrixes, A. H., of, etc., C. D .• of, etc., E. F., 
of, etc., spinster, G. H., of, etc., on behalf of themselves 
and all other the bond and simple contract creditors ( 01' 
legatees or neaJt of kin) of I. J., late of, etc., deceased, who 
shall come in and contribute to the expenses of this suit, 
that, etc. 
6. By an Infant. 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, 
your orator, A. B., an infant under the age of 21 years, 
that is to say, of the age of --years, or thereabouts, by 
C. D., of, etc., his (relation) and next friend, that, etc. 
7. By a Ferne Covert. 
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, 
your orator and oratrix, A. B., of, etc., and C., his wife, 
that, etc. 
8. By a Feme Covert, claimin,q in opposition to her 
Husband. 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, 
your oratrix, C., the wife of A. B., etc., by D. E., her next 
friend, that, etc. 
9. By a Feme Covert whose Husband is an Er1Jile, etc. 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Lordship, 
your oratrix, A. B., of, etc., the wife of C. B., late of, ate., 
who hath by due course of law b~en sentenced to trans-
portation to parts beyond the Rea, where he no\v is (or who 
hath abjured the realm, or w4o ia an alien enemy) .. that, 
etc. 
10. By a Lunatic. 
Humbly complaining, show unto your Lordship, your 
orators, A. B., of, etc., and C. D., late of, etc., but now of 
etc., against whom ·a con1mission of lunacy has lately been 
awarded and issued. and is now in force; and under which 
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commission the said C. D. was duly found and declared to
be a lunatic, and your orator, A. B., appointed committee
of his estate; that,etc.
11. Information on behalf of the Crown.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his
Majesty, that, etc.
12. Information on behalf of those who partake of the
Prerogative.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, on behalf of his
Majesty, and the masters, fellows, and scholars of Trinity
College, Cambridge, (or as the case may be) that, etc.
13. Information with a Relator.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, at and by the re-
lation of C. D., clerk, vicar of the parish of E., and F. G.
and H. J., church wardens of the same parish, for and on
behalf of themselves and the rest of the parishoners of
the said parish, (or as the case may be) that, etc.
14. Information and Bill.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,
Knight, his Majesty’s Attorney General, at and by the re-
lation of C. D. and E. F., of, etc., and humbly complain-
ing show unto your Lordship, the said C. D. and E. F.,
that, etc., (statement). And his Majesty’s Attorney Gen-
era], by the relation aforesaid, informeth ; and your orators
further show unto your Lordship, that, etc.
15. Information on behalf of a Lunatic.
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B.,














































































































































commission the said C. D. 'vas duly found and declared to 
be a lunatic, an.d your orator, A. B., appointed committee 
of his estate; that, etc. 
11. Information on behalf"' of the Crown. 
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B., 
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his 
Majesty, that, etc. 
12. Information on behalf of those who partake of the 
Prero.qative. 
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B., 
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of his 
Majesty, and the masters, fellows, and scholars of Trinity 
College, Cambridge, (or as the case may be) t.hat, etc. 
13. Information with a Relator. 
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B., 
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, at and by the re-
lation of C. D., clerk, vicar of the parish of E., and F. G. 
and H. J., church wardens of the same parish, for and on 
behalf of themselves and the rest of the parishoners of 
the said parish, (or as the case may be) that, etc. 
14. Information and Bill. 
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B., 
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, at and by the re-
lation of C. D. and E. F., of, etc., and humbly cotnplain-
ing show unto your Lord'3hip, the said C. D. and E. F., 
that, etc., (.~tatement). And his Majesty's Attorney Gen-
eral, by the relation aforesaid, informeth; and your orators 
further show unto your Lordship, that, etc. 
15. Information on behalf of a Lu,natic. 
Informing, showeth unto your Lordship, Sir A. B., 
Knight, his Majesty's Attorney General, on behalf of C. 
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D., a lunatic, at and by the relation of E. F., of, etc-., that,
etc.
16. Information for the Queen.
Information, showeth unto your Lordship, A. B., Esq.,
Attorney General of her Majesty the Queen Consort,
that, etc.
Statement of Requests and Charge 0/ Confederacy.
And your orator hath accordingly, both by himself
and his agents, frequently and in a friendly manner ap-
plied to and requested the said C. D. and E. F., (the de-
fendants) to, etc.; and your orator well hoped that such
his just and reasonable requests would have been com-
plied with, as in justice and equity they ought to have
been. But now so it is, may it please your lordship, the
said C. D. and E. F., combining and confederating with
divers other persons at present unknown to your orator,
but whose names, when discovered, your orator prays he
may be at liberty to insert in -this his bill, with apt and
proper words to charge them as parties defendant hereto,
and contriving how to injure and oppress your orator in
the premises, the said C. D. and E. F., absolutely refuse
to comply with your orator’s aforesaid reasonable requests ;
and to countenance such their unjust conduct, they some-
times pretend that (pretences and charges). All Which
actings, pretences, and refusals of the said confederates,
are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tendto
the manifest wrong and injury of your orator in the prem-
ises.
Clause of. Equity, and Commencement of the Interrogat-
ing Part.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-
tor is without remedy in the premises at common law,














































































































































D., a lunatic, at and by the relation of E. F., of, etc .. , that, 
etc. 
16. Information for the Queen. 
Information, showeth unto your Lordship, A. B., Esq., 
Attorney General of her Majesty the Queen Consort, 
that, etc. 
Statement of Requests and Charge of Confederacy. 
And your orator hath accordingly, both by-himself 
and his agents, frequently and in a friendly manner ap-
plied to and requested the said 0. D. and E. F., (the de-
fendants) to, etc.; and your orator well hoped that such 
his just and reasonable requests would have been com-
plied with, as in justice and equity they ought to have 
been. But now so it is, tnay it please your lordship, the 
said 0. D. and E. F., combining and confederating with 
divers other persons at present unknown to your orator, 
but whose names, when discovered, your orator prays he 
may be at liberty to insert in this his bill, with apt and 
proper words to charge them as parties defendant hereto, 
and contriving how to injure and oppress your orator in 
the premises, the said 0. D. and E. F., absolutely refuse 
to comply with your orator's aforesaid reasonable requests; 
and to countenance such their unjust conduct, they some-
times pretend that (pretences and char.qes ). All which 
actings, pretences, and refusals of the said confederates, 
are contt:ary to equity and good con~ci~nce, and tend· to 
the manifest \Vrong and injury of your orator in the prem-
ises. 
Clause of. Equity, and Cotnmenoement of the Interro.qat-
ing Part. 
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora. 
tor is without remedy in the premises at common law, 
and cannot have adequate relief except in a court of 
FORMS. 129
equity, where matters of this sort are properly cognizable
and relievable; to the end that the said C. D. and E. F.,
and their confederates, when discovered, may upon their
several and respective corporal oaths, according to the
best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,
remembrance, information, and belief, full, true, perfect,
and distinct answers make to all and singular the matters
aforesaid, and that as fully and particularly as if the same
were here repeated, and they thereunto severally and re-
spectively, distinctly interrogated; and more especially
that the said defendants, C. D. and E. F., may, in manner
aforesaid, answer and set forth whether, etc.
SPECIAL INQUIRIES.
1. As to Applications and Requests.
And whether your orator hath not by himself or
agents, or how otherwise, made such applications and re-
quests to the said defendants, as are hereinbefore in that
behalf mentioned, or some such or the like, or any, and
what other applications and requests in respect of the sev-
eral matters aforesaid, and whether the said defendants
have not refused to comply therewith, and why?
2. As to a Deed set forth in the Bill.
Whether such indenture, bearing date on or about
the—— day of—, as hereinbefore particularly men-
tioned, was not made between such parties as hereinbe-
; fore stated; or whether some indenture of some and what
date was not made between some and which of the said
parties, and was not of some such or the like purport or















































































































































equity, where matters of this sort are properly cognizable 
and relievable; to the end that the said C. D. and E. F., 
and their confederates, whe11 discavered, may upon their 
seve1·al and respective corporal oaths, accordinf,t to the 
best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge, 
~emembrance, information, and belief, full, true, perfect, 
and distinct answers make to all and singular the matters 
aforesaid, and that as fully and particularly as if the same 
were here repeated, and they thereunto severally and re-
spectively, distinctly interrogated; and more especially 
that the said defendants, 0. D. and E. F., may, in manner 
aforesaid, answer and set forth whether, etc. 
SPECIAL INQUIRIES. 
1. As to Applications and Requests. 
And wttether your orator hath not by himself or · 
agents, or how otherwise, made such applications and re-
quests to the said defendants, as are hereinbefore in that 
behalf mentioned, or some such or the like, or any, and 
what other applications and requests in respect of the sev-
eral matters aforesaid, and whether the said defendants 
have not refused to comply therewith, and why~ 
S. As to a IJeed set forth in the Bill . 
.. 
Whether such . indenture, bearing· date on or about 
the-- day of--, as hereinbefore particularly men-
tioned, was not made between such parties as hereinbe-
l fore stated; or whether some indenture of some and what 
date was not made bet\veen some and which of the said 
parties, and was not of some such or the like. purport or 
effect, or how otherwise. 
9 
130 roams.
3. For an Account of Money had and received.
And that the said defendants may set forth an ac-
count of all and every sum and sums of money received
by them or either of them or by any person or
persons by their or either of their order, or for their or
either of their use, for or in respect of the said (as the case
may be), and when and from whom, and from what in
particular all and every such sums were respectively re-
ceived, and how the same respectively have been applied
or disposed of.
4. For an Account of the Rents and Profits of a Testa-
tor’s Real Estate.
And the said defendants may set forth a full, true,
and just rental and particular of the real estates, whereof
or whereto the said testator was seized or\entitled in fee
simple, at the time of his death; and also a full, true and
particular account of all and every sum and sums of
money, which hath or have been received by them, or
any other person or persons by their or either of their or-
der, or for their or either of their use, for or in respect of
the rents and profits of the said estates, or any part there-
of; and whether any, and which of the said estates, or any
part or parts thereof, have or hath not been sold or dis-
posed of, and at what price or prices respectively, and
when and to whom; and whether such price or prices re-
spectively have or hath not been paid, and to whom; and
if not, why not.
5. For an Account of Personals.
And that the said defendants may discover and set
forth a full, true, and particular account of all and singu-
lar the personal estate and effects of the said testator, and
of every part thereof, which hath been possessed by or














































































































































3. For an Account of .Money had and received. 
And that the said defendants may set forth an .ac-
count of all and every sum and sums of money received 
by them or either of them or by any person or 
persons by their or either of their order, or for their or 
either of their use, for or in respect of the said (a-s the case 
may be), and when and from whom, and from what in 
particular all and every such sums were respectively re-
ceived, and how the same respectively have been applied 
or disposed of. 
4.. For an Account of the Rents and Profits of a Testa-
tor's Real Estate. 
And the said defendants may set forth a full, true, 
and just rental and particular of the real estates, whereof 
or whereto the said testator was seized or.entitled in fee 
simple, at the time of his death; and also a full, true and 
particular account of all and every sum and sums of 
money, which hath or have been received py them, or 
any other person or persons by their or either of their or-
der, or for their or either of their use, for or in respect of 
the rents and profits of the said estates, or any part there-
of; and whether any, and which of the said estates, or any 
part or parts thereof, have or hath not been sold or dis-
posed of, and at what price or prices respectively, and 
when and to whom; and whether such price or prices re-
spectively have or hath not been paid, and to whom; and 
if not, why not. 
5. For an Account of Personals.· 
And that the said defendants may discover and set 
forth a full~ true, and particular account of all and singu-
lar the personal estate and effects of the said testator, and 
of every part thereof, which hath been possessed by or 
come to the hands of the said defendants, or either of 
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them, or to the hands of any other person or persons, by
their or either of their order, or for their or either of their
use; with the particular nature, quantities, qualities, and
true and utmost values thereof, and of every part thereof
respectively; and how the same, and every part thereof,
hath been applied and disposed of; and whether any and
what part thereof, now remains unapplied and undisposed
of, and why ; and whether any, and what part of such
personal estate remains outstanding, to any, and what
amount, and why; and that the said defendants may also
set forth an account of the debts due from the said testator,
and of his funeral expenses and legacies; and whether
any, and which of such debts are outstanding; and why.
6’. For the production of Deeds and Papers.
And that the said defendants may set forth a list or
schedule and description of every deed, book, account,
letter, paper or writing relating to the matters aforesaid,
or any of them, or wherein or whereupon there is any
note, memorandum, or writing, relating in any manner
thereto, which now are, or ever were, in their or either,
and which, of their possession or power, and may particu-
larly describe which thereof now are in their, or either,
and which of their possession or power, and may deposit
the same in the hands of their clerk or clerks in court, for
the usual purposes; and otherwise that the said defendants
may account for such as are not in their possession or
power.
1. Prayer for General Relief.
And that your orator may have such further and
other relief in the premises, as to your Lordship shall
seem meet, and the nature and justice of the case may re-















































































































































them, or to the hands of any other person or persons, by 
their or either of their order, or for their or either of their 
use; with the particular nature, quantities, qualities, and 
true and utmost values thereof, and of every part thereof 
respectively ; and how the same, and every part thereof, 
hath been applied and disposed of; and whether any and 
what part thereof, now remains unapplied and undisposed 
of, and why; and whether any, and what part of such 
personal estate remains outstanding, to any, and what 
amount, and why; and that the said defendant~ rnay also 
set forth an account of the debts due from the said testator, 
and of his funeral expenses and legacies; and wheth~r 
an~', and which of such debts are outstanding; and why. 
6. Ji'or the production of Deeds n/nd Papers. 
And that the said defendants tnay set forth a list or 
schedule and description of every deed, book, account, 
letter, paper or writing relating to the matters aforesaid, 
or any of t.hem, or wherein or whereupon there is any 
note, memorandum, or writing .. relating in any manner 
thereto, which now are, or ever were, in their or either, 
and which, of their possession or power, and may particu-
larly describe which thereof now are in their, or either, 
and which of their possession or power, and may deposit 
the same in the hands of their clerk or clerks in court, for 
the usual purposes; and otherwise that the said defendants 
may account for such a~ are not in their possession or 
power. 
1. Prayer for General Rel·ief. 
And that your orator may have such further and 
other relief in the premises, as to your Lordship shall 
seem meet, and the nature and justice of the case may re-
quire, may it please, etc. 
132 I I roams.
2. Prayer of Bill of Revivor.
To the end therefore that the said suit and proceed-
ings therein may stand revived against the said C. D. and
be restored to the same plight and condition as the same
were in at the time of (abatement), or that the said C. D.
may show good cause to the contrary, may it please, etc.
3. Conclusion of Prayer in a Bill of Discovery.
And that your orator may have a full disclosure and
discovery of all and every the matters and things afore-
said, may it please, etc.
4. Prayer of a bill to perpetuate Testimony.
And that your orator may be at liberty to have his
witnesses examined to the several matters and things
hereinbefore mentioned, so that the testimony of the said
witnesses may be preserved and perpetuated; and that
your orator may be at liberty on all future occasions, to
read and make use of the same, as he shall be advised,
may it please, etc.
Clause of Equity in the same.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-
tor cannot have the said witnesses examined in order to
perpetuate their testimony, without the aid of a court of
equity, to the end, etc.
5. Prayer of Bill of lnterpleader.
And that the said O. D. and E. F. may be decreed to
interplead and adjust their said several claims and
demands between themselves, your orator being willing
and desirous that the said (demand) should be paid to
such of said defendants as shall appear to be entitled















































































































































f. Prayer of Bill of Revivor. 
To the end thPrefore tha~ the said suit and proceed-
ings therein may stand revived against the said 0. D. and 
be restored to the same plight and condit1on as the same 
were in at the time of (abatement), or that the said 0. D. 
may show good cause to the contrary, may it. please, etc. 
3. Conclusion f)( Prayer in a Bill of .Discove·'I'Y· 
And that your orator may have a full disclosure and 
discovery of all and every the matters and thitigs afore-
said, may it please, etc. 
#. Prayer of a bill to perpetuate Testimony. 
And that your orator may be at liberty to have his 
witnesses examined to the several matters and · things 
hereinbefore mentioned, so that the testimony of the said 
witnesses may be preserved and perpetuated; and that 
your orator may be at liberty on all future occasions, to 
read and make use of the same, as he shall be advised, 
may it please, etc. 
Clause of Equity in the same. 
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your. ora-
tor cannot have the said witnesses examined in order to 
perpetuate their testimony, without the aid of a court of 
equity, to the end, etc. 
6. Prayer of Bill of Interpleader. 
And that the said 0. D. and E. F. may be decreed to 
interplead and adjust their said several claims and 
demands between themselves, your orator being willing 
and desirous that the said (demand) should be paid to 
such of said defendants as shall appear to be entitled 
thereto, and your orator doth hereby offer to pay the same 
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into the hands of the accountant general of this honorable
court, to be disposed of as this honorable court shall direct
(if injunction)—
6. Prayer for an Injunction.
And that in the meantime, the said C. D. and E. F.,
their counsel, solicitors, agents and attorneys may be
restrained by the order and injunction of this honorable
court, .from prosecuting or commencing any action or
actions at law against your orator, for or in respect of the
several matters aforesaid, and that your orator, etc. (gen-
eral relief.)
Clause of Equity, in a Bill of Interpleader.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-
tor is remediless in the premises, without the aid of a
court of equity where the said several claimants may
interplead and settle and adjust their several rights and
demands between themselves, so that your orator may be
enabled to pay the said (demand) with safety, to the end,
etc.
7. Conclusion of Certiorari Bill.
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as for\want
of jurisdiction in the said (court below) your orator is
remediless there; and your orator is advised that he is
entitled to have a writ of certiorari issued from this hon-
orable court, and directed to (court below) commanding
him to certify and remove said bill, and all proceedings
thereon, unto this honorable court; may it therefore
I please, etc.
8. Prayer of Bill of Review.
And that for the reasons aforesaid, the said cause and














































































































































into the bands of the accountant general of ~hi~ honorable 
court, to be disposed of as this honorable court shall direct 
(if injunction)-
6. Prayer for an Injunction. 
And that in the meantime, the said C. D. and E. F., 
their counsel, solicitors, agents and attorneys may be 
restrained by the order and injunction of this honorable. 
court, . from prosecuting or co~n1encing any action or 
actions at law against your orator, for or in respect of the 
several matters aforesaid, and that your orator, etc. (gen· . 
eral relief.) 
Clause of Equity, in a Bill of Interpleader. 
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your ora-
tot· 'is remediless in the premises, without the aid of a 
court of equity where the ·said several claimants may 
interplead and settle and adjust their several rights and 
demands between themselves, so that your orator may be 
enabled to pay the said (demand) with safety, to the end, 
etc. 
7. Ooncluaion of Certiorari Bill. 
In consideration whereof, and· forasmuch as for ·want 
of juri~diction in the said (court below) your orator is 
remediless there; and your orator is advised that he is 
entitled to have a writ of certiorari issued from this hon-
orable court, and directed to (court below) commanding 
him to certify and remove said bill, and all proceedings 
• thereon, unto this honorable court; may it therefore 
. please, etc. 
8. Pray.er of Bill of Review. 
And that for the reasons aforesaid, the said cause and 
decree therein pronounced, may be reviewed by this hon-
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orable court, and that the said decree may be reversed for
error apparent therein, and no further proceedings taken
thereon; may it please, etc. "
DEMURRERS, PLEAS AND ANSWERS.
(Title of.)
The Answer (or Plea, or Demurrer) of C. D., the defend-
ant (or one of the defendants) to the bill of complaint
of A. B., complainant.
Joint and Several Answers.
The joint and several Answer of C. D. and E. F. the
defendants (or two of the defendants) to the bill of
complaint of A. B., complainant.
I nfant’s Answer.
The Answer of 0. D., an infant under the age of twenty-
one years, by E. F., his guardian, one of the defend-
ants to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant.
1. Commencement and Conclusion of an Answer.
This defendant, saving and reserving to himself now,
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit
and advantage of exception, which can or may be had or
taken to the said complainant’s said bill of complaint, for
answer thereto, or to so much thereof as this defendant is
advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to
make answer unto, and answers and says, etc.
(conclude.) And this defendant denies all and all man-
ner, etc.
2. Joint Answer.
These defendants, etc., (as before) each answering for














































































































































orable court, and that the said decree may be· reversed for 
error apparent therein, and no further proceedings taken 
thereon; may it please, etc. ! 
DEMURRERS, PLEAS AND ANSWERS. 
(Title of.) 
The Answer (or Plea, or Demurrer) of 0. D., the defend-
ant (or one of the defendants) to the bill of complaint 
of A. B., complainant. 
Joi1it and Several Answers. 
The joint and several Answer of C. D. and E. F. the 
defendants (or two of the defendants) to the bill of 
complaint of A. B., complainant. 
Infant's Answer. 
rrhe Answer of 0. D., an infant under the age of twenty-
one years, by E. F., his guardian, one of the defend-
, ants to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant. 
1. Commencement and Conclusion of an Answer. 
This defendant, saving and reserving to himself now, 
and at all times hereafter, all and all manner of benefit 
and advantage of exception, which can or may be had or 
taken to the said complainant's said bill of complaint, for 
answer thereto, or to so 1nuch thereof as this defendant is 
advised is in anywise material or necessary for him to 
make answer unto, and answers and says, etc. 
(conclude.) And this defendant denies all and all man-
ner~ etc. 
~. Joint Answer. 
These defendants, etc., (as before) each answering for 
hirnself (and herself) and not the one for the other, 
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jointly and severally answer and say, etc.; and these
defendants deny all, etc.
3. Infant’s Answer.
This defendant, answering by his said guardian, saith,
that he is an infant of the age of years, or there-
abouts, and he therefore submits his rights and interests
in the matters in question in this cause, to the protection
of this honorable court; without this, that, etc.
.
4. Title of Further Answer, and of Answer to
Amended Bill.
The further Answer of C. D., defendant to-the (original)
bill, (and his answer to the amended bill) of com-
plaint of A. B., complainant.
This defendant, saving and reserving to himself the
same benefit of exception to the said (original) (and
amended) bill, as by his former answer to the said (orig-
inal) bill is saved and reserved, for answer thereto, etc.;
(conclude) without this, that, etc.
5. Answer and Disclaimer.
The Answer and Disclaimer of C. D., one of the defend-
ants, to the bill of complaint of A. B., complainant.
This defendant, etc.; (conclude.) And this defendant
saith, that he never had, or claimed or pretended to have,
nor has he now, nor does he claim, or pretend to have any
right, title, or interest of, in, or to the said (matter in
question) or any part thereof; and this defendant dis-
claims all right and title of, in or to the same, and every
part thereof; and this defendant denies, etc.
6. He Answer of a Formal Party. who is a stranger to
the Facts charged. ‘














































































































































jointly and severally answer and say, etc.; and these 
defendants deny alJ, etc. 
9. Infant's Answer. 
~rhis defendant, answering by his said guardian, saith, 
that he is an infant of the age of years, or there-
abouts, and he therefore submits his rights and interests 
in the matters in question in this cause, to the protection 
of this honorable court.; without this, that, etc. 
4. Title of Further Answer, and of Answer to 
Amended Bill. 
'I' he further Answer of C. D., defendant to· the {original) 
bill, (and his answer to the amended bill) of com-
plai~t of A. B., complainant. 
This defendant, saving and reserving to himself the 
same benefit of exception to the said {original) {and 
amended) bill, as by his former answer to the said { orig-
inal) bill is saved and reserved, for answer thereto, etc.; 
(conclude) without this, that, etc. 
5. Answer and Disclaimer. 
The Answer and Disclairner of C. D., one of the defend-
ants, to the bill of complaint of A. B., cornplainant. 
'fhis defendant .. etc.; { concl~ede.) And this defendant. 
saith~ that he never had, or claimed or pretended to have, 
nor has he now, nor does he claim, or pretend to have any 
right, title, or interest of, in, or to the said {matter in 
qtteation) or any part thereof; and this defendant dis-
claims all ri~ht and title of, in or to the same, and every 
part thereof; and this defendant denies, ete. 
6. The .Answer of a Forrnal Party .. who is a atran,qer to 
th.e Facts charged. 
This defendant., saving and reserving to himself, etc., 
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answers and says, that he is a stranger to all and singular
the matters and things in said complainants bill of com-
plaint contained, and therefore leaves the complainant to
make such proof thereof as he shall be able to produce,
without this, that, etc.
N. B. This is the usual answer of the Attorney General.
7. Conclusion of an Answer, claiming the same Benefit
of Defence as if the Bill had been-demurred to for
want of equity.- ‘
And this defendant submits to this honorable court,
that all and every of the matters in the said complainant’s,
bill mentioned and complained of, are matters which may
be tried and determined at law. and with respect to which
the said complainant is not entitled to any relief from a
court of equity; and this defendant hopes he shall have
the same benefit of this defence as if he had demurred to
the said complainant‘s bill; and this defendant denies,
etc.
THE COMMENCEMENT AND CONCLUSION OF A
' DEMURRER.
1. To the whole Bill.
This defendant, by protestation, not confessing or
acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in the
said complainant’s bill contained to be true, in such man-
ner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth
demur thereto; and for cause of demurrer showeth that,
etc. (conclude.) Wherefore, and for divers other causes
of demurrer, appearing in said bill, this defendant humbly
demands the ‘judgment of this honorable court, whether
he shall be compelled to make any further or other














































































































































answers and says, that he is a stranger to all and singular 
the matters and things in said complainants bill of com-
plaint contain~d, and therefore leaves the complainant to 
make such proof thereof as he shall be able to produce, 
without this, that, etc. 
N. B. Tbls Is the nsual answer or the Attorney General. 
7. Conclusion of an Answer, claiming the same Benefit 
of Defence as if tne Bill had been·demurred to for 
want of equity .. 
And this defendant submits to this honorable court, 
that all and every of the ·matters in the said complainant's. 
bill mentioned and con1plained of, are matters which may 
be tried and determined at law, and with respect to which 
the said complainant 1s not entitled to any relieJ from a 
court of equity; and this defendant hopes he shall have 
the same benefit of this defence as if he had demurred to 
the said complainant"s bill; and this defendant denies, 
etc. 
THE COMMENCEMENT AND CONCLUSION OF A 
DEMURRER. 
1. To the whole Bill. 
ThiR defendant, by protestation, not confe-ssing or 
acknowledging all or any of the matters and things in the 
said complainant's bill contained to .be true, in such man-
ner and form as the same are therein set forth, doth 
demur thereto; and for cause of detnurrer showeth that, 
etc. (conclude.) Wherefore, and for divers other causes 
of demurrer, appearing in said bill, this defendant humbly 
demands the 'jurlgment of this honorable court, whether 
he shall be compelled to make any further or other 
anRwer to the saiu bill; and prays to be hence dismissed, 
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with his reasonable costs, in this behalf most wrongfully
sustained.
2. Demurrer to Part of the Bill, and Answer to the
Residue.
This defendant, by protestation, etc., as to so much of
the said bill as seeks (parts demurred to), doth demur;
and for cause of demurrer showeth, that, etc. (conclude.)
Wherefore, and for divers other causes of demurrer,
appearing in the said bill, this defendant humbly demands
the judgment of this honorable court, whether he shall
be compelled to make any further answer unto such part
of the said bill as is so demurred unto aforesaid; and as
to the residue of said bill this defendant not waiving his
sa-id demurrer, but relying thereon, and saving and reserv-
ing to himself, etc.‘ (as before, aide answer.)
8. Commencement and Conclusion of a Plea.
This defendant, by protestations, etc. (as in demur-
rer), doth plead thereto, and for plea saith, etc. ( conclude.)
All which matters and things this defendant doth aver to
be true, and is ready to prove, as this honorable court
shall direct. Wherefore, he doth plead thepsame (in bar,
or as the case may be) to the said bill, and humbly
demands the judgment, etc. (as in demurrer.)
4. Plea to part and Answer to residue of Bill.
(Is the same as Demurrer and Answer, mutatis mutandis.)
EXCEPTIONS.
1. To an Answer.
Between A. B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Complainant,
and C. D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defendant.














































































































































with bis reasonable costs, in this behalf most wrongfully 
sustained. 
~. .Demurrer to Part of the Bill, and .Answer to the 
Residue. 
This defendant, by protestation, etc., as to so much of 
the said bill as seeks (parts demurred to), doth demur; 
.. and for cause of demurrer showeth, that, etc. (conclude.) 
Wherefore, and for divers other causes of demurrer, 
appearing in tbe said bill, this defendant humbly demands 
the judgment of this honorable court, whether he shall 
be compelled to make any further answer unto such part 
of the said bill as is so demurred unto aforesaid ; and as 
to the residue of said bill this defendant not waiving his 
said detnurrer, but relying thereon, and saving and reserv-
ing to himself, etc.. (as before, vide answer.) 
3. Commencement and Conclusion of a Plea. 
This defendant, by protestations, etc. (as in demur-
rer), doth plead thereto, and for plea saith, etc. (conclude.) 
All which matters and things this defendant doth aver to 
be true, and is ready to prove, as this honorable eourt 
shall direct. Wherefore, he .doth plead the_ same (in bar, 
or- as tn.e case may be) to the said bill, and humbly 
demands the judgment, etc. (as in ·demurrer.) 
4. Plea to part and Answer to rea~due of Bill. 
(Is the ja·me as Detnurrer and Answer, mutatis mutandis.) 
EXCEPTIONS. 
1. To an Answer. 
Between A. B ......................•••.••• Co1nplainant, 
and 0. D.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...••..•••.•.• Defendant. 
Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the answer 
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put in by the said defendant, C. D., to the said com-
plainant’s bill of complaint.
1st. For that the said defendant, C. D., has not, to
the best and utmost of his knowledge, remembrance,
information and belief, answered and set forth whether
(the interrogatory verbatim as in the bill.)
2d. For that the said defendant hath not in manner
aforesaid, answered and set forth whether, etc.
In all which particulars the said answer of the said
defendant, C. D., is, as the said complainant is advised,
imperfect, insufiicient and evasive; and the said com-
plainant therefore excepts thereto, and prays that the
said defendant, C. D., may put in a further and better
answer to the said bill of complaint.
.





Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the report of
E. F., Esq., one of the masters of this honorable
court, to whom this cause stands referred, bearing
date the day of
First exception: For that the said master has, in and
by his said report, certified, etc. (as the case may be.)
Whereas, the said master ought to have certified that, etc.
Second exception: For that the said master has cer-
tified, etc.
In all which particulars the report of the said master is,
as the said defendant is advised, erroneous, and the















































































































































put in by the said defendant, C. D., to the said com-
plainant's bill of complaint. 
1st. For that the said defendant, C. D., has not, to 
the best and utmost of his knowledge, remetnbrance, 
information and belief, answered and set forth whether 
( tlte interro,qatory verbatim as in the bill.) 
2d. For that the said defendant hath not in manner 
aforesaid, answered and set forth whether, etc. 
In all which particulars the said answer of the said 
defendant, C. D., is, as the said complainant is advised, 
imperfect, insufficient and evasive; and the said com-
plainant therefore excepts thereto, and prays that the 
said defendant, 0. D., n1ay put in a further and better 
answer to the said bill of complaint. 
2. EaJceptions to Master's Report. 
In Chancery. 
Between and lA. B., Complainant, C. D., Defendant. _ 
Exceptions taken by the said complainant to the report of 
E. F., Esq., one of the masters of this honorable 
court, to who1n this cause stands referred, bearing 
date the day of 
First exception: For that the said master has, in and 
by his said report, certified, etc. (as the. case may be.) 
Whereas, the said master ought to have certified that, etc. 
Second exception: For that the said master has cer-
tified, etc. 
In all which particulars the report of the said master is, 
as the said defendant is advised, erroneous, and the 
said defendant appeals therefrom to the judgment of 
this honorable court. 
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INTERROGATORIES.
For the Eacamination of Witnesses.
In Chancery.
Between A. B., Complainant, and C. D. and E. F.,
Defendant.
Interrogatories to be exhibited to witnesses to be pro-
duced, sworn and examined in this cause, now depend-
ing and at issue in this honorable court.
On the part of the said complainant:
1st. Do you know the parties, complainant and
defendant, in the title of these interrogatories named, or
any and which of them, and how long have you known
them, or any and which of them, respectively? Declare
the truth of the several matters by this interrogatory
inquired after, according to the best of your knowledge,
remembrance and belief, with your reasons at large.
2d Interrogatory: Whether or no, etc. (as the case
may be), declare, etc.
Lastly: Do you know, or can you set forth, any other
matter or thing which may in anywise tend to the benefit
or advantage of the complainant in this cause? If yea,
set forth the same, and all the circumstances and particu-
lars thereof, as if you had been interrogated thereto,
according to the best of your knowledge, remembrance
and belief, with the reasons for such your belief, fully and
at large.
Interroyatories before lhe Master (title of).
In Chancery.
Between A. B., and C. D., Complainants, and E. F.
and G. H., Defendants.
Interrogatories to be exhibited before I. J., Esq., one of















































































































































For the Er»aminatio11, of Witnesaea. 
In Chancery. 
Between A. B., Con1plainant, and 0. D. and E. F., 
Defendant. 
Interrogatories to be exhibited to witnesses to be pro-
duced, swor~ and examined in this cause, now depend-
ing and at issue in this honora~le court. 
On the part of the said complainant: 
1st. Do you know the parties, complainant and 
defendant, in the title of these interrogatories named, or 
any and which of t.hem~ and how long have you known 
thetn, or any and whtch of them, respectively~ Declare 
the truth of the several matters by this interrogatory 
inquired after, according· to the best of your knowledge, 
remembrance and belief, with your reasons at large. 
2d Interrogatory: Whether or no, etc. (aa the caae 
may be), declare, etc. 
Lastly: Do you know, or can you set forth, any other 
matter or thing which may in anywise tend to t.he benefit 
or advantage of the complainant in this cause~ If yea, 
set. forth the same, and all the circumstances and particu-
lars thereof,' as if you had been interrogated thereto, 
according to the best of your knowledge, remembrance 
and belief, with the reasons for such your qelief, fully and 
at large. 
Interrogatories before lhe ¥aster (title of). 
In Chancery. 
Between A. B., and C. D., Complainants, and E. F. 
and G. H., Defendants. 
Interrogatories to be exhibited before I. J., Esq., one of 
the masters of this honorable court, for the examina-
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tion of (as the case may be), pursuant to an order
made in this cause (or as the case may be), bearing
date the _— day of -———, in the year
First interrogatory, etc., etc.
.
it PRECEDENT OF A BILL AND ANSWER.
(From the Garsus Cancellarioe.)
A Bill to cause one to show his Writings, whereby he holds
his Lands, etc.
Humbly complaining, W. B. showeth, etc.: That,
whereas, about four years last past, one '1‘. L., of,.etc., upon
a certain judgment in a plea of debt, amounting to the
sum of, etc., or thereabouts, by him obtained in her Ma-
jesty’s court of common pleas, against one G. L., of M., in
the county of, etc., sued forth her Majesty’s writ of fieri
facias, directed to the sheriff of the said county, for the
levying of the said debt of the goods and chattles of the
said G. L. By virtue of which writ the said sheriff did,
amongst other things, take into his hands one lease for
divers years yet to come, made to the said G. L. by one T.
S., Esq., in the county of D., of three parcels of land, called
or known by the name or names of, etc., with all‘and
singular their appurtenances, lying and being in the par-
ishes of, etc., in the said county of, etc., together with all
and singular woods, underwoods and trees, growing or
being in or upon the premises, or any part thereof; to-
gether, also, with the reversion and reversions of the
premises aforesaid, and of every part and parcel thereof,
together with all manner of commons, ways, estovers,
profits, commodities, hereditaments, and appurtenances to
the same premises, belonging or appertaining. And after-
wards, that is to say, on the —— day of, etc., he, the said














































































































































tion of (as the case may be), pursuant to an order 
made in this cause (or as the case may be), bearing 
date the -- day of--, in the year 
First interrogatory, etc., etc. 
* PREUEDENT OF A BILL AND ANSWER~ 
(From the OurBUB Oancellarire.) 
A Bill to cause one to show his Writings, whe?,eby he holds 
h·is Lands, etc. 
Humbly complaining, W. B. showeth, etc.: That, 
whereas, about four years last past, one 'r. L., of,~tc., upon 
a certain judgment in a plea of debt, amounting to the 
sum of, etc., or th~reabouts, by him obtained in her Ma· 
jesty's court of common pleas, against one G. L., of M., in 
the county of, etc., sued forth her Majesty's writ of fieri 
facias, directed to the sheriff of the said county, for the 
levying of the said debt of the goods and chattles of the 
said G. L. :By virtue of which writ the said sheriff did, 
amongst other things, take into his hands one lease for 
divers years yet to come, made to the said G. L. by one T. 
S., Esq., in the county of D., of three parcels of land, called 
or known by the name or names of, etc., with all· and 
singular their appurtenances, lying and being in the par-
ishes of, etc., in the said county of, etc., together with all 
and singular woods, underwoods and trees, growing or 
being in or up.on the premises, or any part thereof; to-
gether, also, with the reversion and reversions of the 
premises aforesaid, and of every part and parcel thereof, 
together with all manner of commons, ways, estovers, 
profits, commodities, hereditaments, and appurtena.nces to 
the same premises, belonging or appe~taining. And after-
wards, that is to say, on the-- day of, etc., he, the said 
* Referred to in page 377. 
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sheriff, by his deed bearing date, etc., under his hand and
seal, did, in consideration of, etc., to him paid towards the
satisfaction of the debt and thejudgment aforesaid, bar-
gain, sell, assign and set over the said lease and term of
years yet to come, of all and singular the said premises,
unto one W. B., of London, Gent. Which said W. B., not
long after did, in consideration of, etc., by your orator to ,
him paid, bargain, sell, assign and set over unto your ora-
tor, all and singular the said premises, and every part
thereof; upon which bargain, sale, and assignment of the
said premises so made as aforesaid, your orator was in very
good hopes to have peaceably and quietly entered into
the said premises, and so to have held, occupied and en-
joyed the same accordingly. But now so it is, may it
please your Lordship, that one T. R., of, etc., pretending
to have a lease for divers years yet to come, of some part
of the said lands made unto him by the said G. L., long
time before any such sale or assignment made thereof to
your orator as aforesaid, hath and still doth keep your ora-
tor out of the possession of the said lands and premises;
upon which lease or demise he, the said '1‘. R., pretends a
certain yearly rent is reserved to the said G. L., his execu-
tors or assigns; which rent (if any be), your orator hath
vheard is, etc., by the year, and which your orator, by
reason of the lawful conveyance to him made as aforesaid,
ought, both in reason and good conscience, to have and
enjoy during such term as the said T. R. shall hold and
occupy the land aforesaid, by reason of the said lease
which he so pretendeth to have. But forasmuch as your
orator doth not certainly know whether the said '1‘. R. has
any such lease, or (if he hath any such lease) what date
the same beareth, nor what term the said T. hath herein
unexpired, nor what rent is thereby, reserved, nor what
covenants are therein contained; and also, forasmuch as














































































































































sheriff, by his deed bearing date, etc., under his hand and 
seal, did, in consideration of, etc., to him paid towards the 
satisfaction of the debt and the judgment aforesaid, bar-
gain, sell, assi.gn and set over the said lease and term of 
years yet to come, of all and singular the said premises, 
unto one W. B., of London, Gent. Which said W. B., not 
long after did, in consideration of, etc., by your orator to . 
him paid, bargain, sell, assign and set over unto your ora-
tor, all and singular the .ilaid prert1ises, and every part 
thereof; upon which bargain, sale, and assignment of the 
said.premises so made as aforesaid, your orator was in very 
good hopes to have peaceably and quietly entered into 
the said premises, and so to_ have held, occupied and en-
joyed the same accordingly. But now so it is, may it 
please your Lordship, that one T. R., of, etc., pretending 
to have a lease for divers years yet to come, of some part 
of the said lands made unto him by the said G. L., long 
time before any such sale or assignment made thereof to 
your orator as aforesa~d, hath and still doth keep your ora-
tor out of the possession of the said lands and pretnises; 
upon which lease or demise he, the said 1,. R., pretends a 
certain yearly rent is reserved to the said G. L., his execu-
tors or assigns; which rent (if any be), your orator hath 
·heard is, etc., by the year, and \vhich your orator, by 
reason of the lawful conveyance to him made as aforesaid, 
ought, both in reason and good conscience, to have and 
enjoy during such term as the said T. R. shall hold and 
occupy the land aforesaid, by reason of the said lease 
which he so pretendeth to have. But forasmuch as your 
orator doth not certainly know whether the said rr. R. has 
any such lease, or (if he hath any such lease) what date 
the same beareth, nor what term the said T. hath herein 
unexpired, nor what rent is thereby_ reserved, nor what 
covenants are therein contained; and also, foras1nuch as 
your orator cannot, by the strict rules of law, enter into 
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the premises, nor knoweth howin due form of law to com-
mence any action against the said T. R., either for the re-
covery of the said land or the rent aforesaid. And for
that the said T. R. doth not only use and occupy the said
lands and premises to his own profit and advantage, with-
out yielding or paying any rent therefor to your orator, or
to any other person lawfully claiming the same, but doth
also utterly refuse to show his said lease whereby he
claimeth to hold the said lands aforesaid, either to your
orator or any other person; and for that the said T., in
combination and confederacy with, etc.,( as the usual clause
of confederacy). All which actings and doings of the said
T., etc., are contrary to right,.equity and good conscience,
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury and oppression of
your orator. In tender consideration whereof, and foras-
much as your orator is remediless, etc. (as usual) ; and
for that your orator hath no ordinary way by the ordinary
course of the common law to enforce the said T. R. to pro-
duce or show to your orator such writings as he hath for
the holding and occupying the lands aforesaid, but is alto-
gether destitute of the means to have a sight of the same,
but by the aid and assistance of this honorable court. To
the end, therefore, that the said T. R. may be enforced
upon his oath to discover what right he hath to the prem-
ises, or any part thereof, and what rent or rents he hath
paid for the same, and to whom; and that he may also set
forth in his answer, upon oath, a true copy or true copies
of such lease or other writings in hoec verba, whereby he
claimeth the premises aforesaid, or any part thereof; and
that the said T. may truely and directly answer upon oath
all the matters and things hereinbefore contained, as fully
and perfectly as if the same had been here again repeated
and interrogated, and may particularly set forth upon oath
whether, etc. May it therefore please your Lordship to














































































































































the premises, nor knoweth how in due forrn of law to com-
mence any action against the said T. R., either for the re-
covery of the said land or the rent aforesaid. And for 
that the said T. R. doth not only use and occupy the said 
lands and premises to his own profit and advantage, with-
out yielding or paying any rent therefor to your orator, or 
to any other person lawful1y clain1ing the same, but doth 
also utterly refuse to 8how his said lease \Vhereby he 
claimeth to hold the said lands aforesaid, either to your 
orator or any other person; and for that the said T., in 
combination and confederacy with, etc.,( as the usual clause 
of confederacy). All which actings and doings of the said 
T., etc., are contrary to right, .equity ann good conscience, 
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury and oppression of 
your orator. In tender conRideration whereof, and foras-
much as your orator is remedilesA, etc. (as usual); and 
for that your orator hath no ordinary way by the ordinary 
course of the common law to enforce the said T. R. to pro-
duce or show to your orator such writings as he l)ath for 
the holding and occupying the lands aforesaid, but is alto-
gether destitute of the means to have a sight of the same, 
but by the aid and assistance of this honorable court. To 
the end, therefore, that the· said T. R. may he enforced 
upon his oath to discover what l'ight he hath to the prem-
ises, or any part thereof, and what rent or rents he hath 
paid for the satne, and to whom; and that he may also set 
forth in his ans\\"er, upon oath, a true copy or true copies 
of such lease or other writings i1~ hmo verba, whereby he 
claimeth the premises aforesaid, or any part thereof; and 
that the said T. may truely and directly answer upon oath 
all the matters and things hereinbefore contained, as fully 
and perfectly as if the same had been here again repeated 
and interrogated, and may particularly set forth upon oath 
whether, etc. May it therefore please your Lordship to 
grant, etc., process prayed, vers. T. R. 
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T /16 Answer of T. 15., Defendant, to the Bill of Com-
plaint of W. B., Gent, Complainant.
The said defendant now, and at all times hereafter,
saving, etc., saith, That the said G. L. named in the com-
plainant’s said bill, was possessed for divers years yet to
come of the said parcels of land in the said bill mentioned,
and called or known by the name of, etc., by virtue of a
lease thereof, made by the said T. S., Esq., in the said bill
also named, unto the said G. L. long before the supposed
extent specified in the said bill of complaint. And the
said G. L. so being thereof possessed long before the sup-
posed extent (if any such there were) had in such manner
as in the said bill of complaint is supposed, made a lawful
demise and lease of part of the said three parcels of land,
containing fourteen acres, or thereabouts, unto the said
defendant for divers years yet to come; upon which lease
the said G. L. reserved a yearly rent, to be paid during the
continuation of the said lease; by force of which lease the
defendant entered into the said fourteen acres, part of the
said three said parcels of land, and was, and yet is law-
fully possessed accordingly, and ever since hath, and yet
doth enjoy the same, by virtue of the said lease and de-
mise, and is thereby to have and enjoy the same during
the continuance of the said years, of which there are at
this time about sixty years to come and unexpired, and
saith, That the complainant is a person altogether un-
known to this defendant, being one he, this defendant,
never had any dealings or correspondence with, and there-
‘-fore this defendant cannot but Wonder at this suit, com-
menced by the said complainant against this defendant,
touching the premises. And this defendant saith, That
the said G. L., after the said lease and. demise so made to
the said defendant, of the said fourteen acres of land as
aforesaid, and before the said supposed extent, made a














































































































































The Anawer of T. R., Defent!ant, to tlte Bill of Com-
plaint of W. B., Gent, Complainant. 
The said defendant now, and at all times hereafter, 
saving, etc., saith, That .the said G. L. named in the com-
plainant's said bill, was possessed for divers years yet to 
come of the said parcels of land in the said bill mentioned, 
and called or known by the name of, etc., by virtue of a 
lease thereof, made by the said '11• S., Esq., in the said bill 
also nan1ed, unto the said G. L. long before the supposed 
e~tent specified in the said bill of complaint.. And the 
said G. L. so being thereof possessed long b~fore the sup-
posed extent (if any such there were) had in such manner· 
as in the said bill of complaint is supposed, made a lawful 
den1ise and lease of part of the said three parcels of land, 
containing fourteen acres, or thereabout~, unto the ~aid 
defendant for divers years yet to come; upon which lease 
the said G. L. reserved a yearly rent, to be paid during the 
continuation of the said lease; by force of which lease the 
defendant entered into the said fourteen acres, part of the 
said three said parcels of land, and was, and yet is law-
full.v possessed accordingly, and ever since hath, and yet 
doth enjoy the same, by virtue of the said lease and de-
mise, and is thereby to have and enjoy the same during 
the continuance of the said years, of which there are at 
this time about sixty years to con1e and unexpired, and 
saith, That the complainant is a person altogether un-
known to this defendant, being one he, this defendant, 
never had any dealings or correspondence with, and there-
. fore this defendant cannot but wonder at this suit, com-
menced by the said complainant against this defendant, 
touching the premises. And this defendant saith, That 
the said G. L., after the said lease and. demise so made to 
the said defendant, of the said fourteen acres of ]and as 
aforesaid, and before the said supposed extent., made a 
grant and assignment of the interest and tertn of the said 
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G. L., as well of the fourteen acres, which the said de~
fendant hath and occupieth by virtue of the said lease,for
divers years thereof yet to come and undetermined; as
also of the residue of the said three parcels of land men-
tioned in the said bill of complaint, unto H. L., son of the
said G. L., unto which grant and assignment the said de-
fendant was privy. And therefore this defendant humbly
conceives, and is advised, That he, this defendant, is, for
the payment of his rent, chargeable, and ought by the law
to pay, the same rent so reserved, unto the said H. L., and
not to the said complainant, which said R., this defendant,
doth verily think is the lawful landlord during the said
term for years yet to come, and not the said complainant,
who is altogether a stranger to this defendant, and saith,
That the said complainant never at any time heretofore
demanded any rent for the said part of the land that this
defendant hath, and occupieth, by virtue of the said lease
, for years; And also saith, that he is sued by the said W.
B. in the said bill of complaint named, in her Majesty’s
Court of Queen’s Bench, in an action of debt brought by
him against the said defendant; and therefore the said de-
fendant is somewhat surprised at this suit brought against
him by the said complainant, touching the premises,
whereby this defendant is wrongfully vexed, and sued
without any just cause; without that, that there is any
such extent made of the said three parcels of land, called,
etc.; or that after the same extent there was any such bar-
gain and sale made by the sheriff of the said term and
lease for years to the said W. B. as in the said bill set
forth, or that the said W. B. bargained or sold the prem-
ises to the complainant, or that the said complainant
ought to have and enjoy the said premises to the knowl-
edge of this defendant. And without that there is any














































































































































G. L., as well of the fourteen acrPs, which the said de-
fendant hath and occupieth by virtue of the said lease, for 
divers years thereof yet to come and undetermined; as 
also of the residue of the said three parcels of land men-
tioned in the said bill of complaint, unto H. L., son of the 
said G. L., unto which grant and assignment the said de-
fendant was privy. And therefore this defendant humbly 
conceives, and is ad vised, That he, this defendant, is, for 
the payment of his rent, chargeable, and ought by the law 
to pay, the same rent so reserved, unto the said H. L., and 
not to the said complainant, which said R., this defendant, • 
·doth verily think is the lawful landlord during the said 
term for years yet to come, and not the said complainant, 
who is altogether a stranger to this defendant, and saith, 
That the said complainant never at any time heretofore 
demanded any rent for the said part of the land that this 
defendant hath, and occupieth, by virtue of the said lease 
for years ; And also saith, that he is sued by the said W. 
B. in the said bill of cotnplaint named, in her Majesty'e: 
Oourt of Queen's Bench, in an action of debt brought by 
him against the said defendant_; and therefore the said de-
fendant is sotnewhat surprised at this snit brought against 
him by the said complainant, touching the premises, 
whereby this defendant is wrongfully vexed, and sued 
without any just cause; without that, that there is any 
such extent made of the said three parcels of land, called, 
·etc.; or that after the same extent there was any such bar-
gain and sale made by the sheriff of the said term and 
lease for years to the said W. B. as in the said bill set 
forth, or that the said W. B. bargained or sold the prem.; 
ises to the complainant, or that the said complainant 
ought to have and enjoy the said premises to the know}. 
edge of this defendant. .Lt\.nd without that there is any 
other matter, cause,.etc., (as before.) 
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